Quote from Report Of The
On National Security/21st Century:
FINAL DRAFT REPORT
EMBARGOED UNTIL
Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change
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"Thus, in Phase III, it recommends a new
National
Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly
two dozen disparate departments and agencies that have a role in
Securing the National Homeland
The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation
with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative
invulnerability of the
We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent
National Homeland Security Agency
(NHSA) with responsibility for planning,
coordinating, and integrating various
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(320 Pages, 1212 footnotes)
(1) The Phase III Report Of The
On National Security/21st Century
http://www.rense.com/general10/roadmap.htm
Part 1
http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf
Data Compiled By 'mebs'
FINAL DRAFT REPORT
EMBARGOED UNTIL JAN. 31, 2001
Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change
The Phase III Report of the
National Security/21st Century
The
DRAFT FINAL REPORT
January 31, 2001
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century*1
Gary Hart
Co-Chair
Warren B.Rudman
Co-Chair
Anne Armstrong Norman
Commissioner
R. Augustine
Commissioner
John Dancy
Commissioner
John R. Galvin
Commissioner
Leslie H. Gelb
Commissioner
Newt Gingrich
Commissioner
Lee H. Hamilton
Commissioner
Donald B. Rice
Commissioner
James Schlesinger
Commissioner
Harry D. Train
Commissioner
Andrew Young
Commissioner
Contents
Foreword, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman
Preface, Charles G. Boyd
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction: Imperative for
A. The Strategic Framework
B. Organizational Realignment.
C. Executive-Legislative Cooperation
II. Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and
Education
A. Investing in Innovation
B. Education as a National Security Imperative
III. Institutional Redesign
A. Strategic Planning and Budgeting
B. The National Security Council
C. Department of State
D. Department of Defense
E. Space Policy
F. The Intelligence Community
IV. The Human Requirements for National Security
A. A National Campaign for Service to the Nation
B. The Presidential Appointments Process.
C. The Foreign Service
D. The Civil Service
E. Military Personnel
V. The Role of Congress
A Final Word
Appendix 1: The Recommendations
Appendix 2: The USCNS/21 Charter
Appendix 3: Commissioner Biographies and Staff Listing
Foreword
American power and
influence have been decisive factors for democracy and security throughout the
last half-century. However, after more than two years of serious effort, this
Commission has concluded that without significant reforms, American power and
influence cannot be sustained. To be of long-term benefit to us and to others,
that power and influence must be disciplined by strategy, defined as the
systematic determination of the proper relationship of ends to means in support
of American principles, interests, and national purpose.
This Commission was established to redefine national
security in this age and to do so in a more comprehensive fashion than any
other similar effort since 1947. We have carried out our duties in an
independent and totally bipartisan spirit. This report is a blueprint for
reorganizing the U.S. national security structure in order to focus that
structure's attention on the most important new and serious problems before the
nation, and to produce organizational competence capable of addressing those
problems creatively.
The key to our vision is the need for a culture of
coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security
institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent
threat. Without creative strategic planning in this new environment, we will
default in time of crisis to a reactive posture. Such a posture is inadequate
to the challenges and opportunities before us.
We have concluded that, despite the end of the Cold War
threat, America faces distinctly new dangers, particularly to the homeland and
to our scientific and educational base. These dangers must be addressed
forthwith.
We call upon the new President, the new administration,
the new Congress, and the country at large to consider and debate our recommendations
in the pragmatic spirit that has characterized America and its people in each
new age.
Gary Hart Warren Co-Chair
B. Rudman Co-Chair
Preface
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century was
born more than two years ago out of a conviction that the entire range of U.S.
national security policies and processes required reexamination in light of new
circumstances. Those circumstances encompass not only the changed geopolitical
reality after the Cold War, but also the significant technological, social, and
intellectual changes that are occurring.
Prominent among such changes is the information
revolution and the accelerating discontinuities in a range of scientific and
technological areas. Another is the increased integration of global finance and
commerce, commonly called "globalization." Yet another is the
ascendance of democratic governance and free-market economics to unprecedented
levels, and another still the increasing importance of both multinational and
non-governmental actors in global affairs. The routines of professional life,
too, in business, university, and other domains in advanced countries have been
affected by the combination of new technologies and new management techniques.
The internal cultures of organizations have been changing, usually in ways that
make them more efficient and effective.
The creators of this Commission believed that unless the
U.S. government adapts itself to these changes-and to dramatic changes still to
come-it will fall out of step with the world of the 21st century. Nowhere will
the risks of doing so be more manifest than in the realm of national security.
Mindful of the likely scale of change ahead, this
Commission's sponsors urged it to be bold and comprehensive in its undertaking.
That meant thinking out a quarter century, not just to the next election or to
the next federal budget cycle. That meant searching out how government should
work, undeterred by the institutional inertia that today determines how it does
work. Not least, it meant conceiving national security not as narrowly defined,
but as it ought to be defined-to include economics, technology, and education
for a new age in which novel opportunities and challenges coexist uncertainly
with familiar ones.
The fourteen Commissioners involved in this undertaking,
one that engaged their energies for over two years, have worked hard and they
have worked well.*2 Best of all, despite diverse experiences and views, they
have transcended partisanship to work together in recognition of the
seriousness of the task: nothing less than to assure the well-being of this
Republic a quarter century hence.
This Commission has conducted its work in three phases.
Phase I was dedicated to understanding how the world will likely evolve over
the next 25 years. From that basis in prospective reality, Phase II devised a
U.S. national security strategy to deal with that world. Phase III aims to
reform government structures and processes to enable the U.S. government to
implement that strategy, or, indeed, any strategy that would depart from the
embedded routines of the last half-century.
Phase I concluded in September 1999 with the publication
of New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century.*3 Phase II produced
the April 2000 publication, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom. Phase III, presented in these pages,
is entitled Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. This report
summarizes enough of the Commission's Phase I and Phase II work to establish an
intellectual basis for understanding this Phase III report, but it does not
repeat the texts of prior phases in detail. For those seeking fuller background
to this report, the Commission's earlier works should be consulted directly.*4
In Road Map for National Security, the Commission has
endeavored to complete the logic of its three phases of work, moving from
analysis to strategy to the redesign of the structures and processes of the
U.S. national security system. For example, in Phase I the Commission stressed
that mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland was of serious
and growing concern. It therefore proposed in Phase II a strategy that
prioritizes deterring, defending against, and responding effectively to such
dangers. Thus, in Phase III, it recommends a new National Homeland Security
Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate
departments and agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today.
That said, not every Phase I finding and not every Phase
II proposal has generated a major Phase III recommendation. Not every aspect of
U.S. national security organization needs an overhaul. Moreover, some
challenges are best met, and some opportunities are best achieved, by crafting
better policies, not by devising new organizational structures or processes.
Where appropriate, this report notes those occasions and is not reluctant to
suggest new policy directions.
Many of the recommendations made herein require legislation
to come into being. Many others, however, require only Presidential order or
departmental directive. These latter recommendations are not necessarily of
lesser importance and can be implemented quickly.
The Commission anticipates that some of its recommendations
will win wide support. Other recommendations may generate controversy and even
opposition, as is to be expected when dealing with such serious and complex
issues. We trust that the ensuing debate will ultimately yield the very best
use of this Commission's work for the benefit of the American people.
Organizational reform is not a panacea. There is no
perfect organizational design, no flawless managerial fix. The reason is that
organizations are made up of people, and people invariably devise informal
means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of personality
and temperament. Even excellent organizational structure cannot make impetuous
or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make
good leaders less effective.
Sound organization is important. It can ensure that
problems reach their proper level of decision quickly and efficiently and can
balance the conflicting imperatives inherent in any national security
decision-system-between senior involvement and expert input, between speed and
the need to consider a variety of views, between tactical flexibility and
strategic consistency. President Eisenhower summarized it best:
"Organization cannot make a genius out of a dunce. But it can provide its
head with the facts he needs, and help him avoid misinformed mistakes."
Most important, good organization helps assure
accountability. At every level of organization, elected officials-and
particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief-must be
able to ascertain quickly and surely who is in charge.
But in a government that has expanded through serial incremental adjustment
rather than according to an overall plan, finding those responsible to make
things go right, or those responsible when things go wrong, can be a very
formidable task. This, we may be sure, is not what the Founders had in mind.
This Commission has done its best to step up to the
mandate of its Charter. It is now up to others to do their best to bring the
benefits of this Commission's effort into the institutions of American
government.
Charles G. Boyd, General, USAF (Ret.) Executive Director
Executive Summary
After our examination of the new strategic environment of
the next quarter century (Phase I) and of a strategy to address it (Phase II),
this Commission concludes that significant changes must be made in the
structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus. Our
institutional base is in decline and must be rebuilt. Otherwise, the United
States risks losing its global influence and critical leadership role.
We offer recommendations for organizational change in
five key areas:
1 ensuring the security of the American homeland;
2 recapitalizing America's strengths in science and
education;
3 redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;
4 overhauling the U.S. government personnel system; and
5 reorganizing Congress's role in national security
affairs.
We have taken a broad view of national security. In the
new era, sharp distinctions between "foreign" and
"domestic" no longer apply. We do not equate national security with
"defense." We do believe in the centrality of strategy, and of
seizing opportunities as well as confronting dangers. If the structures and
processes of the U.S. government stand still amid a world of change, the United
States will lose its capacity to shape history, and will instead be shaped by
it.
Securing the
National Homeland
The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation
with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative
invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack
against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter
century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization
that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our
nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.
We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent
National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning,
coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in
homeland security. NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border
security-the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol-
transferred to it. NHSA would not only protect American lives, but also assume
responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical
infrastructure, including information technology.
The NHSA Director would have Cabinet status and would be
a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The legal foundation for
the National Homeland Security Agency would rest firmly within the array of
Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties. The observance of these
guarantees in the event of a national security emergency would be safeguarded
by NHSA's interagency coordinating activities-which would include the
Department of Justice-as well as by its conduct of advance exercises.
The potentially catastrophic nature of homeland attacks
necessitates our being prepared to use the tremendous resources of the
Department of Defense (DoD). Therefore, the department needs to pay far more
attention to this mission in the future. We recommend that a new office of
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security be created to oversee the various DoD
activities and ensure that the necessary resources are made available.
New priorities also need to be set for the U.S. armed
forces in light of the threat to the homeland. We urge, in particular, that the
National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S.
Constitution itself ordains. The National Guard should be reorganized, trained,
and equipped to undertake that mission.
Finally, we recommend that Congress reorganize itself to
accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it also form a special
select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and
oversight in this critical area.
Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and
Education
Americans are living off the economic and security
benefits of the last three generations' investment in science and education,
but we are now consuming capital. Our systems of basic scientific research and
education are in serious crisis, while other countries are redoubling their
efforts. In the next quarter century, we will likely see ourselves surpassed,
and in relative decline, unless we make a conscious national commitment to
maintain our edge.
We also face unprecedented opportunity. The world is
entering an era of dramatic progress in bioscience and materials science as
well as information technology and scientific instrumentation. Brought together
and accelerated by nanoscience, these rapidly developing research fields will
transform our understanding of the world and our capacity to manipulate it. The
United States can remain the world's technological leader if it makes the
commitment to do so. But the U.S. government has seriously underfunded basic scientific
research in recent years. The quality of the U.S. education system, too, has
fallen well behind those of scores of other nations. This has occurred at a
time when vastly more Americans will have to understand and work competently
with science and math on a daily basis.
In this Commission's view, the inadequacies of our
systems of research and education pose a greater threat to U.S. national
security over the next quarter century than any potential conventional war that
we might imagine. American national leadership must understand these
deficiencies as threats to national security. If we do not invest heavily and
wisely in rebuilding these two core strengths, America will be incapable of
maintaining its global position long into the 21st century.
We therefore recommend doubling the federal research and
development budget by 2010, and instituting a more competitive environment for
the allotment of those funds.
We recommend further that the role of the President's
Science Advisor be elevated to oversee these and other critical tasks, such as
the resuscitation of the national laboratory system and the institution of
better inventory stewardship over the nation's science and technology assets.
We also recommend a new National Security Science and Technology
Education Act to fund a comprehensive program to produce the needed numbers of
science and engineering professionals as well as qualified teachers in science
and math. This Act should provide loan forgiveness incentives to attract those
who have graduated and scholarships for those still in school and should
provide these incentives in exchange for a period of K-12 teaching in science
and math, or of military or government service. Additional measures should
provide resources to modernize laboratories in science education, and expand
existing programs aimed at economically-depressed school districts.
Institutional
Redesign
The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the
Cold War of the last half- century have not been accompanied by any major
institutional changes in the Executive Branch of the U.S. government. Serious
deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy.
Most troublesome is the lack of an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S.
national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and
priorities are rarely set. Budgets are prepared and appropriated as they were
during the Cold War.
The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled
institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and
thereby weakened further. Only if the State Department's internal weaknesses
are cured will it become an effective leader in the making and implementation
of the nation's foreign policy. Only then can it credibly seek significant
funding increases from Congress. The department suffers in particular from an
ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies
do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability,
and leadership are lacking.
For this and other reasons, the power to determine
national security policy has steadily migrated toward the National Security
Council (NSC) staff. The staff now assumes policymaking roles that many
observers have warned against. Yet the NSC staff's role as policy coordinator
is more urgently needed than ever, given the imperative of integrating the many
diverse strands of policymaking.
Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence community is adjusting
only slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era. While the
economic and political components of statecraft have assumed greater
prominence, military imperatives still largely drive the analysis and
collection of intelligence. Neither has America's overseas presence been
properly adapted to the new economic, social, political, and security realities
of the 21st century.
Finally, the Department of Defense needs to be
overhauled. The growth in staff and staff activities has created mounting
confusion and delay. The failure to outsource or privatize many defense support
activities wastes huge sums of money. The programming and budgeting process is
not guided by effective strategic planning. The weapons acquisition process is
so hobbled by excessive laws, regulations, and oversight strictures that it can
neither recognize nor seize opportunities for major innovation, and its
procurement bureaucracy weakens a defense industry that is already in a state
of financial crisis.
In light of such serious and interwoven deficiencies, the
Commission's initial recommendation is that strategy should once again drive
the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies. That means
that the President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning
process and that process should be linked to the allocation of resources
throughout the government. When submitting his budgets for the various national
security departments, the President should also present an overall national
security budget, focused on the nation's most critical strategic goals.
Homeland security, counter- terrorism, and science and technology should be
included.
We recommend further that the President's National
Security Advisor and NSC staff return to their traditional role of coordinating
national security activities and resist the temptation to become policymakers
or operators. The NSC Advisor should also keep a low public profile.
Legislative, press communications, and speech-writing functions should reside
in the White House staff, not separately in the NSC staff as they do today. The
higher the profile of the National Security Advisor the greater will be the
pressures from Congress to compel testimony and force Senate confirmation of
the position.
To reflect how central economics has become in U.S.
national security policy, we recommend that the Secretary of Treasury be named
a statutory member of the National Security Council. Responsibility for
international economic policy should return to the National Security Council.
The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its
domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council.
Critical to the future success of U.S. national security
policies is a fundamental restructuring of the State Department. Reform must
ensure that responsibility and accountability are clearly established, regional
and functional activities are closely integrated, foreign assistance programs
are centrally planned and implemented, and strategic planning is emphasized and
linked to the allocation of resources.
We recommend that this be accomplished through the
creation of five Under Secretaries with responsibility for overseeing the
regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter- America, and Near East/South Asia, and
a redefinition of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global
Affairs. The restructuring we propose would position the State Department to
play a leadership role in the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy,
as well as to harness the department's organizational culture to the benefit of
the U.S. government as a whole. Perhaps most important, the Secretary of State
would be free to focus on the most important policies and negotiations, having
delegated responsibility for integrating regional and functional issues to the
Under Secretaries.
Accountability would be matched with responsibility in
senior policymakers, who in serving the Secretary would be able to speak for
the State Department both within the interagency process and before Congress.
No longer would competing regional and functional perspectives immobilize the
department. At the same time, functional perspectives, whether they be human
rights, arms control, or the environment, will not disappear. The Under
Secretaries would be clearly accountable to the Secretary of State, the
President, and the Congress for ensuring that the appropriate priority was
given to these concerns. Someone would actually be in charge.
We further recommend that the activities of the U.S.
Agency for International Development be fully integrated into this new State
Department organization. Development aid is not an end in itself, nor can it be
successful if pursued independently of other U.S. programs and diplomatic
activities. Only a coordinated diplomatic and assistance effort will advance
the nation's goals abroad, whether they be economic growth, democracy, or human
rights.
The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to
strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the
allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning,
Assistance, and Budget Office. Rather than multiple Congressional
appropriations, the State Department should also be funded in a single
integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign
assistance programs and activities as well as the expenses for all related
personnel and operations. Also, all U.S. Ambassadors, including the Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, should report directly to the Secretary
of State, and a major effort needs to be undertaken to "right-size"
the U.S. overseas presence.
The Commission believes that the resulting improvements
in the effectiveness and competency of the State Department and its overseas
activities would provide the basis for the significant increase in resources
necessary to carry out the nation's foreign policy in the 21st century.
As for the Department of Defense, resource issues are
also very much at stake in reform efforts. The key to success will be direct,
sustained involvement and commitment to defense reform on the part of the
President, Secretary of Defense, and Congressional leadership. We urge first
and foremost that the new Secretary of Defense reduce by ten to fifteen percent
the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
military services, and the regional commands. This would not only save money
but also achieve the decision speed and encourage the decentralization
necessary to succeed in the 21st century.
Just as critical, the Secretary of Defense should
establish a ten-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20-25 percent
through steps to consolidate, restructure, outsource, and privatize as many DoD
support agencies and activities as possible. Only through savings in
infrastructure costs, which now take up nearly half of DoD's budget, will the
department find the funds necessary for modernization and for combat personnel
in the long-term.
The processes by which the Defense Department develops
its programs and budgets as well as acquires its weapons also need fundamental
reform. The most critical first step is for the Secretary of Defense to produce
defense policy and planning guidance that defines specific goals and
establishes relative priorities.
Together with the Congress, the Secretary of Defense
should move the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the second year of a
Presidential term. The current requirement, that it be done in an
administration's first year, spites the purpose of the activity. Such a
deadline does not allow the time or the means for an incoming administration to
influence the QDR outcome, and therefore for it to gain a stake in its
conclusions.
We recommend a second change in the QDR, as well; namely
that the Secretary of Defense introduce a new process that requires the Services
and defense agencies to compete for the allocation of some resources within the
overall Defense budget. This, we believe, would give the Secretary a vehicle to
identify low priority programs and begin the process of reallocating funds to
more promising areas during subsequent budget cycles.
As for acquisition reform, the Commission is deeply
concerned with the downward spiral that has emerged in recent decades in
relations between the Pentagon as customer and the defense industrial base as
supplier of the nation's major weapons systems. Many innovative high-tech firms
are simply unable or unwilling to work with the Defense Department under the
weight of its auditing, contracting, profitability, investment, and inspection
regulations. These regulations also impair the Defense Department's ability to
function with the speed it needs to keep abreast of today's rapid pace of
technological innovation. Weapons development cycles average nine years in an
environment where technology now changes every twelve to eighteen months in
Silicon Valley-and the gap between private sector and defense industry
innovation continues to widen.
In place of a specialized "defense industrial
base," we believe that the nation needs a national industrial base for
defense composed of a broad cross-section of commercial firms as well as the
more traditional defense firms. "New economy" sectors must be
attracted to work with the government on sound business and professional
grounds; the more traditional defense suppliers, which fill important needs
unavailable in the commercial sector, must be given incentives to innovate and
operate efficiently. We therefore recommend these major steps:
1 Establish and employ a two-track acquisition system,
one for major acquisitions and a "fast track" for a modest number of
potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and
control. 2 Return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of
selected weapons and support systems to foster innovation. We should use testing
procedures to gain knowledge and not to demonstrate a program's ability to
survive budgetary scrutiny. 3 Implement two-year defense budgeting solely for
the modernization element (R&D/procurement)of the Defense budget and expand
the use of multi-year procurement. 4 Modernize auditing and oversight
requirements (by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title 10, and the
Federal Acquisition Regulations) with a goal of reducing the number of auditors
and inspectors in the acquisition system to a level commensurate with the
budget they oversee. Amidst the other process reforms for the Defense
Department, the Commission recognizes the need to modernize current force
planning methods. We conclude that the concept of two major, coincident wars is
a remote possibility supported neither by the main thrust of national
intelligence nor by this Commission's view of the likely future. It should be
replaced by a planning process that accelerates the transformation of
capabilities and forces better suited to, and thus likely to succeed in, the
current security environment. The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to
shift from the threat-based, force sizing process to one which measures
requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence
estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security
objectives as defined in the new administration's national security
strategy-once formulated. The Commission furthermore recommends that the
Secretary of Defense revise the current categories of Major Force Programs
(MFPs) used in the Defense Program Review to correspond to the five military
capabilities the Commission prescribed in its Phase II report- strategic
nuclear forces, homeland security forces, conventional forces, expeditionary
forces, and humanitarian and constabulary forces.
Ultimately, the transformation process will blur the
distinction between expeditionary and conventional forces, as both types of
capabilities will eventually possess the technological superiority,
deployability, survivability, and lethality now called for in the expeditionary
forces. For the near term, however, those we call expeditionary capabilities
require the most emphasis. Consequently, we recommend that the Defense
Department devote its highest priority to improving and further developing its
expeditionary capabilities. There is no more critical dimension of defense
policy than to guarantee U.S. commercial and military access to outer space.
The U.S. economy and military are vitally dependent on communications that rely
on space. The clear imperative for the new era is a comprehensive national
policy toward space and a coherent governmental machinery to carry it out. We
therefore recommend the establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Space
(IWGS).
The members of this interagency working group would
include not only the relevant parts of the intelligence community and the State
and Defense Departments, but also the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the Department of Commerce, and other Executive Branch agencies as
necessary.
Meanwhile, the global presence and responsibilities of
the United States have brought new requirements for protecting U.S. space and communications
infrastructures, but no comprehensive national space architecture has been
developed. We recommend that such responsibility be given to the new
interagency space working group and that the existing National Security Space
Architect be transferred from the Defense Department to the NSC staff to take
the lead in this effort.
The Commission has concluded that the basic structure of
the intelligence community does not require change. Our focus is on those steps
that will enable the full implementation of recommendations found elsewhere
within this report.
First in this regard, we recommend that the President
order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security
Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Second, the intelligence community should emphasize the
recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the
intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that existing
operational guidelines support this policy.
Third, the community should place new emphasis on
collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns,
and incorporate more open source intelligence into its analytical products. To
facilitate this effort, Congress should increase significantly the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and analysis.
The Human
Requirements for National Security
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The
declining orientation toward government service as a prestigious career is
deeply troubling. Both civilian and military institutions face growing
challenges, albeit of different forms and degrees, in recruiting and retaining
America's most promising talent. This problem derives from multiple
sources-ample private sector opportunities with good pay and fewer bureaucratic
frustrations, rigid governmental personnel procedures, the absence of a single
overarching threat like the Cold War to entice service, cynicism about the
worthiness of government service, and perceptions of government as a plodding
bureaucracy falling behind in a technological age of speed and accuracy.
These factors are adversely affecting recruitment and
retention in the Civil and Foreign Services and particularly throughout the
military, where deficiencies are both widening the gap between those who serve
and the rest of American society and putting in jeopardy the leadership and
professionalism necessary for an effective military. If we allow the human
resources of government to continue to decay, none of the reforms proposed by
this or any other national security commission will produce their intended
results.
We recommend, first of all, a national campaign to
reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the nation. The key step in
such a campaign must be to revive a positive attitude toward public service.
This will require strong and consistent Presidential commitment, Congressional
legislation, and innovative departmental actions throughout the federal
government. It is the duty of all political leaders to repair the damage that
has been done, in a high-profile and fully bipartisan manner.
From these changes in rhetoric, the campaign must
undertake several actions. First, this Commission recommends the most urgent
possible streamlining of the process by which we attract senior government
officials. The ordeal that Presidential nominees are subjected to is now so
great as to make it prohibitive for many individuals of talent and experience
to accept public service. The confirmation process is characterized by vast
amounts of paperwork and many delays. Conflict of interest and financial
disclosure requirements have become a prohibitive obstacle to the recruitment of
honest men and women to public service. Post-employment restrictions confront
potential new recruits with the prospect of having to forsake not only income
but work itself in the very fields in which they have demonstrated talent and
found success. Meanwhile, a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism about
government service is reinforced by the encrustation of complex rules based on
the assumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or
contact with the private sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked.
We therefore recommend the following: 1 That the
President act to shorten and make more efficient the Presidential appointee
process by confirming the national security team first, standardizing paperwork
requirements, and reducing the number of nominees subject to full FBI
background checks. 2 That the President reduce the number of Senate-confirmed
and non-career SES positions by 25 percent to reduce the layering of senior
positions in departments that has developed over time. 3 That the President and
Congressional leaders instruct their top aides to report within 90 days of
January 20, 2001 on specific steps to revise government ethics laws and
regulations. This should entail a comprehensive review of regulations that might
exceed statutory requirements and making blind trusts, discretionary waivers,
and recusals more easily available as alternatives to complete divestiture of
financial and business holdings of concern. Beyond the appointments process,
there are problems with government personnel systems specific to the Foreign
Service, the Civil Service, and to the military services. But for all three,
there is one step we urge: Expand the National Security Education Act of 1991
(NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign
languages in exchange for civilian government and military service.
This expanded Act is the complement to the National
Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) and would provide
college scholarship and loan forgiveness benefits for government service.
Recipients could fulfill this service in a variety of ways: in the active duty
military; in National Guard or Reserve units; in national security departments
of the Civil Service; or in the Foreign Service. The expanded NSEA thus would
provide an important means of recruiting high-quality people into military and
civilian government service.
An effective and motivated Foreign Service is critical to
the success of the Commission's restructuring proposal for the State
Department, yet 25 percent fewer people are now taking the entrance exam
compared to the mid-1980s. Those who do enter complain of poor management and
inadequate professional education. We therefore recommend that the Foreign
Service system be improved by making leadership a core value of the State
Department, revamping the examination process, and dramatically improving the
level of on-going professional education.
The Civil Service faces a range of problems from the
aging of the federal workforce to institutional challenges in bringing new
workers into government service to critical gaps in recruiting and retaining
information technology professionals. To address these problems, the Commission
recommends eliminating recruitment hurdles, making the hiring process faster
and easier, and designing professional education and retention programs worthy
of full funding by Congress. Retaining talented information technology workers,
too, will require greater incentives and the outsourcing of some IT support
functions.
The national security component of the Civil Service
calls for professionals with breadth of experience in the inter-agency process
and with depth of knowledge about policy issues. To develop these, we recommend
the establishment of a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to broaden the
experience base of senior departmental managers and develop leaders who seek
integrative solutions to national security policy problems. Participating
departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy,
and the new National Homeland Security Agency-the departments essential to
interagency policymaking on key national security issues. While participating
departments would retain control over their personnel, an interagency advisory
group would design and monitor the rotational assignments and professional
education that will be key to the Corps' success.
With respect to military personnel, reform is needed in
the recruitment, promotion, compensation and retirement systems. Otherwise, the
military will continue to lose its most talented personnel, and the armed
services will be left with a cadre unable to handle the technological and
managerial tasks necessary for a world-class 21st century force.
Beyond the significant expansion of scholarships and debt
relief programs recommended in both the modified National Security Education
Act and the newly created National Security Science and Technology Education
Act, we recommend substantial enhancements to the Montgomery GI Bill and strengthening
recently passed and pending legislation that supports benefits-including
transition, medical, and homeownership-for qualified veterans. The GI Bill
should be restored as a pure entitlement, be transferable to dependents if
desired by career service members, and should equal, at the very least, the
median tuition cost of four-year U.S. colleges. The payments should be
accelerated to coincide with school term periods and be indexed to keep pace
with college cost increases. In addition, Title 38 authority for veterans
benefits should be modified to restore and substantially improve medical,
dental, and VA home ownership benefits for all who qualify, but especially for
career and retired service members. Taken as a package, such changes will help
bring the best people into the armed service and persuade quality personnel to
serve longer in order to secure greater rewards for their service.
While these enhancements are critical they will not, by
themselves, resolve the quality recruitment and retention problems of the
Services. We therefore recommend significant modifications to military
personnel legislation governing officer and enlisted career management,
retirement, and compensation-giving Service Secretaries more authority and
flexibility to adapt their personnel systems and career management to meet 21st
century requirements. This should include flexible compensation and retirement
plans, exemption from "up-or-out" mandates, and reform of personnel
systems to facilitate fluid movement of personnel. If we do not decentralize
and modernize the governing personnel legislation, no military reform or
transformation is possible. We call for an Executive-Legislative working group
to monitor, evaluate and share information about the testing and implementation
of these recommendations. With bipartisan cooperation, our military will remain
one of this nation's most treasured institutions and our safeguard in the
changing world ahead.
The Role of
Congress
While Congress has mandated many changes to a host of Executive
departments and agencies over the years, it has not fundamentally reviewed its
own role in national security policy. Moreover, it has not reformed its own
structure since 1949. At present, for example, every major defense program must
be voted upon no fewer than eighteen times each year by an array of committees
and subcommittees. This represents a very poor use of time for busy members of
the Executive and Legislative Branches.
To address these deficiencies, the Commission first
recommends that the Congressional leadership conduct a thorough bicameral,
bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch's relationship to national security
and foreign policy. The House Speaker, Majority, and Minority leaders and the
Senate Majority and Minority leaders must work with the President and his top
aides to bring proposed reforms to this Congress by the beginning of its second
session.
From that basis, Congressional and Executive Branch
leaders must build programs to encourage members to acquire knowledge and experience
in national security. These programs should include ongoing education, greater
opportunities for serious overseas travel, more legislature-to-legislature
exchanges, and greater participation in wargames.
Greater fluency in national security matters must be
matched by structural reforms. A comprehensive review of the Congressional
committee structure is needed to ensure that it reflects the complexity of 21st
century security challenges and of U.S. national security priorities.
Specifically we recommend merging appropriations subcommittees with their
respective authorizing committees so that the new merged committees will
authorize and appropriate within the same bill. This should decrease the
bureaucracy of the budget process and allow more time to be devoted to the
oversight of national security policy.
An effective Congressional role in national security also
requires ongoing Executive- Legislative consultation and coordination. The
Executive Branch must ensure a sustained effort in consultation and devote
resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher
priority, in part by forming a permanent consultative group composed of the
Congressional leadership and the Chairpersons and Ranking Members of the main
committees involved in national security. This will form the basis for
sustained dialogue and greater support in times of crisis.
The Commission notes, in conclusion, that some of its
recommendations will save money, while others call for more expenditure. We
have not tried to "balance the books" among our recommendations, nor
have we held financial implications foremost in mind during our work. We
consider any money that may be saved a second-order benefit. We consider the
provision of additional resources to national security, where necessary, to be
investments, not costs, in first-order national priorities.
Finally, we strongly urge the new President and the
Congressional leadership to establish some mechanism to oversee the
implementation of the recommendations proffered here. Once some mechanism is
chosen, the President must ensure that responsibility for implementing the
recommendations of this Commission be given explicitly to senior personnel in
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. The press of daily
obligations is such that unless such delegation is made, and those given
responsibility for implementation are held accountable for their tasks, the
necessary reforms will not occur. The stakes are high. We of this Commission
believe that many thousands of American lives, U.S. leadership among the
community of nations, and the fate of U.S. national security itself are at risk
unless the President and the Congress join together to implement the
recommendations set forth in this report.
Introduction:
Imperative for Change
The U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century
was chartered to be the most comprehensive examination of the structures and
processes of the U.S. national security apparatus since the core legislation
governing it was passed in 1947. The Commission's Charter enjoins the
Commissioners to "propose measures to adapt existing national security
structures" to new circumstances, and if necessary, "to create new
structures where none exist." The Commission is also charged with providing
"cost and time estimates to complete these improvements," as
appropriate, for what is to be, in sum, "an institutional road map for the
early part of the 21st century."*5
Our Phase III report provides such a road map. But Phase
III rests on the first two phases of the Commission's work: Phase I's
examination of how the world may evolve over the next quarter century, and
Phase II's strategy to deal effectively with that world on behalf of American
interests and values.
In its Phase I effort, this Commission stressed that
global trends in scientific- technological, economic, socio-political, and
military-security domains-as they mutually interact over the next 25 years-will
produce fundamental qualitative changes in the U.S. national security environment.
We arrived at these fourteen conclusions:
* The United States will become increasingly vulnerable
to hostile attack on the America homeland, and U.S. military superiority will
not entirely protect us.
* Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will
create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security.
* New technologies will divide the world as well as draw
it together.
* The national security of all advanced states will be
increasingly affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic
infrastructure.
* Energy supplies will continue to have major strategic
significance.
* All borders will be more porous; some will bend and
some will break.
* The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but
will endure as the main principle of international political organization.
* The fragmentation and failure of some states will
occur, with destabilizing effects on entire regions.
* Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the
deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations.
* Space will become a critical and competitive military
environment.
* The essence of war will not change.
* U.S. intelligence will face more challenging
adversaries, and even excellent intelligence will not prevent all surprises.
* The United States will be called upon frequently to
intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances, and with the prospect of
fewer forward-deployed forces.
* The emerging security environment in the next quarter
century will require different U.S. military and other national capabilities.
The Commission's stress on communicating the scale and pace of change has been
borne out by extraordinary developments in science and technology in just the
eighteen-month period since the Phase I report appeared. The mapping of the
human genome was completed. A functioning quantum computing device was
invented. Organic and inorganic material was mated at the molecular level for
the first time. Basic mechanisms of the aging process have been understood at
the genetic level. Any one of these developments would have qualified as a
"breakthrough of the decade" a quarter century ago, but they all
happened within the past year and a half.
This suggests the possible advent of a period of change
the scale of which will often astound us. The key factor driving change in
America's national security environment over the next 25 years will be the
acceleration of scientific discovery and its technological applications, and
the uneven human social and psychological capacity to harness them. Synergistic
developments in information technology, materials science, biotechnology, and
nanotechnology will almost certainly transform human tools more dramatically
and rapidly than at any time in human history.
While it is easy to underestimate the social implications
of change on such a scale, the need for human intellectual and social
adaptation imposes limits to the pace of change. These limits are healthy, for
they allow and encourage the application of the human moral sense to choices of
major import. We will surely have our hands full with such choices over the
next quarter century. In that time we may witness the development of a capacity
to guide or control evolution by manipulating human DNA. The ability to join
organic and inorganic material forms suggests, that humans may co-evolve
literally with their own machines. Such prospects are both sobering and
contentious. Some look to the future with great hope for the prospect of curing
disease, repairing broken bodies, ending poverty, and preserving the biosphere.
But others worry that curiosity and vanity will outrun the human moral sense,
thus turning hope into disaster. The truth is that we do not know where the
rapidly expanding domain of scientific-technological innovation will bring us.
Nor do we know the extent to which we can summon the collective moral fortitude
to control its outcome.
What we do know is that some societies, and some people
within societies, will be at the forefront of future scientific- technological
developments and others will be marginal to them. This means more polarization
between those with wealth and power and those without-both among and within
societies. It suggests, as well, that many engrained social patterns will
become unstable, for scientific-technological innovation has profound, if
generally unintended, effects on economic organization, social values, and
political life.
In the %Internet age, for example, information
technologies may be used to empower communities and advance freedoms, but they
can also empower political movements led by charismatic leaders with irrational
premises. Such men and women in the 21st century will be less bound than those
of the 20th by the limits of the state, and less obliged to gain large
industrial capabilities in order to wreck havoc. For example, a few people with
as little as $50,000 investment may manage to produce and spread a
genetically-altered pathogen with the potential to kill millions of people in a
matter of months. Clearly, the threshold for small groups or even individuals
to inflict massive damage on those they take to be their enemies is falling
dramatically.
As for political life, it is clear that the rapidity of
change is already overwhelming many states in what used to be called the Third
World. Overlaid on the enduring plagues of corruption and sheer bad government
is a new pattern: information technology has widened the awareness of democracy
and market-driven prosperity, and has led to increasing symbolic and material
demands on government. These demands often exceed existing organizational
capacities to meet them. One result is that many national armies do not respond
to government control. Another is that mercenaries, criminals, terrorists, and
drug cartel operators roam widely and freely. Meanwhile, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) along with global financial institutions sometimes
function as proxy service and regulatory bureaucracies to do for states that
which they cannot do for themselves-further diminishing governmental control
and political accountability.
As a result of the growing porosity of borders, and of
the widening scope of functional economic integration, significant political
developments can no longer be managed solely through the vehicle of bilateral
diplomatic relations. A seemingly internal crisis in Sierra Leone, carefully
observed, implicates most of West Africa. A problem involving drug cultivation
and political rebellion in Colombia cannot be addressed without involving
Panama, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. Financial
problems in Thailand tumble willy-nilly onto Russia, Brazil, Japan, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the United States.
Demography is another major driver of global political
change. Population growth tends to moderate with increased literacy,
urbanization, and especially changes in traditional values that attend the
movement of women into the workplace. Thanks to these trends, the world's rate
of population increase is slowing somewhat, but the absolute increases over the
next quarter century will be enormous and coping with them will be a major
challenge throughout much of the world. In some countries, however, the problem
will be too few births. In Japan and Germany, for example, social security and
private pension systems may face enormous strain because too few young workers
will be available to support retirees living ever-longer lives. The use of
foreign workers may be the only recourse for such societies, but that raises
other political and social difficulties.
Yet another driver of change may be sustained economic
growth in particular parts of the world. Asia may well be the most economically
dynamic region on earth by 2025. Much depends on China's ability to reform
further the structure of its economy and on India's ability to unleash its vast
economic potential. But if these two very large countries achieve sustained
economic growth-and if the economies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam also grow-the focus of world
power will shift away from the dominant Western centers of the past five
centuries. While America is itself increasingly diverse, it still shares more
philosophically and historically with Europe than with Asia. The challenge for
the United States, then, may rest not only in a geostrategic shift, but in a
shift in the cultural fabric of international politics itself.
In Phase II the Commission moved from describing
objective conditions to prescribing a strategy for dealing with them. Subtitled
A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, the Commission
stressed that America cannot secure and advance its own interests in isolation.
The nations of the world must work together-and the United States must learn to
work with others in new ways-if the more cooperative order emerging from the
Cold War epoch is to be sustained and strengthened.
Nonetheless, this Commission takes as its premise that
America must play a special international role well into the future. By dint of
its power and its wealth, its interests and its values, %the United States has
a responsibility to itself and to others to reinforce international order. Only
the United States can provide the ballast of global stability, and usually the
United States is the only country in a position to organize collective
responses to common challenges.
We believe that American strategy must compose a balance
between two key aims. The first is to %reap the benefits of a more integrated
world in order to expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and
for others. But second, American strategy must also strive to %dampen the
forces of global instability so that those benefits can endure and spread.
On the positive side, this means that the United States
should pursue, within the limits of what is prudent and realistic, the
worldwide expansion of material abundance and the %eradication of poverty. It
should also promote political pluralism, freedom of thought and speech, and
individual liberty. Not only do such aims inhere in American principles, they
are practical goals, as well. There are no guarantees against violence and evil
in the world. We believe, nonetheless, that the expansion of human rights and
basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against them. %On the
negative side, these goals require concerted protection against four related
dangers: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international
terrorism; major interstate aggression; and the collapse of states into
internal violence, with the associated regional destabilization that often
accompanies it.
% THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO PREVENT REBELLION?
These goals
compose the lodestone of a U.S. strategy to expand freedom and maintain
underlying stability, but, as we have said, the United States cannot achieve
them by itself. American leadership must be prepared to act unilaterally if
necessary, not least because the will to act alone is sometimes required to
gain the cooperation of others. But U.S. policy should join its efforts with
allies and multilateral institutions wherever possible; the United States is
wise to strengthen its partners and in turn will derive strength from them.
The United States, therefore, as the %prime keeper of the
international security commons, must speak and act in ways that lead others, by
dint of their own interests, to ally with American goals. If it is too arrogant
and self-possessed, American behavior will invariably stimulate the rise of
opposing coalitions. The United States will thereby drive away many of its
partners and weaken those that remain. Tone matters.
To carry out this strategy and achieve these goals, the
Commission defined six key objectives for U.S. foreign and national security
policy: First, the preeminent objective is "to defend the United States
and ensure that it is safe from the dangers of a new era." The combination
of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international
terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to
catastrophic attack. To deter attack against the homeland in the 21st century,
the United States requires a new triad of prevention, protection, and response.
Failure to prevent mass-casualty attacks against the American homeland would
jeopardize not only American lives but U.S. foreign policy writ large. It would
undermine support for U.S. international leadership and for many of our
personal freedoms, as well. Indeed, the abrupt undermining of U.S. power and
prestige is the worst thing that could happen to the structure of global peace
in the next quarter century, and nothing is more likely to produce it than
devastating attacks on American soil.
Achieving this goal, and the nation's other critical
national security goals, also requires the U.S. government, as a second key
objective, to "maintain America's social cohesion, economic
competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength." That
means a larger investment in and better management of science and technology in
government and in society, and a substantially better educational system,
particularly for the teaching of science and mathematics.
The United States must also take better advantage of the
opportunities that the present period of relative international stability and
American power enable. A third key objective, therefore, is "to assist the
integration of key major powers, especially China, Russia, and India, into the
mainstream of the emerging international system." Moreover, since
globalization's opportunities are rooted in economic and political progress,
the Commission's fourth key U.S. objective is "to promote, with others,
the dynamism of the %new global economy and improve the effectiveness of
international institutions and international law."
A fifth key objective also follows, which is "to
adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era in which
America's partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility." A sixth and
final key objective inheres in an effort "to help the international
community %tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change."
While the prospect of major war is low, much of the planet will experience
conflict and violence. Unless the United States, in concert with others, can
find a way to limit that conflict and violence, it will not be able to
construct a foreign policy agenda focussed on opportunities.
Achieving all of these objectives will require a basic
shift in orientation: to focus on preventing rather than simply responding to
dangers and crises. The United States must redirect its energies, adjust its
diplomacy, and redesign its military capabilities to ward off cross-border
aggression, assist states before they fail, and avert systemic international
financial crises. To succeed over the long run with a preventive focus, the
United States needs to institutionalize its efforts to grasp the opportunities
the international environment now offers.
An %opportunity-based strategy also has the merit of
being more economical than a reactive one. Preventing a financial crisis, even
if it involves well-timed bailouts, is cheaper than recuperating from stock
market crashes and regional recessions. Preventing a violent conflict costs
less than responsive peacekeeping operations and nation-building activities.
And certainly, preventing mass-casualty attacks on the American homeland will
be far less expensive than recovering from them.
These six objectives, and the Commission's strategy
itself, rest on a premise so basic that it often goes unstated: democracy
conduces generally to domestic and international peace, and peace conduces to,
or at least allows, democratic politics. While this premise is not a
"law," and while scholars continue to study and debate these matters,
we believe they are strong tendencies, and that they can be strengthened
further by a consistent and determined national policy. We know, that a world
characterized by the spread of genuine democracy would not be flawless, nor
signal "the end of history." But it is the best of all possible
worlds that we can conceive, and that we can achieve.
In Phase I, this %Commission presented four "Worlds
in Prospect," agglomerations of basic trends that, we believed, might
describe the world in 2025. The Democratic Peace was one. Nationalism and
Protectionism was a second, Division and Mayhem a third, and Globalism Triumphant
the fourth. We, and presumably most observers, see the Democratic Peace as a
positive future, Nationalism and Protectionism as a step in the wrong
direction, Division and Mayhem as full-fledged tragedy. But the Globalism
Triumphant scenario divides opinion, partly because it is the hardest to
envision, and partly because it functions as a %template for the projection of
conflicting political views.
%%%Some observers, for example, believe that the end of
the nation-state is upon us, and that this is a good thing, for, in this view,
nationalism is the root of racism and militarism. The eclipse of the national
territorial state is at any rate, some argue, an inevitable development given
the very nature of an increasingly integrated world.
We demur. To the extent that a more integrated world
economically is the best way to raise people out of poverty and disease, we
applaud it. We also recognize the need for unprecedented international
cooperation on a range of transnational problems. But the state is the only
venue discovered so far in which democratic principles and processes can play
out reliably, and not all forms of nationalism have been or need be illiberal.
We therefore affirm the value of American sovereignty as well as the political
and cultural diversity ensured by the present state system. Within that system
the United States must live by and be ready to share its political values-but
it must remember that those values include tolerance for those who hold
different views.
A broader and deeper Democratic Peace is, and ought to
be, America's aspiration, but there are obstacles to achieving it. Indeed,
despite the likely progress ahead on many fronts, the United States may face
not only episodic problems but also genuine crises. If the United States
mismanages its current global position, it could generate resentments and
jealousies that leave us more isolated than isolationist. Major wars involving
weapons of mass destruction are possible, and the general security environment
may deteriorate faster than the United States, even with allied aid, can
redress it. Environmental, economic, and political unraveling in much of the
world could occur on a scale so large as to make current levels of prosperity
unsustainable, let alone expandable. Certain technologies-biotechnology, for
example-may also undermine social and political stability among and within
advanced countries, including the United States. Indeed, all these crises may
occur, and each could reinforce and deepen the others.
The challenge for the United States is to seize the new
century's many opportunities and avoid its many dangers. %The problem is that
the current structures and processes of U.S. national security policymaking are
incapable of such management. That is because, just below the enormous power
and prestige of the United States today is a neglected and, in some cases, a
decaying institutional base.
The U.S. government is not well organized, for example,
to ensure %homeland security. No adequate coordination mechanism exists among
federal, state, and local government efforts, as well as those of dozens of
agencies at the federal level. If present trends continue in ***elementary and
secondary school science and mathematics education, to take another example,
the United States may lose its lead in many, if not most, major areas of
critical scientific-technological competence within 25 years. We are also
losing, and are finding ourselves unable to replace, the most critical asset we
have: talented and dedicated personnel throughout government.
Strategic planning is absent in the U.S. government and
its budget processes are so inflexible that few resources are available for
preventive policies or for responding to crises, nor can resources be
reallocated efficiently to reflect changes in policy priorities. The economic
component of U.S. national security policy is poorly integrated with the
military and diplomatic components. The State Department is demoralized and
dysfunctional. The Defense Department appears incapable of generating a
strategic posture very different from that of the Cold War, and its weapons
acquisition process is slow, inefficient, and burdened by excess regulation.
National policy in the increasingly critical environment of space is adrift,
and the intelligence community is only slowly reorienting itself to a world of
more diffuse and differently shaped threats. The Executive Branch, with the aid
of the Congress, needs to initiate change in many areas by taking bold new
steps, and by speeding up positive change where it is languishing.
The very mention of changing the engrained routines and
structures of government is usually enough to evoke cynicism even in a born
optimist. But the American case is surprisingly positive, especially in
relatively recent times. The reorganizations occasioned by World War II were
vast and innovative, and the 1947 National Security Act was bold in advancing
and institutionalizing them. Major revisions of the 1947 Act were passed
subsequently by Congress in 1949, 1953, and 1958. Major internal Defense
Department reforms were promulgated as well, one in 1961 and another, the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols) in 1986. The
essence of the American genius is that we know better than most societies how
to reinvent ourselves to meet the times. This Commission, we believe, is true
to that estimable tradition.
Despite this relatively good record, resistance will
arise to changing U.S. national security structures and processes, both within
agencies of government and in the Congress. What is needed, therefore, is for
the new administration, together with the new Congress, to exert real
leadership. Our comprehensive recommendations to guide that leadership follow.
First, we must prepare ourselves better to defend the
national homeland. We take this up in Section I, Securing the National
Homeland. We put this first because it addresses the most dangerous and the
most novel threat to American national security in the years ahead.
Second, we must rebuild our strengths in the generation
and management of science and technology and in education. We have made
Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education the second section
of this report despite the fact that science management and education issues
are rarely ranked as paramount national security priorities. We do so to
emphasize their crucial and growing importance.
Third, we must ensure coherence and effectiveness in the
institutions of the Executive Branch of government. Section III, Institutional
Redesign, proposes change throughout the national security apparatus.
Fourth, we must ensure the highest caliber human capital
in public service. U.S. national security depends on the quality of the people,
both civilian and military, serving within the ranks of government. If we are
unsuccessful in meeting the crisis of competence before us, none of the other
reforms proposed in this report will succeed. Section IV, The Human
Requirements for National Security, examines government personnel issues in
detail.
---%Fifth, the Congress is part of the problem before us,
and therefore must become part of the solution. Not only must the Congress
support the Executive Branch reforms promulgated here, but it must bring its
own organization in line with the 21st century. Section V, The Role of
Congress, examines this critical facet of government reform.
Each section of this report carries an introduction
explaining why the subject is important, identifies the major problems
requiring solution, and then states this Commission's recommendations. All
major recommendations are in bold-face type. <not in ASCII FORMAT
*instead>
*6 Related but subordinate recommendations are italicized
and in bold-face type in the text.
As appropriate throughout the report, we outline what Congressional,
Presidential, and Executive department actions would be required to implement
the Commission's recommendations. Also as appropriate, we provide general
guidance as to the budgetary implications of our recommendations but, lest
details of such consideration confuse and complicate the text, will provide
suggested implementation plans for selected areas in a separately issued
addendum. A last word urges the President to devise an implementing mechanism
for the recommendations put forth here. Finally, we observe that some of our
recommendations will save money, while others call for more expenditure. We
have not tried to "balance the books" among our recommendations, nor
have we held financial implications foremost in mind during our work. Wherever
money may be saved, we consider it a second-order benefit. Provision of
additional resources to national security, where necessary, are investments,
not costs, and a first-order national priority.
I. Securing the
National Homeland
One of this Commission's most important conclusions in
its Phase I report was that attacks against American citizens on American soil,
possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century.
*7 This is because both the technical means for such
attacks, and the array of actors who might use such means, are proliferating
despite the best efforts of American diplomacy.
These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and
weapons of mass disruption. As porous as U.S. physical borders are in an age of
burgeoning trade and travel, %its "cyber borders" are even more
porous-and the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U.S. economy
depends can now be targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's
present global predominance does not render it immune from these dangers. To
the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the American homeland more appealing as a
target, while America's openness and freedoms make it more vulnerable. xxx
Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of the threat to the
homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction and disruption, the U.S.
government has not adopted homeland security as a primary national security
mission. Its structures and strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The
President must therefore both develop a comprehensive strategy and propose new
organizational structures to prevent and protect against attacks on the
homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection should
fail.
Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the
scenarios we envision and the enormity of their consequences. We need
orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning, coordination, and exercise. The
government must also be prepared to use effectively-albeit with all proper
safeguards-the extensive resources of the Department of Defense. This will
necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and particularly, in our
view, for the National Guard.
The United States, however, is very poorly organized to
design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland. The
assets and organizations that now exist for homeland security are scattered
across more than two dozen departments and agencies, and all fifty states. The
Executive Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to realign,
refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent whole, or even the best
strategy will lack an adequate vehicle for implementation.
This Commission believes that the security of the
American homeland from the threats of the new century should be the primary
national security mission of the U.S. government. While the Executive Branch
must take the lead in dealing with the many policy and structural issues
involved, Congress is a partner of critical importance in this effort. It must find
ways to address homeland security issues that bridge current gaps in
organization, oversight, and authority, and that resolve conflicting claims to
jurisdiction within both the Senate and the House of Representatives and also
between them.
Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that
homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that protects the civil
liberties and privacy of American citizens. We are confident that the U.S.
government can enhance national security without compromising established
Constitutional principles. But in order to guarantee this, we must plan ahead.
In a major attack involving contagious biological agents, for example, citizen
cooperation with government authorities will depend on public confidence that
those authorities can manage the emergency. If that confidence is lacking,
panic and disorder could lead to insistent demands for the temporary suspension
of some civil liberties. That is why preparing for the worst is essential to
protecting individual freedoms during a national crisis. Legislative guidance
for planning among federal agencies and state and local authorities must take
particular cognizance of the role of the Defense Department. Its subordination
to civil authority needs to be clearly defined in advance. In short, advances
in technology have created new dimensions to our nation's economic and physical
security. While some new threats can be met with traditional responses, others
cannot. More needs to be done in three areas to prevent the territory and
infrastructure of the United States from becoming easy and tempting targets: in
strategy, in organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative
cooperation. We take these areas in turn.
A. THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of
intimidation and loss of life is an essential support for an international
leadership role for the United States. Homeland security is not peripheral to
U.S. national security strategy but central to it. At this point, national leaders
have not agreed on a clear strategy for homeland security, a condition this
Commission finds dangerous and intolerable. We therefore recommend the
following:
* 1: The President should develop a comprehensive
strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms
of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and
protection fail.
In our view, the President should:
* Give new priority in his overall national security
strategy to homeland security, and make it a central concern for incoming
officials in all Executive Branch departments, particularly the intelligence
and law enforcement communities;
* Calmly prepare the American people for prospective
threats, and increase their awareness of what federal and state governments are
doing to prevent attacks and to protect them if prevention fails;
* Put in place new government organizations and
processes, eliminating where possible staff duplication and mission overlap;
and
* Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to
facilitate closer cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of
government on this vital issue.
We believe that homeland security can best be assured
through a strategy of layered defense that focuses first on prevention, second
on protection, and third on response.
Prevention: Preventing a potential attack comes first.
Since the occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic loss of life
would represent an unacceptable failure of policy, U.S. strategy should
therefore act as far forward as possible to prevent attacks on the homeland.
This strategy has at its disposal three essential instruments.
Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy.
U.S. foreign policy should strive to shape an international system in which
just grievances can be addressed without violence. Diplomatic efforts to
develop friendly and trusting relations with foreign governments and their
people can significantly multiply America's chances of gaining early warning of
potential attack and of doing something about impending threats.
Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is crucial to help identify
individuals and groups who might be considering attacks on the United States or
its allies. Cooperative foreign law enforcement agencies can detain, arrest,
and prosecute terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic success in resolving
overseas conflicts that spawn terrorist activities will help in the long run.
Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation
must remain a top priority. These policies can help persuade states and
terrorists to abjure weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the export of
fissile materials and dangerous dual-use technologies. But such measures cannot
by themselves prevent proliferation. So other measures are needed, including
the possibility of punitive measures and defenses. The United States should
take a lead role in strengthening multilateral organizations such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
In addition, increased vigilance against international
crime syndicates is also important because many terrorist organizations gain
resources and other assets through criminal activity that they then use to
mount terrorist operations. Dealing with international organized crime requires
not only better cooperation with other countries, but also among agencies of
the federal government. While progress has been made on this front in recent
years, more remains to be done.*8 The second instrument of homeland security
consists of the U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas.
Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or cyber attack is the
key to stopping a strike before it can be delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence,
and military agencies overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working
abroad, are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. But increased
public-private efforts to enhance security processes within the international
transportation and logistics networks that bring people and goods to America
are also of critical and growing importance.
Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are
a third instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who are not detected
and stopped overseas from actually entering the United States. Agencies such as
the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard have a critical prevention role
to play. Terrorists and criminals are finding that the difficulty of policing
the rising daily volume and velocities of people and goods that cross U.S.
borders makes it easier for them to smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move
their operatives into and out of the United States. Improving the capacity of
border control agencies to identify and intercept potential threats without
creating barriers to efficient trade and travel requires a sub-strategy also
with three elements.
First is the development of new transportation security
procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk that importers, exporters,
freight forwarders, and transportation carriers will serve as unwitting
conduits for criminal or terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the
intelligence gathering, data management, and information sharing capabilities
of border control agencies to improve their ability to target high-risk goods
and people for inspection. Third is strengthening the capabilities of border
control agencies to arrest terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments before
they arrive on U.S. soil.
These three measures, which place a premium on
public-private partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order. They will
allow for the more efficient allocation of limited enforcement resources along
U.S. borders. There will be fewer disruptive inspections at ports of entry for
legitimate businesses and travelers. They will lead to reduced theft and
insurance costs, as well. Most important, the underlying philosophy of this
approach is one that balances prudence, on the one hand, with American values
of openness and free trade on the other. *9 To shield America from the world
out of fear of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for
them. To continue business as usual, however, is irresponsible.
The same may be said for our growing cyber problems.
Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure depends on greater public
awareness and improvements in our tools to detect and diagnose intrusions. This
will require better information sharing among all federal, state, and local
governments as well as with private sector owners and operators. The federal
government has these specific tasks:
* To serve as a model for the private sector by improving
its own security practices;
* To address known government security problems on a
system-wide basis
* To identify and map network interdependencies so that
harmful cascading effects among systems can be prevented;
* To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the
federal government and the private sector; and
* To design and carry out simulations and exercises that
test information system security across the nation's entire infrastructure.
Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires
that the United States maintain long-range strike capabilities. The United
States must bolster deterrence by making clear its determination to use
military force in a preemptive fashion if necessary. Even the most hostile
state sponsors of terrorism, or terrorists themselves, will think twice about
harming Americans and American allies and interests if they fear direct and
severe U.S. attack after-or before-the fact. Such capabilities should be
available for preemption as well as for retaliation, and will therefore
strengthen deterrence.
Protection: The Defense Department undertakes many
different activities that serve to protect the American homeland, and these
should be integrated into an overall surveillance system, buttressed with
additional resources. A ballistic missile defense system would be a useful
addition and should be developed to the extent technically feasible, fiscally
prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses should also be pursued against
cruise missiles and other sophisticated atmospheric weapon technologies as they
become more widely deployed. While both active duty and reserve forces are
involved in these activities, the Commission believes that more can and should
be done by the National Guard, as is discussed in more detail below. Protecting
the nation's critical infrastructure and providing cyber-security must also
include:
* Advanced indication, warning, and attack assessments;
* A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate
private-sector reporting of potential attacks to enable other private-sector
targets (and the U.S. government) better to take protective action; and
* Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing
backups, and restoring service.
Response: Managing the consequences of a catastrophic
attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult process. The first
priority should be to build up and augment state and local response
capabilities. Adequate equipment must be available to first responders in local
communities. Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and disseminated and
then practiced through simulations and exercises. Interoperable, robust, and
redundant communications capabilities are a must in recovering from any
disaster. Continuity of government and critical services must be ensured as
well. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and manmade disasters will
also help to build mutual confidence and relationships among those with roles
in dealing with a major terrorist attack.
All of this puts a premium on making sure that the
disparate organizations involved with homeland security-on various levels of
government and in the private sector-can work together effectively. We are
frankly skeptical that the U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond
effectively to the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the
next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our second task: that of
organizational realignment.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL
REALIGNMENT
Responsibility for homeland security resides at all
levels of the U.S. government- local, state, and federal. Within the federal
government, almost every agency and department is involved in some aspect of
homeland security. None have been organized to focus on the scale of the
contemporary threat to the homeland, however. This Commission urges an
organizational realignment that:
* Designates a single person, accountable to the
President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S.
government activities related to homeland security;
* Consolidates certain homeland security activities to
improve their effectiveness and coherence;
* Establishes planning mechanisms so as clearly to define
specific responses to specific types of threats; and
* Ensures that the appropriate resources and capabilities
are available. Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the following:
* 2: The President should propose, and Congress should
agree, to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility
for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities
involved in homeland security. They should use the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) as a key building block in this effort.
Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities
involved in these homeland security tasks, someone needs to be responsible and
accountable to the President not only to coordinate the making of policy, but
also to oversee its implementation. This argues against assigning the role to a
senior person on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and for the creation
of a separate agency. This agency would give priority to overall planning while
relying primarily on others to carry out those plans. To give this agency
sufficient stature within the government, its director would be a member of the
Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The position
would require Senate confirmation.
Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National
Security Council would still play a strategic role in planning and coordinating
all homeland security activities. This would include those of NHSA as well as
those that remain separate, whether they involve other NSC members or other
agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of
Health and Human Services.
We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency
upon the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an
existing federal agency that has performed well in recent years, especially in
responding to natural disasters. NHSA would be legislatively chartered to
provide a focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency planning
scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA's ten existing regional offices
as a core element of its organizational structure.
While FEMA is the
necessary core of the National Homeland Security Agency, it is not sufficient
to do what NHSA needs to do. In particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and
policing the flows of peoples and goods through the hundreds of ports of entry,
must receive higher priority. These activities need to be better integrated,
but efforts toward that end are hindered by the fact that the three
organizations on the front line of border security are spread across three
different U.S. Cabinet departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary
of Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the Department of the
Treasury, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service oversees the Border
Patrol in the Department of Justice. In each case, the border defense agency is
far from the mainstream of its parent department's agenda and consequently
receives limited attention from the department's senior officials. We therefore
recommend the following:
3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer
of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National
Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities.
Bringing these
organizations together under one agency will create important synergies. Their
individual capabilities will be molded into a stronger and more effective
system, and this realignment will help ensure that sufficient resources are
devoted to tasks crucial to both public safety and U.S. trade and economic
interests. Consolidating overhead, training programs, and maintenance of the
aircraft, boats, and helicopters that these three agencies employ will save
money, and further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other resources
such as information technology, communications equipment, and dedicated
sensors. Bringing these separate, but complementary, activities together will
also facilitate more effective Executive and Legislative oversight, and help
rationalize the process of budget preparation, analysis, and presentation.
Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three
individual organizations themselves. The Customs Service, the Border Patrol,
and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of being overwhelmed by the mismatch between
their growing duties and their mostly static resources.
The Customs Service, for example, is charged with
preventing contraband from entering the United States. It is also responsible
for preventing terrorists from using the commercial or private transportation
venues of international trade for smuggling explosives or weapons of mass
destruction into or out of the United States. The Customs Service, however,
retains only a modest air, land, and marine interdiction force, and its
investigative component, supported by its own intelligence branch, is similarly
modest. The high volume of conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the
United States each year already overwhelms the Customs Service's capabilities.
Over $8.8 billion worth of goods, over 1.3 million people, over 340,000
vehicles, and over 58,000 shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of
this volume, Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound
shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in terms of dollars
and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it may well double again between
now and 2005.
Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved
computer information capability and tracking system-as well as upgraded
equipment that can detect both conventional and nuclear explosives, and
chemical and biological agents-would be a wise short-term investment with
important long-term benefits. It would also raise the risk for criminals
seeking to target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for illicit gains.*10
The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and prevention of
illegal entry into the United States. It works primarily between ports of entry
and patrols the borders by various means. There has been a debate for many
years about whether the dual functions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service-border control and enforcement on the one side, and immigration
facilitation on the other-should be joined under the same roof. The U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that they should not be joined.*11
We agree: the Border Patrol should become part of the
NHSA. The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with multiple missions
and a natural role to play in homeland security. It performs maritime search
and rescue missions, manages vessel traffic, enforces U.S. environmental and
fishery laws, and interdicts and searches vessels suspected of carrying illegal
aliens, drugs, and other contraband. In a time of war, it also works with the
Navy to protect U.S. ports from attack.
Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model
homeland security agency given its unique blend of law enforcement, regulatory,
and military authorities that allow it to operate within, across, and beyond
U.S. borders. It accomplishes its many missions by routinely working with
numerous local, regional, national, and international agencies, and by forging
and maintaining constructive relationships with a diverse group of private,
non-governmental, and public marine-related organizations. As the fifth armed
service, in peace and war, it has national defense missions that include port
security, overseeing the defense of coastal waters, and supporting and
integrating its forces with those of the Navy and the other services.
The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's
multi-mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role in protecting
national interests close to home has not been adequately appreciated, and this
has resulted in serious and growing readiness concerns. U.S. Coast Guard ships
and aircraft are aging and technologically obsolete; indeed, the Coast Guard
cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval fleets. As a
result, the Coast Guard fleet generates excessive operating and maintenance
costs, and lacks essential capabilities in speed, sensors, and
interoperability. To fulfill all of its missions, the Coast Guard requires
updated platforms with the staying power, in hazardous weather, to remain offshore
and fully operational throughout U.S. maritime economic zones.*12
The Commission recommends strongly that Congress
recapitalize the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard so
that they can confidently perform key homeland security roles.
HSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities
would be undertaken Nthrough three staff Directorates. The Directorate of
Prevention would oversee and coordinate the various border security activities.
A Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would be created to
handle the growing cyber threat. FEMA's emergency preparedness and response
activities would be strengthened in a third directorate to cover both natural
and manmade disasters. A Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA
Director on research and development efforts and priorities for all three
directorates. Relatively small permanent staffs would man the directorates.
NHSA will employ FEMA's principle of working effectively with state and local
governments, as well as with other federal organizations, stressing interagency
coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take place directly supporting
state officials in its regional offices around the country. Its organizational
infrastructure will not be heavily centered in the Washington, DC area. NHSA
would also house a National Crisis Action Center (NCAC), which would become the
nation's focal point for monitoring emergencies and for coordinating federal
support in a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the private
sector. We envision the center to be an interagency operation, directed by a
two-star National Guard general, with full-time representation from the other
federal agencies involved in homeland security (See Figure 1).
J
J
Figure 1: National Homeland Security Agency NHSA will
require a particularly close working relationship with the Department of
Defense. It will need also to create and maintain strong mechanisms for the
sharing of information and intelligence with U.S. domestic and international
intelligence entities. We suggest that NHSA have liaison officers in the
counter-terrorism centers of both the FBI and the CIA. Additionally, the
sharing of information with business and industry on threats to critical
infrastructures will require further expansion.
HSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the
protection of the nation's Ncritical infrastructure. Considerable progress has
been made in implementing the recommendations of the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision Directive
63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the United States has real and
growing problems in this area.
U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more
concentrated critical infrastructures has increased dramatically over the past
decade. Electrical utilities, water and sewage systems, transportation
networks, and communications and energy systems now depend on computers to
provide safe, efficient, and reliable service. The banking and finance sector,
too, keeps track of millions of transactions through increasingly robust
computer capabilities.
The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are
privately owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with little or no
provision for manual back-ups in an emergency.
Moreover, the computerized information networks that link
systems together are themselves vulnerable to unwanted intrusion and
disruption. An attack on any one of several highly interdependent networks can
cause collateral damage to other networks and the systems they connect. Some
forms of disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but other
forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the dependence of hospitals,
air-traffic control systems, and the food processing industry on computer
controls to appreciate the point.
The bulk of unclassified military communications, too,
relies on systems almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector. Yet
little has been done to assure the security and reliability of those
communications in crisis. Current efforts to prevent attacks, protect against
their most damaging effects, and prepare for prompt response are uneven at
best, and this is dangerous because a determined adversary is most likely to
employ a weapon of mass destruction during a homeland security or foreign
policy crisis.
As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure
Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland Security Agency.
This directorate would have two vital responsibilities. First would be to
oversee the physical assets and information networks that make up the U.S.
critical infrastructure. It should ensure the maintenance of a nucleus of cyber
security expertise within the government, as well. There is now an alarming
shortage of government cyber security experts due in large part to the
financial attraction of private-sector employment that the government cannot
match under present personnel procedures.*13 The director's second
responsibility, would be as the Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and
Security Office (CITASO). This office would coordinate efforts to address the
nation's vulnerability to electronic or physical attacks on critical
infrastructure.
Several critical activities that are currently spread
among various government agencies should be brought together for this purpose.
These include:
* Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which
are government-sponsored committees of private-sector participants who work to
share information, plans, and procedures for information security in their
fields;
* The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO),
currently housed in the Commerce Department, which develops outreach and
awareness programs with the private sector;
* The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC),
currently housed in the FBI, which gathers information and provides warnings of
cyber attacks; and
* The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection
(I3P), which is designed to coordinate and support research and development
projects on cyber security.
In partnership with the private sector where most cyber
assets are developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure Protection
Directorate would be responsible for enhancing information sharing on cyber and
physical security, tracking vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk
management policies, and delineating the roles of various government agencies
in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks. To do this, the
government needs to institutionalize better its private-sector liaison across
the board-with the owners and operators of critical infrastructures, hardware
and software developers, server/service providers, manufacturers/producers, and
applied technology developers.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work
with the private sector must include a strong advocacy of greater government
and corporate investment in information assurance and security. The CITASO
would be the focal point for coordinating with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in helping to establish cyber policy, standards, and
enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer Council (CIO Council), the
CITASO needs to speak for those interests in government councils.*14 The CITASO
must also provide incentives for private-sector participation in Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information on threats, vulnerabilities,
and individual incidents, to identify interdependencies, and to map the
potential cascading effects of outages in various sectors.
The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber
security issues internationally. At present, the FCC handles international
cyber issues for the U.S. government through the International
Telecommunications Union. As this is one of many related international issues,
it would be unwise to remove this responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless,
the CIP Directorate should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in
international bodies. The mission of the NHSA must include some specific
planning and operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response.
These include:
* Setting training and equipment standards, providing
resource grants, and encouraging intelligence and information sharing among
state emergency management officials, local first responders, the Defense
Department, and the FBI;
* Integrating the various activities of the Defense
Department, the National Guard, and other federal agencies into the Federal
Response Plan; and
* Pulling together private sector activities, including
those of the medical community, on recovery, consequence management, and
planning for continuity of services.
Working with state officials, the emergency management
community, and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's third
directorate will be to rationalize and refine the nation's incident response
system. The current distinction between crisis management and consequence
management is neither sustainable nor wise. The duplicative command
arrangements that have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion
and delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single response system for national
incidents, in close coordination with the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the
FBI. This would require that the current policy, which specifies initial DoJ
control in terrorist incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress
creates NHSA. We believe that this arrangement would in no way contradict or
diminish the FBI's traditional role with respect to law enforcement.
Finally, but perhaps most critically, the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate will need to assume a major resource and
budget role. With the help of the Office of Management and Budget, the
directorate's first task will be to figure out what is being spent on homeland
security in the various departments and agencies. Only with such an overview
can the nation identify the shortfalls between capabilities and requirements.
Such a mission budget should be included in the President's overall budget
submission to Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
will also maintain federal asset databases and encourage and support up-to-date
state and local databases.
EMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past
few years and has gained a Fwell-deserved reputation for responsiveness to both
natural and manmade disasters. While taking on homeland security
responsibilities, the proposed NHSA would strengthen FEMA's ability to respond
to such disasters. It would streamline the federal apparatus and provide
greater support to the state and local officials who, as the nation's first
responders, possess enormous expertise. To the greatest extent possible,
federal programs should build upon the expertise and existing programs of state
emergency preparedness systems and help promote regional compacts to share
resources and capabilities.
To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend
transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), currently housed
at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security Agency. The Commission believes
that this transfer to FEMA should be done at first opportunity, even before
NHSA is up and running. The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training
of local responders and providing local and state authorities with equipment
for detection, protection, and decontamination in a WMD emergency. NHSA would
develop the policies, requirements, and priorities as part of its planning
tasks as well as oversee the various federal, state, and local training and
exercise programs. In this way, a single staff would provide federal assistance
for any emergency, whether it is caused by flood, earthquake, hurricane,
disease, or terrorist bomb.
A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm
local fire and rescue squads, medical facilities, and government services.
Attacks may contaminate water, food, and air; large- scale evacuations may be
necessary and casualties could be extensive. Since getting prompt help to those
who need it would be a complex and massive operation requiring federal support,
such operations must be extensively planned in advance. Responsibilities need
to be assigned and procedures put in place for these responsibilities to evolve
if the situation worsens. As we envision it, state officials will take the
initial lead in responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its Regional
Directors to coordinate federal assistance, while the National Crisis Action
Center will monitor ongoing operations and requirements. Should a crisis
overwhelm local assets, state officials will turn to NHSA for additional
federal assistance. In major crises, upon the recommendation of the civilian
Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior figure-a Federal
Coordinating Officer-to assume direction of all federal activities on the
scene. If the situation warrants, a state governor can ask that active military
forces reinforce National Guard units already on the scene. Once the President
federalizes National Guard forces, or if he decides to use Reserve forces, the
Joint Forces Command will assume responsibility for all military operations,
acting through designated task force commanders. At the same time, the
Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer to provide
civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil support. This person would work for
the Federal Coordinating Officer. This response mechanism is displayed in
Figure 2.
J J
J
Figure 2:
Emergency Response Mechanisms
To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under
extreme circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust exercise programs and
regular training to gain experience and to establish effective command and
control procedures. It will be essential to update regularly the Federal
Response Plan. It will be especially critical for NHSA officials to undertake
detailed planning and exercises for the full range of potential contingencies,
including ones that require the substantial involvement of military assets in
support.
HSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland
security, but other Ngovernment agencies will retain specific homeland security
tasks. We take the necessary obligations of the major ones in turn.
Intelligence Community. Good intelligence is the key to
preventing attacks on the homeland and homeland security should become one of
the intelligence community's most important missions.*15 Better human
intelligence must supplement technical intelligence, especially on terrorist
groups covertly supported by states. As noted above, fuller cooperation and
more extensive information-sharing with friendly governments will also improve
the chances that would-be perpetrators will be detained, arrested, and
prosecuted before they ever reach U.S. borders.
The intelligence
community also needs to embrace cyber threats as a legitimate mission and to
incorporate intelligence gathering on potential strategic threats from abroad
into its activities.
To advance these ends, we offer the following
recommendation:
* 4: The President should ensure that the National
Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an
area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and
produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats.
Department of State. U.S. embassies overseas are the
American people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must make homeland
security a top priority for all embassy staff, and Ambassadors need the
requisite authority to ensure that information is shared in a way that
maximizes advance warning overseas of direct threats to the United States.
Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of
information, and particularly from open sources, takes full advantage of all
U.S. government resources abroad, including State Department diplomats,
consular officers, military officers, and representatives of the various other
departments and agencies. The State Department should also strengthen its
efforts to acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad in
private capacities.
The State Department has made good progress in its
overseas efforts to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this effort
into the Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP Directorate, the State
Department should expand cooperation on critical infrastructure protection with
other states and international organizations. Private sector initiatives,
particularly in the banking community, provide examples of international
cooperation on legal issues, standards, and practices. Working with the CIP
Directorate and the FCC, the State Department should also encourage other
nations to criminalize hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track
hackers, computer virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.
Department of Defense. The Defense Department, which has
placed its highest priority on preparing for major theater war, should pay far
more attention to the homeland security mission. Organizationally, DoD
responses are widely dispersed. An Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Civil Support has responsibility for WMD incidents, while the Department of the
Army's Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD contingencies.
Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines of authority and
responsibility or ensure political accountability. The Commission therefore
recommends the following:
* 5: The President should propose to Congress the
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary.
A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security would provide policy oversight for the various DoD activities in the
homeland security mission and insure that mechanisms are in place for
coordinating military support in major emergencies. He or she would work to
integrate homeland security into Defense Department planning, and ensure that
adequate resources are forthcoming. This Assistant Secretary would also
represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency process on homeland security
issues.
Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also
recommend that the Defense Department broaden and strengthen the existing Joint
Forces Command/Joint Task Force- Civil Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military
planning, doctrine, and command and control for military support for all
hazards and disasters.
This task force should be directed by a senior National
Guard general with additional headquarters personnel. JTF-CS should contain
several rapid reaction task forces, composed largely of rapidly mobilizable
National Guard units. The task force should have command and control
capabilities for multiple incidents. Joint Forces Command should work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to ensure the provision of
adequate resources and appropriate force allocations, training, and equipment
for civil support.
On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and
conventional forces is as high a priority for homeland security as it is for
other missions. Shaping a peaceful international environment and deterring
hostile military actors remain sound military goals. But deterrent forces may
have little effect on non-state groups secretly supported by states, or
individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of clear and imminent
danger, the military must be able to take preemptive action overseas in
circumstances where local authorities are unable or unwilling to act. For this
purpose, the United States needs to be prepared to use its rapid, long-range
precision strike capabilities. A decision to act would obviously rest in
civilian hands, and would depend on intelligence information and assessments of
diplomatic consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively is never
taken or needed, the capability should be available nonetheless, for knowledge
of it can contribute to deterrence.
We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its
mission of protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the United States,
consistent with emerging threats such as the potential proliferation of cruise
missiles. The department should examine alternative means of monitoring
approaches to the territorial United States. Modern information technology and
sophisticated sensors can help monitor the high volumes of traffic to and from
the United States. Given the volume of legitimate activities near and on the
border, even modern information technology and remote sensors cannot filter the
good from the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise nor possible to
create a surveillance umbrella over the United States. But Defense Department
assets can be used to support detection, monitoring, and even interception
operations when intelligence indicates a specific threat.
Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of
responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity and
interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. This includes
addressing the nature of a national transportation network or cyber emergency
and the Defense Department's role in prevention, detection, or protection of
the national critical infrastructure. The department's sealift and airlift
plans are premised on largely unquestioned assumptions that domestic
transportation systems will be fully available to support mobilization
requirements. The department also is paying insufficient attention to the
vulnerability of its information networks. Currently, the department's computer
network defense task force (JTF- Computer Network Defense) is underfunded and
understaffed for the task of managing an actual strategic information warfare
attack. It should be given the resources and capability to carry out its
current mission and is a logical source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical
Information Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.
National Guard. The National Guard, whose origins are to
be found in the state militias authorized by the U.S. Constitution, should play
a central role in the response component of a layered defense strategy for
homeland security. We therefore recommend the following:
* 6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's
direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National
Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately
equipped to undertake that mission. At present, the Army National Guard is
primarily organized and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this
the Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active military
during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the Guard carries out many
state- level missions for disaster and humanitarian relief, as well as
consequence management. For these, it relies upon the discipline, equipment,
and leadership of its combat forces. The National Guard should redistribute
resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for conventional wars
overseas to provide greater support to civil authorities in preparing for and
responding to disasters, especially emergencies involving weapons of mass
destruction.
Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed
assessment of force requirements for both theater war and homeland security
contingencies. The Department of Defense should conduct such an assessment,
with the participation of the state governors and the NHSA Director. In setting
requirements, the department should minimize having forces with dual missions
or relying on active forces detailed for major theater war. This is because the
United States will need to maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive
posture against homeland attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most
likely timing of a major terrorist incident will be while the United States is
involved in a conflict overseas.*16
The National Guard is designated as the primary
Department of Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the National
Guard will respond as a state asset under the control of state governors. While
it is appropriate for the National Guard to play the lead military role in
managing the consequences of a WMD attack, its capabilities to do so are uneven
and in some cases its forces are not adequately structured or equipped.
Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams, made up of trained and equipped full-time
National Guard personnel, will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first
responders, provide technical advice, and pave the way for additional military
help. These teams fill a vital need, but more effort is required.
This Commission recommends that the National Guard be
reorganized to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of homeland
security. It should provide a mobilization base with strong local ties and
support. It is already "forward deployed" to achieve this mission and
should: * Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, local, and
regional planning for responding to a WMD incident;
* Train and help organize local first responders;
* Maintain up-to-date inventories of military resources
and equipment available in the area on short notice;
* Plan for rapid inter-state support and reinforcement;
and
* Develop an overseas capability for international
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
In this way, the National Guard will become a critical
asset for homeland security. Medical Community. The medical community has
critical roles to play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or
violence could cause casualties far beyond any imagined heretofore. Most of the
American medical system is privately owned and now operates at close to
capacity. An incident involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the capacities of
local hospitals and emergency management professionals.
In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the
Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a reassessment of
their programs. Research to develop better diagnostic equipment and
immune-enhancing drugs is underway, and resources to reinvigorate U.S.
epidemiological surveillance capacity have been allocated. Programs to amass
and regionally distribute inventories of antibiotics and vaccines have started,
and arrangements for mass production of selected pharmaceuticals have been
made. The Centers for Disease Control has rapid-response investigative units
prepared to deploy and respond to incidents. These programs will enhance the
capacities of the medical community, but the momentum and resources for this
effort must be extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for Emergency
Preparedness and Response assess local and federal medical resources to deal
with a WMD emergency. It should then specify those medical programs needed to
deal with a major national emergency beyond the means of the private sector,
and Congress should fund those needs.
C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE
COOPERATION
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an
Executive Branch problem.
Congress can and should be an active participant in the
development of homeland security programs, as well. Its hearings can help
develop the best ideas and solutions. Individual members should develop
expertise in homeland security policy and its implementation so that they can
fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice in times of crisis.
Most important, using its power of the purse, Congress should help to ensure
that government agencies have sufficient resources and that their programs are
coordinated, efficient, and effective.
Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan
Congressional initiative produced the U.S. effort to deal with the possibility
that weapons of mass destruction could "leak" out of a disintegrating
Soviet Union.*17 It was also a Congressional initiative that established the
Domestic Preparedness Program and launched a 120-city program to enhance the
capability of federal, state, and local first responders to react effectively
in a WMD emergency.*18 Members of Congress from both parties have pushed the
Executive Branch to identify and manage the problem more effectively. Congress
has also proposed and funded studies and commissions on various aspects of the
homeland security problem.*19 But it must do more.
A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul
of much of the legislative framework for preparedness, response, and national
defense programs. Congress designed many of the authorities that support
national security and emergency preparedness programs principally for a Cold
War environment. The new threat environment-from biological and terrorist
attacks to cyber attacks on critical systems-poses vastly different challenges.
We therefore recommend that Congress refurbish the legal foundation for
homeland security in response to the new threat environment. In particular,
Congress should amend, as necessary, key legislative authorities such as the
Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Communications Act of 1934, which
facilitate homeland security functions and activities.*20 Congress should also
encourage the sharing of threat, vulnerability, and incident data between the
public and private sectors-including federal agencies, state governments, first
responders, and industry.*21 In addition, Congress should monitor and support
current efforts to update the international legal framework for communications
security issues.*22
Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its
own to do. As things stand today, so many federal agencies are involved with
homeland security that it is exceedingly difficult to present federal programs
and their resource requirements to the Congress in a coherent way. It is
largely because the budget is broken up into so many pieces, for example, that
counter- terrorism and information security issues involve nearly two dozen
Congressional committees and subcommittees. The creation of the National
Security Homeland Agency will redress this problem to some extent, but because
of its growing urgency and complexity, homeland security will still require a
stronger working relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches.
Congress should therefore find ways to address homeland security issues that
bridge current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more innovative
oversight mechanisms.
There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate's
Arms Control Observer Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement Group were two
successful examples of more informal Executive-Legislative cooperation on key
multi-dimensional issues. Specifically, in the near term, this Commission
recommends the following:
* 7: Congress should establish a special body to deal with
homeland security issues, as has been done effectively with intelligence
oversight. Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy,
defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This body should
also include members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as
ex-officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.
This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of
the problem of homeland security, exchange information and viewpoints with the
Executive Branch on effective policies and plans, and work with standing
committees to develop integrated legislative responses and guidance. Meetings
would often be held in closed session so that Members could have access to
interagency deliberations and diverging viewpoints, as well as to classified
assessments. Such a body would have neither a legislative nor an oversight
mandate, and it would not eclipse the authority of any standing committee.
At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review
and restructure its committee system, as will be proposed in recommendation 48.
A single, select committee in each house of Congress should be given
authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibility for all homeland
security activities. When established, these committees would replace the
function of the oversight body described in recommendation 7.
In sum, the federal government must address the challenge
of homeland security with greater urgency. The United States is not immune to
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or disruption, but neither is it
entirely defenseless against them. Much has been done to prevent and defend
against such attacks, but these efforts must be incorporated into the nation's
overall security strategy, and clear direction must be provided to all
departments and agencies. Non-traditional national security agencies that now
have greater relevance than they did in the past must be reinvigorated.
Accountability, authority, and responsibility must be more closely aligned within
government agencies. An Executive-Legislative consensus is required, as well,
to convert strategy and resources into programs and capabilities, and to do so
in a way that preserves fundamental freedoms and individual rights.
Most of all, however, the government must reorganize
itself for the challenges of this new era, and make the necessary investments
to allow an improved organizational structure to work. Through the Commission's
proposal for a National Homeland Security Agency, the U.S. government will be
able to improve the planning and coordination of federal support to state and
local agencies, to rationalize the allocation of resources, to enhance
readiness in order to prevent attacks, and to facilitate recovery if prevention
fails. Most important, this proposal integrates the problem of homeland
security within a broader framework of U.S. national security strategy writ
large. In this respect, it differs significantly from issue-specific approaches
to the problem, which tend to isolate homeland security away from the larger
strategic perspective of which it must be a part. We are mindful that erecting
the operational side of this strategy will take time to achieve. Meanwhile, the
threat grows ever more serious. That is all the more reason to start right away
on implementing the recommendations put forth here.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Part 2 http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf 4-20-1
II. Recapitalizing
America's Strengths in Science and Education
The scale and nature of the ongoing revolution in science
and technology, and what this implies for the quality of human capital in the
21st century, pose critical national security challenges for the United States.
Second only to a weapon of mass destruction detonating in an American city, we
can think of nothing more dangerous than a failure to manage properly science,
technology, and education for the common good over the next quarter century.
Current institutional arrangements have served the nation
well over the past five decades, but the world is changing. Today, private
proprietary expenditure on technology development far outdistances public
spending. The internationalization of both scientific research and its
commercial development is having a significant effect on the capacity of the
U.S. government to harness science in the service of national security and to
attract qualified scientific and technical personnel. These changes are
transforming most facets of the American economy, from health care to banking
to retail business, as well as the defense industrial base.
The harsh fact is that the U.S. need for the highest
quality human capital in science, mathematics, and engineering is not being
met. One reason for this is clear: American students know that professional
careers in basic science and mathematics require considerable preparation and
effort, while salaries are often more lucrative in areas requiring less
demanding training. Non-U.S. nationals, however, do find these professions attractive
and, thanks to science, math, and technical preparation superior to that of
many Americans, they increasingly fill American university graduate studies
seats and job slots in these areas. Another reason for the growing deficit in
high-quality human capital is that the American kindergarten through 12th grade
(K-12) education system is not performing as well as it should. As a result too
few American students are qualified to take these slots, even if they are so
inclined.
This is an ironic predicament, since America's strength
has always been tied to the spirit and entrepreneurial energies of its people.
America remains today the model of creativity and experimentation, and its
success has inspired other nations to recognize the true sources of power and
wealth in science, technology, and higher education. America's international
reputation, and therefore a significant aspect of its global influence, depends
on its reputation for excellence in these areas. U.S. performance is not
keeping up with its reputation. Other countries are striving hard, and with
discipline they will outstrip us.
This is not a matter merely of national pride or
international image. It is an issue of the utmost importance to national
security. In a knowledge-based future, only an America that remains at the
cutting edge of science and technology will sustain its current world
leadership. In such a future, only a well-trained and educated population can
thrive economically, and from national prosperity provide the foundation for
national cohesion. Complacency with our current achievement of national wealth
and international power will put all of this at risk.
A. INVESTING IN
INNOVATION
Many nations in the world have the intellectual assets to
compete with those of the United States. However, as many leaders abroad
recognize, their social, political, and economic systems often prevent them
from capitalizing on these intellectual assets. The creative release of
individual energies for the public good is not possible without a political,
social, and economic system that frees talent and nurtures innovation.*23
We have before us the negative example of the former
Soviet Union. Its state scientific establishment was the largest in the world
and very talented, yet the attitudes and institutions required to nurture and
disseminate innovation in a broad sense were missing, and it never fulfilled
its potential. Today, many national leaders around the world are determined not
to repeat the Soviet failure. They are studying the American business and
innovation environment in hopes of extracting its secrets. Lessons are being
learned and adopted throughout the world. As a result, global competition is
growing significantly and will continue to do so . Meanwhile, however, many
critical changes are occurring within the United States:
* While basic research remains primarily a
government-funded activity, private and proprietary technology development in
the United States is increasing relatively and absolutely compared to that of
the government.
* The internationalization of basic science and
technology (S&T) activities, assets, and capabilities is accelerating, and
current U.S. advantages in many critical fields are shrinking and may be
eclipsed in the years ahead.
* New classes of defense-relevant technologies are
developing in which the major U.S. defense companies and national labs have
scant experience. There are far fewer institutional linkages between government
scientists and those innovative businesses generating and adapting cutting-edge
technologies (e.g., genetic engineering, materials science, nanotechnology, and
robotics).
During the 1980s, America recognized the need to change
business models that had roots in the Industrial Age. It embarked on an era of
deregulation and experimentation, one that has led to the networked economy
that is still taking shape today. While U.S. reform at the microeconomic level
has been primarily an achievement of the private sector, government has played
an important role. It is also clear the government and the private sector will
have to continue to work in concert to fill many critical needs, e.g.,
telecommunication and cyber-infrastructure policies; information assurance and
protection; and policies to preserve the defense industrial base. This nation
must increase its public research and development budget in order to remain a
world leader. But opportunity and resources will not come together by
themselves. Wise public policies enhance creative investment and promote
intense experimentation.
In particular, we need to fund more basic research and
technology development. As is clear to all, private sector R&D investments
in the United States have increased vastly in recent years. That is good, but
private R&D tends to be more development-oriented than research- oriented.
It is from investment in basic science, however, that the most valuable
long-run dividends are realized. The government has a critical role to play in
this regard, as the "spinoff" achievements of the space program over
the years illustrate. That role remains, not least because our basic and
applied research efforts in areas of critical national interest will not be
pursued by a civil sector that emphasizes short- to mid-term return on
investment.
If the United States does not invest significantly more
in public research and development, it will be eclipsed by others. Recent
failures in this regard may return to haunt us. The decision not to invest in a
large nuclear accelerator, the Superconducting Super Collider, already means
that the most significant breakthroughs in theoretical physics at least over
the next decade will occur in Europe and not in the United States. The
reduction of U.S. research and development in basic electronics engineering has
ensured that the next generation of chip processors and manufacturing
technology will come from an international consortium (U.S.- German-Dutch)
rather than from the United States alone.
We must not let such examples proliferate in the future,
nor should we squander the enormous opportunities before us. We stand on the
cusp of major discoveries in several interlocking fields, and we stand to
benefit, as well, from major strides in scientific instrumentation. As a
result, the way is clear to design large-scale scientific and technological
experiments in key fields-not unlike the effort of the International
Geophysical Year in 1958, the early space program, or the project to decode the
human genome. In the judgment of this Commission, the U.S. government has not
taken a broad, systematic approach to investing in science and technology
R&D, and thus will not be able to sustain projects of such scale and
boldness. We therefore recommend the following:
* 8: The President should propose, and the Congress
should support, doubling the U.S. government's investment in science and
technology research and development by 2010.
Building up an adequate level of effort for major,
long-term research for the public good will require an increased investment on
the order of 100 percent over the next eight years. In other words, a
government-wide R&D budget of about $160 billion by fiscal year 2010 would
be prudent and appropriate.
It would not be wise to combine the government's science
and technology capabilities into a single agency, as some have suggested doing,
or to entirely centralize the government's research and development budget. But
we do need to infuse within the U.S. national R&D program a sense of
responsible stewardship and vision. The government has to better coordinate its
own public research and development efforts among the more than two dozen
government departments and agencies that play major roles in the field.*24
The coordinating body for that purpose, the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), houses within it the National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The White House OSTP has three main
functions: to help design the public R&D budget in conjunction with the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB); to facilitate interagency efforts
involving science and technology and research and development; and to win
support for the administration's science and technology initiatives in
Congress.
The National Science and Technology Council, which
includes virtually every cabinet official and Executive Branch agency head, has
a committee structure designed to facilitate interagency cooperation.
Committees are headed by OSTP personnel, but the participants from other
departments and agencies have other, usually more pressing duties. Hence, with
the exception of their chairmen, NSTC committees are populated by part-timers.
The President may also use the President's Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), composed of non-governmental
experts, to help him decide science and technology policy. Its use, as with the
use of the NSTC, is largely dependent on the interests and inclinations of the
President. The relationships among the OSTP, the NSTC, and the PCAST vary from
administration to administration.*25
While these coordinating and advisory bodies do exist,
they are inadequately staffed, funded, and utilized to carry out their
significant functions. The current OSTP is not small by White House standards,
but it will increasingly be unable to keep up with its mandate as science and
technology issues become more important to the national welfare. The NSTC
permanent administrative staff is too small to support its committee work, and
it has no permanent science and technology professional staff at all. The NSTC
itself meets relatively rarely and only episodically takes on specific subjects
of interest e.g., more fuel-efficient automobiles or nanotechnology research.
One main reason to improve these organizations, in this
Commission's view, is to enable the Executive Branch to strengthen its grip on the
R&D process. Three changes are required:
* The R&D budget has to be rationalized, and in order
to do that a much better effort at physical and human/intellectual inventory
stewardship is required.
* Those organizations responsible for rationalizing and
managing the R&D process should more systematically review and redesign, as
necessary, the science and technology personnel profile of Executive Branch
agencies.
* The R&D budget has to be allocated through a more
creative and competitive process than is the case today. We take these issues
in turn.
The ability of the White House Office for Science and
Technology Policy, together with OMB and other relevant agencies, to
rationalize R&D investment presupposes the ability to identify the best,
generative opportunities for the investment of government R&D monies.
Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Rationalizing the way that public R&D money is spent
must include better accounting of both human and physical capital. It is not
possible to spend $80 billion wisely each year, let alone twice that much,
unless we know where research bottlenecks and opportunities exist. There is no
one place in the U.S. government where such inventory stewardship is performed.
Rather, elements are dispersed in the National Science Foundation, in the
Commerce Department (the Patent and Trademark Office, the National Technical
Information Service, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology),
in the Departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services,
and in parts of the intelligence community. We believe that collating and
analyzing this information in one place, and using the conclusions of that
analysis to inform the R&D budget process, is the sine qua non of a more
effective public R&D effort.
Moreover, without such a basic inventory of the nation's
science and technology "property," the United States could lose
critical knowledge-based assets to competitors and adversaries without ever
knowing it, and without understanding the implications of their loss. In an age
when private, proprietary technology development outpaces publicly-funded
R&D, and when most basic science information cannot reliably be kept
secret, high-end science and technology espionage is a growth industry in which
both foreign corporations and governments participate. The United States
therefore needs to take seriously the protection of such assets to the extent
possible and practical-but it cannot protect what it cannot even identify.*26
To achieve effective inventory stewardship for science
and technology, we recommend that OSTP, in conjunction with the National
Science Foundation-and with the counsel of the National Academies of Science*27
-design a system for the ongoing basic inventory stewardship of the nation's
capital knowledge assets. The job of inventory stewardship could be vouchsafed
to the National Science Board, the governing body of the National Science
Foundation, were it to be provided staff for this purpose.
In addition, this Commission urges a more systematic
effort at functional budgeting for R&D so that we know how we are spending
the public's money in this area. More effective R&D portfolio management
for research is needed with emphasis on critical R&D areas and those of
high potential long-term benefit. We therefore recommend the following:
* 9: The President should empower his Science Advisor to
establish non-military R&D objectives that meet changing national needs,
and to be responsible for coordinating budget development within the relevant
departments and agencies.
This budget, we believe, should emphasize research over
development, and it should aim at large- scale experimental projects that can
make best use of new synergies between theoretical advances and progress in
scientific instrumentation.
We also believe that the President, in tandem with
strengthening the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, should
raise the profile of its head-the Science Advisor to the President. The Science
Advisor needs to be empowered as a more significant figure within the
government, and we believe the budget function we have recommended for him will
be instrumental for this purpose.
There is yet another task that a strengthened OSTP should
adopt. As things stand today, more than two dozen U.S. government agencies have
science and technology responsibilities, meaning that they have personnel slots
for science and engineering professionals and budget categories to support what
those professionals do. (Of the several thousand such personnel in government,
some 80 of these slots are for senior scientists and engineers who must be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.)
Despite the significant numbers of science and technology
(S&T) personnel and their obvious criticality, there is no place in the
U.S. government where S&T personnel assets as a whole are assessed against
changing needs. In the past two decades, the Congressional Research Service,
the General Accounting Office, and the now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment
have all explored this issue. The Office of Management and Budget, too, has
looked regularly at individual departments and agencies, but not at the
government's S&T personnel structure as such. It appears, then, that no one
above the departmental level examines the appropriateness of the fit between
missions and personnel in this area as a whole.
Dealing with government S&T personnel issues in a
disaggregated manner is no longer adequate. It is hard for senior department
and agency managers-and for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) or the OMB
staff-who are themselves not scientists or engineers, to know if they are
operating with the right numbers and kinds of science and technology
professionals. Hence, the Commission recommends that the President, with aid
from his Science Advisor directing NSF's National Science Board, should
reassess and realign, as necessary, government needs for science and technology
personnel for the next quarter century.
Indeed, such a review ought to be made routine. The Science
Advisor with the National Science Board and OPM, in consultation with the
National Academies of Science, should periodically reevaluate Executive Branch
needs for science and technology personnel. They should also suggest means to
ensure the recruitment and retention of the highest quality scientists,
engineers, and technologists for government service-a general subject we have
noted above, and to which we return below in Section IV in the context of
recommendation 42.
At present, as we have said, the U.S. government spends
more than $80 billion each year in publicly funded R&D, of which about half
is defense related. Much of the budgeting, however, still reflects legacies of
the Cold War and the industrial age. We do not suggest that this money is being
wasted in any direct sense, but its benefits are not being maximized. For
example, we believe that defense-related R&D should go back to funding more
basic research, for in recent years it has tilted too much toward the
"D" over the "R" in R&D.*28
More important, we could derive more benefit from our
investment in non-defense R&D if the context for it were a more competitive
one. The Commission holds competition to be an important ingredient for the
creative use of new ideas. Though we believe centralization of budget
development is unnecessary, tailoring the various R&D budgets to meet
overall national objectives would be beneficial. Different organizations
address different needs and bring different perspectives, as do those working
in different scientific disciplines. We therefore recommend that the
President's Science Advisor, beyond his proposed budget coordination role,
should lead an effort to revise government R&D practices and budget
allocations to make the process more competitive.
One barrier to a more competitive, opportunity-based
environment for R&D is institutional inertia. The current structure of
public R&D funding is partly a result of inherited arrangements. We do not
suggest disrupting important relationships between particular government
agencies and, say, the Lincoln Laboratory at M.I.T., for the turbulence created
would not be worth the advantages. But if innovation is to be encouraged, we
need greater competition for government R&D funds. Hence, we propose that
the government foster a "creative market" for a greater number of
research institutions to bid on government research funds.
To create a more competitive market means narrowing the
gap between the two tiers of research institutions that currently exist: the
relatively small number of high-prestige major schools with ample endowments,
and the larger number of less capable institutions. There are several ways to
do this. One is through direct federal investment in or subsidization of
second-tier institutions. Another is to encourage second-tier institutions to
concentrate effort on new fields of inquiry in which older, more established
institutions do not have comparative advantages. We see no reason, as well, to
prevent amateurs from competing, because the history of science and technology
is laden with the genius of the professionally uninitiated.
In addition, we recommend that a strengthened and more
active National Science and Technology Council preside over an on-going effort
to multiply creative, targeted R&D programs within government. The
Council's enlarged professional staff should identify areas of priority
research that the private sector is unlikely to pursue, and challenge those
government agencies with R&D capabilities to form coalitions to bid on
R&D monies set aside for such purposes. To meet such challenges, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency might combine talents, in league with their associates outside
of government, to bid against a Department of Energy-NSF team. The national
laboratory system should also be involved in such competitions-a topic to which
we now turn.
The U.S. national laboratory system is badly in need of
redefinition and new investment. The national laboratories, though vestiges of
the Cold War, remain a national R&D treasure. Unfortunately, they are a
treasure in danger of being squandered.
Without any compelling force analogous to that of the
Cold War to drive government funding and the direction of R&D, the labs
have been left to drift. Nuclear research has given way mostly to maintenance
of the nation's nuclear arsenal and efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons and
manage their radioactive wastes. But however important, these are tasks that a
single major laboratory can handle. Many of the other large and small
laboratories within the system no longer have the sense of purpose and shared
vision that drove the tremendous scientific accomplishments that advanced
national security during the Cold War.
Compounding the labs' identity problem is the fact that
the highest rewards and most interesting scientific and technical work now take
place in the private sector. The Commission found broad consensus that the labs
are no longer competitive in attracting and keeping new scientific talent. The
physical circumstances in which lab professionals work have also deteriorated,
in many instances, to unacceptable levels.*29 The security breaches and the
subsequent series of investigations in recent years have produced a serious
morale problem-and made recruitment and retention problems even more acute. If
this cycle is not broken, our national advantage in S&T will suffer
further.
The labs remain critical in fulfilling America's S&T
national security needs and in addressing S&T issues pertinent to the
public good. Each major laboratory needs a clearly defined mission area-in
long-term defense technology, energy, environmental, or some other kind of
practical research. The smaller labs, among the several hundred that exist,
need to be better connected to one another so that their staffs share a sense
of common purpose; in some cases, smaller labs may benefit from consolidation.
The Commission therefore recommends the following:
* 10: The President should propose, and the Congress
should fund, the reorganization of the national laboratories, providing
individual laboratories with new mission goals that minimize overlap. The
President's Science Advisor, aided and advised by the OSTP, the NSTC, the
PCAST, and the National Academy of Science, should lead this effort. For
example, one lab could focus on nuclear weapons maintenance, while others could
specialize in such fields as energy and environmental research, biotechnology,
and nanotechnology. Whatever goals are determined, more resources are clearly
needed to ensure that the national laboratories remain world class research
institutions, with facilities, resources, and salaries to fulfill their
missions. Finally, the potential for good and ill stemming from many of the
recent developments in the scientific and technical domain is at least as
great, if not greater, than that of atomic energy in 1945-46. As this
Commission stressed in its Phase I report, new scientific discovery and
innovation in information technologies, nanotechnology, and biotechnologies
will have a major impact on social, economic, and political life in the United
States and elsewhere.
It is not in the public or the national interest to allow
these impacts to be determined exclusively by the private sector. The United States
prides itself on having a system of government that does not smother or try to
shape the social or moral life of the nation. But we have always granted
government a role in managing science and technology under special or extreme
circumstances-as for example in the creation of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission after World War II. As was the case then, a public-trust institution
is needed to gather knowledge and to develop informed judgment as the basis for
public policy. We especially need a permanent framework that brings public
sector, private sector, and higher education together to examine the
implications of today's technological revolution.
Now as then, there is a pointed national security
dimension to this requirement. As was the case in the late 1940s, if the United
States does not maintain leadership in this area, the country will decline in
its ability to protect itself from those countries that do.
At present, there is a National Bioethics Advisory
Commission to study the moral implications of bioscience. This Commission is
composed of distinguished and committed members. But the composition of that
Commission is narrow, consisting only of bioethicists. It meets only
episodically, operates on a small budget, has no permanent professional staff
aside from its executive director, works on a limited mandate, and is soon
scheduled to go out of existence. In practice, this Commission cannot influence
or communicate as an equal with the National Institutes of Health, the Food and
Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, or other government bodies
that play major roles in monitoring and regulating the products of bioscience.
Nor can it spend time anticipating issues when its meetings and reports are
consumed almost entirely with responding to concerns that have already been
raised. In short, the vehicle we now have to deal with the social, ethical, and
public safety dimensions of biotechnology is inadequate for the task.
We need an institution that provides a forum for the
articulation of all interests in the implications of new biotechnology and
other new technologies. Without such a forum, it is doubtful whether public
confidence in the progression of bioscience can be sustained amid all the
controversies it will surely provoke over the next 25 years. We need a place
where government officials, scholars, theologians, and corporate executives can
meet regularly to discuss issues of concern. We need an institution that can
deal effectively with the other governmental agencies regularly involved in
these issues; otherwise its findings will remain peripheral to the actual
processes of decision. We therefore recommend that Congress transform the
current National Bioethics Advisory Commission into a much strengthened
National Advisory Commission on Bioscience (NACB).
The NACB should focus on the intersection between
bioscience, information science, and nanotechnology for, as we have said, it is
this intersection that will form the pivot of major transformation. Such change
will affect a wide range of public policy issues, including health, social
security, privacy, and education. Nor should the commission's mandate be
limited to ethical questions. It should concern itself, as well, with the
social and public safety implications of bioscience.
For now, we envision no regulatory authority for such a
strengthened commission such as that possessed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
However, should the Executive and Legislative branches together come to believe
that an institution along such lines is needed for biotechnology, this
strengthened commission could serve as a basis for it.
B. EDUCATION AS A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE
The capacity of America's educational system to create a
21st century workforce second to none in the world is a national security issue
of the first order. As things stand, this country is forfeiting that capacity.
The facts are stark:
* The American educational system needs to produce
significantly more scientists and engineers, including four times the current
number of computer scientists, to meet anticipated demand.*30
* To do this, more than 240,000 new and qualified science
and mathematics teachers are needed in our K-12 classrooms over the next decade
(out of a total need for an estimated 2.2 million new teachers).*31
* However, some 34 percent of public school mathematics
teachers and nearly forty percent of science teachers lack even an academic
minor in their primary teaching fields.*32
* In 1997, Asia alone accounted for more than 43 percent
of all science and engineering degrees granted worldwide, Europe 34 percent,
and North America 23 percent. In that same year, China produced 148,800
engineers, the United States only 63,000.*33
Education is the foundation of America's future. Quality
education in the humanities and social sciences is essential in a world made
increasingly "smaller" by advances in communication and in global
commerce. But education in science, mathematics, and engineering has special
relevance for the future of U.S. national security, for America's ability to
lead depends particularly on the depth and breadth of its scientific and
technical communities.
At the base of American national security, clearly, is
the strength of the American economy. High-quality preparation of Americans for
the working world is more important than ever. The technology-driven economy
will add twenty million jobs in the next decade, many of them requiring
significant technical expertise. The United States will need sharply growing
numbers of competent knowledge workers, many of them in information sciences,
an area in which there are already significant shortages.*34 But it is
misleading to equate "information science" with "science"
itself. It was basic science and engineering excellence that brought about the
information revolution in the first place and, over the next quarter century,
the interplay of bioscience, nanotechnology, and information science will
combine to reshape most existing technologies. The health of the U.S. economy,
therefore, will depend not only on professionals that can produce and direct
innovation in a few key areas, but also on a populace that can effectively
assimilate a wide range of new tools and technologies. This is critical not
just for the U.S. economy in general, but specifically for the defense
industry, which must simultaneously develop and defend against these same
technologies. The American educational system does not appear to be ready for
such challenges and is confronted by two distinct yet inter-related problems.
First, there will not be enough qualified American citizens to perform the new
jobs being created today-including technical jobs crucial to the maintenance of
national security. Already the United States must search abroad for experts and
technicians to fill positions in the U.S. domestic economy, and Congress has
often increased category limits for special visas (H-1B) for that purpose. If
current trends are not stanched and reversed, large numbers of specialized
foreign technicians in critical positions in the U.S. economy could pose
security risks. More important, however, while the United States should take
pride in educating, hosting, and benefiting from foreign scientific and
technical expertise, it should take even more pride in being able to educate
American citizens to operate their own economy at its highest level of
technical and intellectual capacity.
Our ability to meet these needs is threatened by a second
problem-that we do not now have, and will not have with current trends, nearly
enough qualified teachers in our K-12 classrooms, particularly in science and
mathematics. The United States will need roughly 2.2 million new teachers
within the next decade.*35 A continued shortage in the quantity and quality of
teachers in science and math means that we will increasingly fail to produce
sufficient numbers of high-caliber American students to advance to college and
post-graduate levels in these areas. Therefore we will lack not only the
homegrown science, technology, and engineering professionals necessary to
ensure national prosperity and security, but also the next generation of
teachers of science and math at the K-12 level.
A chronic shortage of teachers presages severe
consequences in all fields, but is especially hurtful in science. Too few teachers
means teaching loads and class sizes that exceed optimum levels. Having too
many classes and too many students invariably translates into insufficient time
to prepare, which is a critical variable in effective teaching-especially so in
hands-on science classrooms. It also means the necessity to press into service
teachers who are not adequately prepared for classroom rigors.
The broad effect of the shortages in science and math
teachers, and of other deficits in curricula and method, is already evident.
Mathematics and science exam scores for U.S. students have been rising, but not
fast enough to keep up with a large number of other countries. The lag is
particularly significant for the nation's high school students. Americans have
performed relatively well in both mathematics and science at the 4th grade
level, and slightly above the international average at the 8th grade level, but
show a sharp relative decline in the high school years.*36 The most recent test
shows a relative decline at the 8th grade level as well.*37 This, as former
Secretary of Education William Bennett has pointed out, creates the impression
that the longer students remain in the American education system, the poorer
their relative performance becomes.
Another major concern is that not all American citizens
have the benefits of an adequate education. Wide economic disparity persists
among K-12 public school districts. Fully 34 percent of the total public school
student population (seventeen million children) is being educated in economically-depressed
school districts that face the greatest shortages of teachers. Many teachers in
these districts are not qualified by a degree in the field they teach, and many
lack teaching certification as well. The disparity in the availability of
qualified science and math teachers between regular and economically-depressed
school districts is particularly alarming.
In short, our problems in this area are becoming
cumulative. The nation is on the verge of a downward spiral in which current
shortages will beget even more acute future shortages of high-quality
professionals and competent teachers. The word "crisis" is much
overused, but it is entirely appropriate here. If the United States does not
stop and reverse negative educational trends-the general teacher shortage, and
the downward spiral in science and math education and performance-it will be
unable to maintain its position of global leadership over the next quarter
century.
Resolving these cumulative problems will require a
multi-faceted set of solutions. Educational incentive programs are needed to
encourage students to pursue careers in science and technology, and
particularly as K-12 teachers in these fields. Yet such incentives alone will
not be adequate to avert the looming teacher shortage. Therefore, a set of
additional actions must be taken to restore the professional status of
educators and to entice those with science and math backgrounds into teaching.
Only by addressing the systemic need to increase the number of science and math
teachers will we ensure the supply of qualified science and technology
professionals throughout our economy and in our national security institutions,
both governmental and military.
As a major first step, we therefore recommend the
following:
* 11: The President should propose, and Congress should
pass, a National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) with
four sections: reduced-interest loans and scholarships for students to pursue
degrees in science, mathematics, and engineering; loan forgiveness and
scholarships for those in these fields entering government or military service;
a National Security Teaching Program to foster science and math teaching at the
K-12 level; and increased funding for professional development for science and
math teachers.
Section one of the National Security Science and
Technology Education Act should provide incentives for students at all
levels-high school, undergraduate, graduate, and post- graduate-to pursue
degrees in the fields of science, mathematics, and engineering.
Section two should provide substantial incentives to
bring talented scientists, mathematicians, and engineers into government
service-both civil and military. [The social science complement to this section
will be discussed in recommendation 39.]
Section three should address the need to recruit quality
science and math teachers at the K-12 level. To accomplish this goal, Congress
should create a National Security Teaching Program through which graduates and
experienced professionals in the fields of science, math, and engineering will
commit to teach in America's public schools for three to five years. In return,
NSTP Fellows will receive fellowships to an accredited education certification
program, a loan repayment or cancellation option, and a signing bonus to
supplement entry-level salaries. A national roster of districts in need of
qualified teachers should be compiled and matched with the roster of NSTP
Fellows.
The National Security Teaching Program will place
teachers in the classroom who have both a teaching certification and a degree
in their field. It will also encourage experienced professionals to teach,
bringing deep subject matter expertise and a wealth of experience to bring into
America's classrooms.*38 These lateral entrants might be Ph.Ds who have not
found other suitable professional niches and "young" retired people,
such as those who leave the military in their forties and fifties.*39 Enabling
this latter group to teach will also require further changes in tax laws so
that those receiving retirement and pension benefits are not penalized unduly
for taking on a second educational career.
Section four must emphasize professional development
focused on the needs of science and mathematics teachers. On-going professional
development for science teachers is particularly important, as they must
prepare their students to contend with the rapidly evolving pace of scientific
innovation and discovery. The Eisenhower Program run by the Department of
Education to meet the professional development needs of science and math
teachers is a good example of a program that works.*40 It should be expanded
and resourced accordingly.
Professional development that involves a substantial
number of contact hours over a long period has a stronger impact on teaching
practice than professional development of limited duration. Today, however,
more than half of all science teachers in the United States report receiving no
more than two days of professional development per year.*41 For this reason, we
believe the emphasis of the National Commission on Mathematics and Science
Teaching for the 21st Century (the Glenn Commission) on continuing professional
education is right on the mark. The Glenn Commission emphasized Summer
Institutes as well as Inquiry Groups and distance learning through a dedicated
Internet portal for on-going professional education. *42
Congress should also establish and fund the National Math
& Science Project to provide additional support for continuing professional
development. Such a program can be modeled after the National Writing Project,
an outstanding example of university/district collaboration. Its goal has been
to improve student writing and learning in K-12 and university classrooms by
providing schools, colleges, and universities with an effective professional
development model. The National Writing Project also suggests itself as a model
because it has been both cost-effective and has focused significant resources
on traditionally-neglected impoverished areas.*43
All fifty states should also fund professional enrichment
sabbaticals of various durations for science teachers, and should do so
wherever possible in concert with local universities, science museums, and
other research institutions. The federal government should strongly encourage
and support the states in such endeavors. A more widespread sabbatical system
for science educators would also improve liaison between secondary school
teachers of science and math and university faculties adept in such subjects.
Some metropolitan areas in the United States have developed excellent working
relationships between high school teachers and both university and science
museum faculties, and we encourage Education Department officials to carefully
study and model these success stories.
We recognize that the widespread institution of
enrichment sabbaticals for science teachers would be expensive, for it would
require a personnel "float" to compensate for teachers who are on
sabbatical. But this should be a long-term goal for science educators in at
least grades 7-12, which should come to resemble professional standards at
universities to the extent possible. While the National Security Science and
Technology Education Act would provide educational benefits and ongoing
professional development opportunities for those who choose to teach, a range
of additional actions are needed to improve both teacher recruitment and
retention and the overall strength of school districts.
The anticipated shortage of quality teachers is a
challenge, but it also offers tremendous opportunity. As we renew our pool of
teachers, we can produce and train the best teachers with the best curricula,
the best texts, and the best teaching methods. But it is clear that if the
general national teacher shortage problem is not addressed, efforts to address
deficiencies in the science and mathematics arena will not be met either. One
cannot significantly improve the quality of science and math education without
improving education in general. After all, science and math are taught in the
same buildings, working under the same systems and budgets, and in the same
general environment as that in which all other subjects are taught. That is why
ensuring a superior scientific and technical community, one that satisfies both
national economic and security needs, must start with reforming the educational
system as a whole.
In this light, the Commission recognizes the need to take
immediate steps, beyond the National Security Teaching Program, to attract much
greater numbers of qualified graduates into the teaching profession, and to
raise the quality of professional achievement across the board. We therefore
recommend:
* 12: The President should direct the Department of
Education to work with the states to devise a comprehensive plan to avert a
looming shortage of quality teachers. This plan should emphasize raising
teacher compensation, improving infrastructure support, reforming the
certification process, and expanding existing programs targeted at districts
with especially acute problems.
First, we must raise salaries for teachers, science and
mathematics teachers in particular, to or near commercial levels.*44 As long as
sharp salary inequities exist between what science and math teachers are paid
and what equivalently-educated professionals make in the private sector, the
nation's schools will lack the best qualified teachers in science and
mathematics. Given the exigencies of the market, we see no reason why science
and math teachers should not earn more than other teachers even in the same
school system.
While increased funding from the federal and state
governments is needed to achieve this, public-private and community-wide
partnerships that link universities and businesses with local school districts
could help fulfill both faculty and student needs through endowments and other
programs.*45 Endowments are a proven means for enhancing professional
competitiveness. Beyond their contribution to funding higher teacher salaries,
they involve corporate and private philanthropy more effectively in improving
American education. K-12 education should develop a resource base similar to
that of higher education with which to meet educational needs. The federal
government-through the Department of Education, the National Science
Foundation, and the National Research Council-can also help by standing ready
to provide supplementary or matching funds for communities that take bold local
initiatives to recruit and retain quality teachers. National, state, and local
leaders should encourage corporate and private philanthropists to match
disbursed endowment money, and Congress should work to ensure enhanced
corporate tax benefits for monies provided for NSSTEA science/math education
purposes of all sorts.
Endowment and other partnership programs could be used in
several important ways, in addition to raising teacher salaries. They can
provide the up-to-date laboratory facilities that are essential to effective
discovery-based learning, and that are usually more expensive than most local
school districts choose to bear. Without investment by the federal government
and through these partnership programs in the modernization of high school
laboratory facilities, even the highest quality science teachers will be unable
to maximize their talents. Funds could also be used to develop innovative uses
for technology such as modular texts in science that can be conveyed nationwide
through the Internet.
Finally, these programs can provide student incentives to
choose science and math careers. This may be through summer co-op
programs-somewhat analogous to co-op programs on the university level-where
students take summer jobs or internships related to their interests at
companies and foundations that help endow the schools. Alternatively endowments
might be used to pay students at the high school level for taking courses in
science and math beyond minimal requirements. Some believe that students should
be paid directly and that it is foolish to let students work at fast food chains,
for example, when they could be induced for similar rewards to study physics
and calculus. In lieu of, or in addition to, direct payment, students may be
offered scholarship money to be set aside for university tuition.
Second, we must improve infrastructure support. Other
knowledge-workers in the general economy are the beneficiaries, on average, of
ten times the basic infrastructure investment than that afforded to teachers.
This is a national disgrace. Beyond the laboratory facilities already mentioned,
administrative support and resources are needed to ensure a disciplined and
safe environment, and to provide such seemingly basic services as desk space,
telephones, and copying facilities. This will not only help provide a better
educational environment but, along with salary increases, will also help
restore full professional status to the teaching profession. This will go a
long way toward attracting and retaining high-quality teachers.
Third, we must create more flexible certification
procedures to attract lateral entrants into education. We have already
discussed the benefits of encouraging experienced professionals to become K-12
educators and certification procedures should reflect these benefits. In
general they should be changed to emphasize teacher mastery of substance over
matters of pedagogy at least at the grade 7-12 level.
Fourth, we should supplement these measures by expanding
existing specially-targeted federal programs for geographical and
socio-economic zones with especially acute problems. Through the National
Security Teaching Program, we should strengthen federal loan repayment and
cancellation options for recent college graduates engaged in these programs and
increase their salary and housing benefits. Supplementary teacher training and
certification programs should be provided, as well, in exchange for an
additional commitment to teaching in selected public school systems. At the
same time, we recommend the following:
* 13: The President and Congress should devise a targeted
program to strengthen the historically black colleges and universities in our
country, and should particularly support those that emphasize science,
mathematics, and engineering.
Clearly, serious educational improvement will cost money.
It will also require changes in attitudes toward education professionals. But
if the American people want quality education and a truly professional
environment in schools that is conducive to educational success, they will have
to demand it, pay for it, and show greater respect to those professionals who
deliver it.
We believe, however, that while more money for is a
necessary condition for major improvement in the education system, it is not a
sufficient condition. Despite significant investments in special programs, much
professional attention, and significant expenditure of resources, many results
of the educational system are still disappointing. New and creative approaches
are needed, including approaches that harness the power of competition. As
important, local communities must be empowered and involved more fully in
education, for nothing tracks more directly with high student performance as
parental involvement in their children's education.
In addition to the previous recommendations, this
Commission believes that core secondary school curricula should be heavier in
science and mathematics, and should require higher levels of proficiency for
all high school students. Many specialists believe that tracking math and
science students sometimes leads to a sharp deterioration of expectations, and
hence discipline, in the lower tracks. According to nearly all professional
evaluations, such a deterioration of expectations is lethal to the attitudes
necessary to make the classroom experience work.^46 Given the exigencies of
advanced 21st century economies, it is not good enough that we produce a
sufficient elite corps of science, math, and engineering professionals. We must
raise levels of math, science, and technology literacy throughout our society.
Among other things, that means changing enduring perceptions that taking four
years of science and math in high school is only for the "brainy"
elite. This is a perception that, ultimately, could cause an economic disaster
in this country.
Finally in this regard, as with nearly every other
commission and professional study that has looked at this problem, we favor
more rigorous achievement goals for both American teachers and students in
science and math, and we favor making both accountable for improvements. We
also believe that science curricula, in particular, must be better designed to
teach science for what it is: a way of thinking and not just a body of facts.
In our judgment, too much high school science curricula is still distorted by
inappropriate evaluation methods. If testing and evaluation methods for science
education better reflect the reality of science as a discovery-based rather
than as a fact-based activity, it would be easier to reform curricula in an
appropriate fashion as well. One related matter must be addressed. As noted
earlier, increasing numbers of the qualified engineers and scientists educated
in the United States are coming from outside U.S. borders. Far from being
negative, the cycle of their coming and going to and from the United States
helps sustains U.S. needs. However, should they stop coming, or further
accelerate their return home, the American population alone may not be able to
sustain the needs of the U.S. economy over the next decade.
Fully 37 percent of doctorates in natural science, 50
percent of doctorates in mathematics and computer science, and 53 percent of
doctorates in engineering at U.S. universities-the best in the world-are
awarded to non-U.S. citizens.*47 However, the percentage of science and
engineering doctoral recipients with firm plans to stay in the United States is
declining.*48 The growing emphasis on science and technology in many foreign
countries is enticing many U.S- trained foreign students to return to their
countries of origin, or to go to other parts of the world. They are doing so in
increasing numbers.
Given the uncertainty as to whether U.S. nationals alone
can fill U.S. economic needs, Congress should adjust the appropriate
immigration legislation to make it easier for those non- U.S. citizens with
critical educational and professional competencies to remain in the United
States, and to become American citizens should they so desire. The White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, along with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the appropriate Congressional committees, is the
proper place to design such adjustments.
We believe strongly that America's future depends upon
the ability of its educational system to produce students who constantly
challenge current levels of innovation and push the limits of technology and
discovery. They are the seed corn of our future. Presidential leadership will
be critical in addressing the initiatives in education addressed by this
Commission. That is why the Commission is heartened to learn that the new administration
has declared education to be its first priority. It is the right choice.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Part 3 http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf 4-20-1
III. Institutional
Redesign
Beyond the pressing matter of organizing homeland
security, and of recapitalizing core U.S. domestic strengths in science and
education, this Commissions recommends significant organizational redesign for
the Executive Branch. This redesign has been conceived with one overriding
purpose in mind: to permit the U.S. government to integrate more effectively
the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a
new era-not only the traditional agenda of defense, diplomacy, and
intelligence, but also economics, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime,
protecting the environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting
international human rights.
The key component of any Executive Branch organizational
design is the President. As one of only two elected members of the Executive
Branch, the President is responsible for ensuring that U.S. strategies are
designed to seize opportunities and not just to respond to crises. He must find
ways to obtain significantly more resources for foreign affairs, and in
particular those resources needed for anticipating threats and preventing the
emergence of dangers. Without a major increase in resources, the United States
will not be able to conduct its national security policies effectively in the
21st century.
To that end, the nation must redesign not just individual
departments and agencies but its national security apparatus as a whole.
Serious deficiencies exist that cannot be solved by a piecemeal approach.
* Most critically, no overarching strategic framework
guides U.S. national security policymaking or resource allocation. Budgets are
still prepared and appropriated as they were during the Cold War.
* The power to determine national security policy has
migrated toward the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The staff now
assumes policymaking and operational roles, with the result that its ability to
act as an honest broker and policy coordinator has suffered.
* Difficulties persist in ensuring that international
political and security perspectives are considered in the making of global
economic policy, and that economic goals are given proper attention in national
security policymaking.
* The Department of State is a crippled institution that
is starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies and is thereby
weakened further. The department suffers in particular from an ineffective
organizational structure in which regional and functional goals compete, and in
which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.
* America's overseas presence has not been adjusted to
the new economic, social, political, and security realities of the 21st
century. The broad statutory authority of U.S. Ambassadors is undermined in
practice by their lack of control over resources and personnel.
* The Department of Defense has serious organizational
deficiencies. The growth in staff and staff activities creates confusion and
delay. The failure to outsource or privatize many defense support activities
wastes huge sums of money. The programming and budgeting process is not guided
by effective strategic planning. The weapons acquisition process is so hobbled
by excessive laws, regulations, and oversight strictures that it can neither
recognize nor seize opportunities for major innovation, and it stifles a
defense industry already in financial crisis. Finally, the force structure
development process is not currently aligned with the needs of today's global
security environment. * National security policymaking does not manage space
policy in a serious and integrated way.
* The U.S. intelligence community is adjusting only
slowly to the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War era. While the
economic and political components of statecraft have assumed greater
prominence, military imperatives still largely drive the collection and
analysis of intelligence.
We offer recommendations in several areas: strategic
planning and budgeting; the National Security Council; the Department of State;
the Department of Defense; space policy; and the intelligence community. We
take these areas in turn.
A. STRATEGIC
PLANNING AND BUDGETING
Strategic planning is largely absent within the U.S.
government. The planning that does occur is ad hoc and specific to Executive
departments and agencies. No overarching strategic framework guides U.S.
national security policy or the allocation of resources.
Each national security department and agency currently
prepares its own budget. No effort is made to define an overall national
security budget or to show how the allocation of resources in the individual
budgets serves the nation's overall national security goals. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) does on occasion consider tradeoffs in the
allocation of resources among the various national security departments and
agencies, but this is not done systematically. Nor are department budgets
presented in a way that Congress can make these tradeoffs as it fulfills its
responsibilities in the budgeting process.
There is an increasing awareness of this deficiency throughout
the national security community but, so far, only very preliminary steps have
been taken to produce crosscutting budgets. These preliminary steps have been
limited to special transnational issues such as counter-terrorism. At present,
therefore, neither the Congress nor the American people can assess the relative
value of various national security programs over the full range of Executive
Branch activities in this area.
To remedy these problems, the Commission's initial
recommendation is that strategy should once again drive the design and
implementation of U.S. national security policies:
* 14: The President should personally guide a top-down
strategic planning process and delegate authority to the National Security
Advisor to coordinate that process.
Such a top-down process is critical to designing a
coherent and effective U.S. national security policy. In carrying out his
strategic planning responsibilities on the President's behalf, the National
Security Advisor must enlist the active participation of the members and
advisors of the National Security Council. This group should translate the
President's overall vision into a set of strategic goals and priorities, and
then provide specific guidance on the most important national security policies.
Their product would become the basis for the writing of the annual,
legislatively-mandated U.S. National Security Strategy.
Carrying out this guidance would rest with the
senior-level deputies in the departments and agencies, facilitated by the NSC staff.
They would be specifically responsible for designing preventive strategies,
overseeing how the departments carry forward the President's strategic goals,
and reviewing contingency planning for critical military and humanitarian
operations.
The Commission believes that overall strategic goals and
priorities should also guide the allocation of national security resources, and
therefore recommends the following:
* 15: The President should prepare and present to the
Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that
emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President
should continue to submit budgets for the individual national security
departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation.
The OMB, with the support of the NSC staff, should
undertake the task of formulating this national security budget. Initially, it
should focus on a few of the nation's most critical strategic goals, involving
only some programs in the departmental budgets. Over time, however, it could
evolve into a more comprehensive document. Homeland security,
counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and science and
technology should be included in the initial national security budget. This process
should also serve as a basis for defining the funds to be allocated for
preventive strategies.
Such goal-oriented budgets would help both the
administration and Congress identify the total level of government effort as
well as its composition. Gaps and duplication could be more readily identified.
Such budgets would also enable the Congress to prioritize the most critical
national security goals when they appropriate funds to departments and
agencies.
The President would be able to implement these recommendations
on his own authority as they involve White House staff activities. As far as
the budgetary implications go, this reform would not cost money but, by
rationalizing the strategy and budgeting process, go far toward assuring that
money is spent more efficiently and wisely.
B. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
In exercising his Constitutional power, the President's
personal style and managerial preferences will be critical in how he relates to
his Cabinet secretaries and in how he structures his White House staff. But the
organization and the characteristics of the national security apparatus will
importantly affect the policies that emerge.
The National Security Council was created as part of the
1947 National Security Act to advise the President on the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies, and to help coordinate the activities
of the national security departments and agencies. Its statutory members
currently include the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary
of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisers. The NSC staff authorized by the 1947
Act has evolved over time into a major instrument of Presidential governance,
wielded by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the
National Security Advisor or NSC Advisor), not specified in any statute, who
has become increasingly powerful.
Obviously, this evolution has been affected by the degree
of Presidential involvement in foreign and national security policy as well as
by their various personalities and leadership styles. Over the past decade,
Presidents have increasingly centralized power with the NSC staff for the
making and execution of national security policy. In many ways, the NSC staff
has become more like a government agency than a Presidential staff. It has its
own views and perspectives on the myriad of national security issues
confronting the government. It has its own press, legislative, communication,
and speechmaking "shops" to enable it to conduct ongoing relations
with the media, Congress, the American public, and foreign governments. Aside
from staffing the President, the NSC staff's primary focus has become the
day-to-day management of the nation's foreign and national security policy.
Why has this centralization of power occurred? First,
with the end of the Cold War, national security issues now involve even more
policy dimensions-financial and trade issues, environmental issues,
international legal issues, for example-and each dimension has proponents
within the Executive Branch. It has become harder, therefore, to assign any one
department as the leading actor for a given policy area. The traditional
dividing lines between foreign and domestic policy have also blurred further.
Of all the players, only the NSC staff, in the name of the President, is in a
position to coordinate these disparate interests effectively.
Second, foreign policy is also now very politicized. Few,
if any, issues are easily separated from domestic political debate: not
military intervention, not diplomatic relations, and certainly not trade and
economic interactions with the outside world. Political oversight of these
policies naturally falls to the White House, with the NSC staff acting as its
foreign policy arm.
Finally and most importantly, the State Department over
the past few decades has been seriously weakened and its resources
significantly reduced. Foreign aid programs, as well as representational
responsibilities, are now dispersed throughout the government. It therefore has
fallen to the NSC staff to manage the conduct of America's foreign policy that
was once the prerogative of the Department of State.
This description of the origin of the problem clearly
illustrates a key principle in any attempt to set it aright; namely, that the
NSC Advisor and staff cannot be redirected unless the Department of State is
also set aright.
The Commission views with alarm the expansion of the role
of the NSC staff and recommends the following:
* 16: The National Security Council (NSC) should be
responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of
national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic
law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda.
The NSC Advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central
policymaking and operational role.
The National Security Advisor and NSC staff should give
priority to their traditional and unique roles, namely coordinating the
policymaking process, so that all those with stakes are involved, and all
realistic policy options are considered and analyzed.49 The NSC Advisor and
staff should provide advice privately to the President and oversee the implementation
of Presidential decisions. They should also assume those roles that are unique
to the President's staff, such as preparations for overseas trips and
communications with foreign leaders.
At the same time, the NSC advisor and staff should resist
pressures toward the centralization of power, avoid duplicating the
responsibilities of the departments, and forego operational control of any
aspect of U.S. policy. Assuming a central policymaking role seriously detracts
from the NSC staff's primary roles of honest broker and policy coordinator.
The National Security Advisor should also keep a low
public profile. Legislative, press, communications, and speech writing
functions should reside in the White House staff. These functions should not be
duplicated separately in the NSC staff as they are today. The President, not
his personal staff or advisors, is publicly accountable to the American people.
To the degree that the role of the National Security Advisor continues to be
one of public spokesman, policymaker, and operator, the Commission wishes the
President to understand that pressure is growing in the Congress for making the
National Security Advisor accountable to the American people through Senate
confirmation and through formal and public appearances before Congressional
committees. Returning to a lower-profile National Security Advisor will be
difficult, but such an approach will produce the best policy results and
deflate this pressure.
Every President in the last 30 years has devised some organizational
approach to integrating international economic policies with both domestic
economic policies and national security considerations. Many methods have been
tried. Most recently, in 1993 the Clinton Administration created the National
Economic Council (NEC) as a parallel coordinating institution to the NSC.
The NEC experiment has been a disappointment. The
Treasury Department dominates global financial policy, and its decisions have
often neglected broader national security considerations-most critically, for
example, in the early stages of the recent Asian economic crisis. Meanwhile,
the United States Trade Representative (USTR)-and not the NEC-retains
responsibility for coordinating trade policies and negotiations. The small NEC
staff, as well, finds itself bureaucratically weaker than the NSC staff and
(even when the staffers are dual-hatted) the NSC perspective has predominated.
The policy process should ensure that the coordination of
national security activities reflects the new centrality of economics. This
Commission therefore offers the following two recommendations:
* 17: The President should propose to the Congress that
the Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security
Council.
Consistent with our strong preference for Cabinet
government, this Commission believes the Secretary of the Treasury should be
the President's right arm for international economic policy. But the Treasury's
actions should be coordinated within the National Security Council process. In
the NSC system of supporting subcommittees, Treasury should chair an
interagency working group that manages international economic and financial
policies (including managing financial crises), but it is a Presidential
interest that decisions be fully coordinated with other relevant national
security agencies. We understand that Secretaries of the Treasury have been
routinely invited to National Security Council meetings. But designation as a
statutory member of the NSC would signify the importance of truly integrating
economic policy into national security policy.
* 18: The President should abolish the National Economic
Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the
Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the
National Security Council.
The NSC staff should assume the same coordinating role
for international economic policy as for other national security policies. To
emphasize its importance, the Commission recommends the appointment of a Deputy
National Security Advisor with responsibility for international economics. We
also believe that to integrate properly the economic component of statecraft in
the NSC staff system, more experts in international economics need to be
recruited and placed in offices throughout the NSC staff. To ensure the
integration of domestic and international economic policies, the staffs of the
Domestic Policy Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the NSC will
need to work together very closely.
C. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Over the past few decades, the Department of State has
been seriously weakened as many of its core functions were parceled out to
other agencies. The Agency for International Development, Treasury, and Defense
assumed responsibility for foreign assistance programs, the USTR took over
trade negotiations, and the Commerce Department began to conduct foreign
commercial activities. For many years, too, arms control and public diplomacy
were managed by separate agencies. Other departments, as well as the NSC staff,
have also acquired foreign policy expertise and regularly pursue
representational activities all around the world.
The State Department's own effort to cover all the
various aspects of national security policy-economic, transnational, regional,
security-has produced an exceedingly complex organizational structure.
Developing a distinct "State" point of view is now extremely
difficult and this, in turn, has reduced the department's ability to exercise
any leadership.
Over the past decade, the impulse to create individual
functional bureaus was useful substantively and politically; e.g., in the cases
of human rights, democracy, law enforcement, refugees, political-military
affairs, and nonproliferation. The problem is that overall organizational
efficiency and effectiveness have been lost in the process.
More fundamentally, the State Department's present
organizational structure works at cross-purposes with its Foreign Service
culture. The Foreign Service thinks in terms of countries, and therein lies its
invaluable expertise. But the most senior officials have functional
responsibilities. The department's matrix organization makes it unclear who is
responsible for policies with both regional and functional elements. The
department rarely speaks with one voice, thus reducing its influence and
credibility in its interactions with the Congress and in its representation
abroad.
As a result of these many deficiencies, confidence in the
department is at an all-time low. A spiral of decay has unfolded over many
years in which the Congress, reacting to inefficiencies within the department,
has consistently underfunded the nation's needs in the areas of representation
overseas and foreign assistance. That underfunding, in turn, has deepened the State
Department's inadequacies. This spiral must be reversed. Foreign assistance is
a valuable instrument of U.S. foreign policy, but its present organizational
structure, too, is a bureaucratic morass. Congress has larded the Foreign
Assistance Act with so many earmarks and tasks for the U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) that it lacks a coherent purpose.
Responsibility today for crisis prevention and responses is dispersed in
multiple AID and State bureaus, and among State's Under Secretaries and the AID
Administrator. In practice, therefore, no one is in charge.
Over $4 billion is spent on the State Department's
bilateral assistance programs (Economic Support Funds) and AID's sustainable
development programs. Neither the Secretary of State nor the AID Administrator
is able to coordinate these foreign assistance activities or avoid duplication
among them. More important, no one is responsible for integrating these
programs into broader preventive strategies or for redeploying them quickly in
response to crises. The Congress, too, has no single person to hold accountable
for how the monies it appropriates are spent. Moreover, the majority of AID
funding is expended through contracts with non- governmental organizations
(NGOs) who often lobby Congress over various AID programs, further undermining
the coherence of the nation's assistance programs.
Take the case of a potential response to a humanitarian
disaster in Africa, similar in nature and scale to the 1999 floods in
Mozambique. Today, should some such disaster recur, three AID bureaus would be
involved: those dealing with Africa, Global Programs, and Humanitarian
Response. Responsibility would be dispersed among at least three Under
Secretaries of State (Global Affairs, Political Affairs, and International
Security Affairs), and four State bureaus (Africa; Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor; Population, Refugees, and Migration; and Political-Military). Neither
the Secretary of State nor the AID Administrator would be in a position to commit
the resources found to be necessary, or to direct related humanitarian and
refugee assistance operations. As Figure 3 on page 57 suggests, other
government agencies, and especially the Defense Department, would be at a loss
to know where and how to coordinate their activities with those of the State
Department.
This Commission believes that the Secretary of State
should be primarily responsible for the making and implementation of foreign
policy, under the direction of the President. The State Department needs to be
fundamentally restructured so that responsibility and accountability are
clearly established, regional and functional activities are closely integrated,
foreign assistance programs are centrally planned and implemented, and
strategic planning is emphasized and linked to the allocation of resources.
While we believe that our NSC and State Department recommendations make maximal
sense when taken together, the reform of the State Department must be pursued
whether or not the President adopts the Commission's recommendations with
respect to the NSC Advisor and staff.
Significant improvements in its effectiveness and
competency would provide the rationale for the significant increase in State
Department resources necessary to carry out the nation's foreign policy in the
coming quarter century. In our view, additional resources are clearly needed to
foster the nation's critical goals: promoting economic growth and democracy,
undertaking preventive diplomacy, providing for the security of American officials
abroad, funding the shortfalls in personnel and operating expenses, and
installing the information technologies necessary for the U.S. national
security apparatus to operate effectively in the 21st century. The United
States will be unable to conduct its foreign policy in all its dimensions
without the commitment of such new resources. A failure to provide these funds
will be far more costly to the United States in the long term.
More specifically, then, this Commission strongly
recommends the following State Department redesign:
* 19: The President should propose to the Congress a plan
to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with
responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe,
Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of
the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would
operate in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management.
The new Under Secretaries, through the Secretary of
State, would be accountable to the President and the Congress for all foreign
policy activities in their areas of responsibility. Someone would actually be
in charge.
On behalf of the Secretary, the new Under Secretaries
would formulate a "State" view and represent the department in NSC
meetings. They would appear before Congressional committees. They would be
positioned to orchestrate preventive diplomatic strategies as well as crisis
responses. They would oversee the implementation of all the various assistance
programs (development aid, democracy building, and security assistance) and
explain them coherently before Congress. They would assemble the various
political and security considerations that need to be factored into U.S.
government decisions on global financial crises and other international
economic policies. They would be able to tailor public diplomacy to policy
goals and integrate these activities with other aspects of America's diplomacy.
They would be able to liaise effectively with the growing number of NGOs
engaged in national security activities. (To show how this would work, we have
provided below illustrative responsibilities for a regional Under Secretary and
for the Under Secretary for Global Affairs.)
Figure 3
Figure 4
As Figure 4 on
page 58 shows, each Under Secretary would have a Deputy, so as to provide depth
in crisis situations, or to take on critical diplomatic assignments. Three
bureaus would support the Under Secretaries, each organized to achieve
functional goals (political affairs, security affairs, and economic and
transnational affairs). The new Under Secretary for Global Affairs would be
designated as the third-ranking official in the department to emphasize the
importance of global issues and activities. Consistent with past practice, this
designation would not represent another organizational layer; the Under
Secretary for Global Affairs would simply be the one designated as Acting
Secretary when the Secretary and Deputy Secretary were away. The functions of
the Under Secretary for Management would need to be redefined in light of the
responsibility being given for programs and budgets to the other Under
Secretaries.
This reorganization should be accompanied by, and will be
strengthened by, the full integration of the nation's foreign assistance
activities into the overall framework of U.S. national security. We therefore
recommend strongly that:
* 20: The President should propose to the Congress that
the U.S. Agency for International Development be consolidated into the State
Department. Development aid is not an end in itself, nor can it be successful
if pursued independently of other U.S. programs and activities. It is part of
the nation's overall effort to eradicate poverty, encourage the adoption of democratic
norms, and dampen ethnic and religious rivalries. To be effective, U.S.
development assistance must be coordinated with various other diplomatic
activities, such as challenging corrupt government practices or persuading
governments to adopt more sensible land-use policies. Only a coordinated
diplomatic and assistance effort will advance the nation's goals abroad,
whether they be economic growth and stability, democracy, human rights, or
environmental protection.
Such a fundamental organizational redesign must have a
strategic planning and budgetary process aligned with it. We therefore
recommend the following:
* 21: The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis
to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocation
of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance, and
Budget Office. This office would work directly for the Secretary of State and
represent the department in NSC-led government-wide strategic planning efforts.
Within that framework, the office would define the department's overall foreign
policy goals and priorities. It would plan and prioritize all the department's
assistance programs. It would be responsible for coordinating the budget
planning process and adjudicating any differences among the Under Secretaries.
Take the case of a Congressional appropriation involving
worldwide population programs. This new office would ask the Under Secretary
for Global Affairs to make the initial recommendation as to how the funds would
be distributed. The regional Under Secretaries would then have an opportunity
to appeal. Once the Secretary decided, the Under Secretary for Global Affairs
would have line responsibility for implementing those programs destined for
international organizations, and the other Under Secretaries for programs
within their regions.
By integrating strategic and resource planning, the
Secretary of State would have a more effective means for managing the
activities of the department as well as U.S. embassies abroad.
This office would essentially combine the offices of
Resources, Plans & Policy, and Policy Planning in the current
organizational set-up, eliminating the major design flaw of segregating
planning from resource allocation. But it would retain the responsibility for
housing and encouraging a small group of officers to do longer-range and
strategic thinking, as has been the principal task of the Policy Planning Staff
for half a century.
Figure 3. Current
Organization of Department of State*50
Figure 4: Proposed
Organization of Department of State
It follows from a reform that integrates many of the
nation's foreign policy activities under the Secretary of State that a similar
logic should be applied to the State Department budget as a whole. We therefore
recommend the following:
* 22: The President should ask Congress to appropriate
funds to the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget,
which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as
all expenses for personnel and operations.
The State Department's International Affairs (Function
150) Budget Request would no longer be divided into separate appropriations by
the Foreign Operations subcommittee on the one hand, and by a subcommittee on
the Commerce, State, and Justice Departments on the other. The Congressional
leadership would need to alter the current jurisdictional lines of the
Appropriations subcommittees so that the Foreign Operations subcommittee would
handle the entire State Department budget. Such a reform would give the
administration the opportunity to:
-Allocate all the State Department's resources in a way
to carry out the President's overall strategic goals;
-Ensure that the various assistance programs are
integrated, rather than simply a collection of administrations' political
commitments and Congressional earmarks; and
-Replace the existing budget categories with purposeful
goals.*51
We cannot emphasize strongly enough how critical it is to
change the Department of State from the demoralized and relatively ineffective
body it has become into the President's critical foreign policymaking
instrument. The restructuring we propose would position the State Department to
play a leadership role in the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy,
as well as to harness the department's organizational culture to the benefit of
the U.S. government as a whole. Perhaps most important, the Secretary of State
would be free to focus on the most important policies and negotiations, having
delegated responsibility for integrating regional and functional issues to the
Under Secretaries.
Accountability would be matched with responsibility in
senior policymakers, who in serving the Secretary would be able to speak for
the State Department both within the interagency process and before Congress.
No longer would competing regional and functional perspectives immobilize the
department. At the same time, those functional perspectives, whether human
rights, arms control, or the environment, would not disappear. The Under
Secretaries would be clearly accountable to the Secretary of State, the
President, and the Congress for ensuring that the appropriate priority was
given to these functional tasks.
By making work on functional matters a career path
through the regional hierarchy, the new organization would give Foreign Service
officers an incentive to develop functional expertise in such areas as the
environment, arms control, and drug trafficking. Civil servants in the State
Department would have new opportunities to apply their technical expertise in
regional settings. The ability to formulate and integrate U.S. foreign policies
in a regional context, too, will give them greater coherence and improve their
effectiveness.
The Under Secretary for Global Affairs, as redefined,
would give priority and high-level attention to working with international
organizations. In particular, it would consolidate humanitarian and refugee
assistance programs, thereby remedying the lack of leadership and coordination
in past operations. This new organization would bring together all the
department's crisis management operations: counter-terrorism Foreign Emergency
Support Teams (FEST) teams, humanitarian assistance Disaster Assistance
Response Teams (DART) teams, and military over-flight clearances.
The overall restructuring of the State Department would
vastly improve its management. It would rationalize the Secretary's span of
control through a significant reduction in the number of individuals reporting
directly to the Secretary, and it would abolish Special Coordinators and
Envoys. The duplication that exists today in the regional and functional
bureaus would be eliminated. The number of bureaus would be reduced
significantly. One new Under Secretary would be created, but the AID
Administrator position would be eliminated.
We are aware that our proposed restructuring of the State
Department will give rise to the concern that such functional goals as
nonproliferation and human rights will be diminished in importance. Indeed, the
primary motivation for establishing the functional Under Secretaries and their
bureaus was to counter the prevailing culture of the department, which tends to
give priority to maintaining good bilateral relations rather than pressing
foreign governments on these contentious matters.
But in the restructuring reform offered here, proponents
for these functional goals will still exist. Indeed, they will be in a better
position to affect policies by being involved in their formulation early on in
the process, and not at the last moment by intercession with the Secretary. The
Under Secretaries will be responsible for ensuring that the priorities of the
President, Secretary, and Congress are being achieved. If these involve counter-terrorism,
refugees, the environment, or some other functional goal, it is hard to imagine
that they would be neglected.
Another possible concern is that organizing in terms of
regional Under Secretaries is inconsistent with globalizing trends. The Commission's
Phase I Report forecasts that global forces, especially economic ones, will
continue to challenge the role and efficacy of states. More important, however,
it affirms that "the principle of national sovereignty will
endure."*52 States will remain the main venue for diplomatic activity for
a long time. This restructuring proposal is based on the reality that the
United States will need to continue to deal with states around the world while
being able, as well, to integrate policies in both regional and global
contexts. The new Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office, along with
the Global Affairs Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries, will also be
available to ensure that global perspectives are given sufficient attention.
Defining the geographical coverage of the regions will
necessarily be somewhat arbitrary, but the same problem exists under any
arrangement. Russia will be integrated again into Europe and South Asia joined
again with the Middle East. The most difficult decisions will involve where to
place Turkey; whether to keep India and Pakistan in the same region or separate
them; how to divide up the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union;
and whether northern Africa is part of the Middle East or Africa. Setting up the
new organization will provide an opportunity to make these decisions anew in
light of prospective developments in the coming decades, and, if at all
possible, to build in some degree of flexibility for the years ahead.
Issues will certainly arise that span regions or require
the integration of regional and global perspectives. Planning for G-8 meetings,
for example, will have to involve all the Under Secretaries. The Under
Secretaries of Global Affairs, Europe, the Americas, and Asia would have a role
in policies bearing on national missile defense. Global financial crises would
almost certainly engage more than one Under Secretary. Jurisdictional disputes
may well arise that the Secretary (or the Deputy Secretary) will have to
address. What the restructuring will have done, however, is to make the number
of those cases requiring intervention far fewer than today. That is how senior
management is most effectively employed in any successful private corporate
organization; so why not in the U.S. Department of State?
Another concern that some may have is that development
programs will be neglected if AID is integrated into the State Department. Some
may worry, as well, that the State Department will direct foreign assistance to
programs promising immediate political returns. This is not so. In the new
organization, the Secretary of State could directly instruct the Strategic
Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office to ensure that priority is given to
development aid-if that is the wish of the President and the Congress. The
demise of AID would also mean that no single person, apart from the Secretary
of State, would be accountable for the implementation of development programs.
It is true that each Under Secretary would oversee development aid for only their
area of responsibility. But they would be able to integrate these activities
with all the other regional or global assistance programs far more effectively
than is the case today. Indeed, AID's current decentralized structure would fit
well with the overall State restructuring. AID's regional and global offices
would become part of the new Economic and Transnational Bureaus. AID regional
and global planning and budgeting offices would be retained as part of the
Under Secretaries' staffs. AID's budget officials would join the Strategic
Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office, and their procurement and contracting
officials would be integrated into State Department offices with similar
responsibilities. The actual planning and administration of AID programs would
be very similar to current practices. The United States is represented overseas
in 160 countries, with over 250 embassies, consulates, and missions. Over
14,000 Americans and about 30,000 foreign nationals are employed in these
posts. More than 30 U.S. government agencies operate overseas. This Commission
believes that the U.S. overseas presence has been badly short-changed by
shortsighted budget cuts to the point where the security and prosperity of the
American people are ill-served. But it also believes that the U.S. presence
must be adjusted to new and prospective economic, social, political, and
security realities. Only with such changes will Congressional confidence be
restored, and the necessary funding provided, to support these critical activities.
We also believe that in order for the State Department to
run efficiently in an increasingly "wired world," its worldwide
information technology assets must be updated. There has been progress in this
area, but more could be done. This Commission urges Congress to provide
sufficient funding to ensure the full completion of this effort.*53
U.S. Ambassadors and embassies play critical roles in
promoting U.S. national security goals overseas. We therefore recommend that
all other Ambassadors, including the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, be brought under the authority of the Secretary of State for
policymaking and implementation, without altering their representational role
on behalf of the President.
The President should also take steps to reinforce the
authorities of all U.S. Ambassadors. Ambassadors should be responsible for
planning and coordinating the activities of all the agencies at each mission,
including U.S. assistance and law enforcement activities. The Ambassadors should
formulate a comprehensive, integrated mission plan and recommend to the Cabinet
secretaries an integrated country budget. The new State Department Under
Secretaries should be advocates for their Ambassadors' budget priorities in
Washington's interagency budget deliberations. We further recommend the
following:
* 23:The President should ensure that Ambassadors have
the requisite area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to
function effectively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan
advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees,
career and non-career alike.
This Commission also believes that the Secretary of
State, on behalf of the President, should pursue urgently the process of
"right-sizing" all American posts overseas. The process must ensure
that embassy activities are responsive to emerging challenges and encourage
greater flexibility in the size and concept of embassies and consulates to
serve specialized needs.*54 Embassies should also be reorganized into sections
reflecting the new State Department organization: political, security, and
economic/transnational affairs.
Regions will become more important in the emerging world
of the 21st century. State borders no longer contain the flow of refugees, the
outbreak of ethnic violence, the spread of deadly diseases, or environmental
disasters. Humanitarian and military operations will often depend on access
rights in many different countries. As regional political and economic
organizations gradually evolve outside Europe, they may begin to take on roles
in fighting such transnational dangers as crime, drugs, and money laundering.
The United States needs flexible ways to deal with these regional problems.
Today, U.S. Ambassadors are accredited to individual
states. No mechanism exists for them to coordinate their activities regionally.
The unified military commands are regionally based, but their planning and
operations are focused primarily on military contingencies. Every regional
Commander-in-Chief (CINC) does have a Political Adviser from the State
Department, but there is no systematic civilian foreign policy input into
military planning. When a crisis occurs, coordinating the various civilian
activities (humanitarian assistance and police forces) with military activities
(transport or peacekeeping operations) remains very uneven. More fundamentally,
a gap exists between the CINC, who operates on a regional basis, and the
Ambassador, who is responsible for activities within one country.
In light of these circumstances, and fully mindful of the
need to reinforce the goals of the new State Department organization proposed
above, the Commission encourages the departments and agencies involved in
foreign operations-State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice- to
cooperate more fully in regional planning. Specifically the President should:
* Establish NSC interagency working groups for each major
region, chaired by the respective regional Under Secretary of State, to develop
regional strategies and coordinated government-wide plans for their
implementation;
* Direct the Secretary of Defense to have regional CINCs
institute a process through their Political Advisers to involve the Ambassadors
in their region in their military planning; and
* Direct the Secretary of State to instruct the regional
Under Secretaries to meet at least semi-annually with the ambassadors located
in their region (with one such meeting each year being held in the same general
location as the regional CINCs).
The implementation of these recommendations concerning
the Department of State in all its various aspects, and their budgetary
implications, is a complex undertaking. As noted, the Commission's
recommendations involving the NSC processes and staff could be implemented
immediately. The problem will be that, to have any chance of returning to the
NSC's more traditional roles, the State Department needs to be strengthened
well beyond the designation of a strong Secretary of State. Congressional
action will be required to implement the proposed reorganization. With respect
to the U.S. overseas presence, the President has the authority to carry out the
Commission's recommendations. We urge him to use that authority forthwith.
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department of Defense (DoD) protects the American
people and advances the nation's interests and values worldwide. It also plays
a critical role in maintaining global peace. And it stands in dire need of
serious reform.
DoD's current organization, infrastructure, business
practices, and legal and regulatory structure evolved during the Cold War in ad
hoc and incremental ways. Many commissions have addressed DoD structure over
the years and offered recommendations for reform. Some have been implemented,
but this Commission believes that much still needs to be done. In particular:
* DoD's policy organization is outdated and overly
complex;
* Major staff roles and responsibilities are ill-defined,
with duplication and redundancy the rule not the exception;
* Supporting infrastructure is highly inefficient and
consumes a major portion of the DoD budget;
* The present process for programming and budgeting
military forces generates strategic postures not very different from those of
the Cold War despite vastly changed strategic realities;
* The weapons acquisition process, which is slow,
inefficient, and burdened by excessive regulation and politicization, has
become a burden on a defense industry is already in the midst of a financial
crisis; and
* The process by which force structure planning occurs is
not appropriately aligned with the current global security realities.
The key to success will be direct, sustained involvement
and commitment to defense reform on the part of the President, Secretary of Defense,
and Congressional leadership. The new Secretary of Defense will need to be
personally engaged. The challenges are too great to delegate responsibility to
others. His central task will be to persuade Congress to accord him the
flexibility he needs to carry out the Commission's recommendations, and to
contain Congress' desire to micro-manage DoD processes through crippling laws
and regulations.
Resource issues are also at stake in Defense Department
reform. America's global commitments are so extensive, and the costs of future
preparedness are so high, that significantly more resources will be required to
match means to ends. The potential mismatch ahead between strategy and
resources can be mitigated in the longer run by generating savings from within
the Defense Department through extensive management reform. Not only will the
Defense Department save money that it needs for its core responsibilities, it
may also increase Congress' willingness to shrink the mismatch between means
and ends in the nearer term.
Policy Reform The
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supports the Secretary of Defense in his
role as a member of the National Security Council, and helps him to ensure that
the multiplicity of DoD's defense and military activities are guided by the
President's overall national security policies. The structure of the Policy
staff has evolved over many years as a result of the wishes of individual
Secretaries and various Congressional mandates. Today, the office retains its
traditional focus on security assistance and alliance relations. It has also
expanded its mandate to foster defense relationships throughout the world as
well as to participate in such functional activities as nuclear threat
reduction, humanitarian assistance, and counter-drug efforts. At the same time,
such policy activities as export controls and arms control verification have
been given to the recently consolidated Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The most recent reorganization gives little emphasis to
strategic planning, though the Strategy and Threat Reduction office is involved
to some extent in defense strategy and contingency planning. Regional and
functional responsibilities are dispersed among Policy's three offices. The
office of International Security Affairs covers Europe, Asia, Middle East, and
Africa. A Congressionally-mandated assistant secretary deals with Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) as well as Inter-American
affairs, terrorism, drugs, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. The Strategy
and Threat Reduction office focuses on the functional areas of nuclear weapons
and missile defense, counter-proliferation and threat reduction, and the
regional areas of Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. The result is a very complex
structure that makes coordination difficult within the Defense Department and
with other government agencies.
This Commission therefore recommends some modest but
important reforms, as follows:
* 24: The Secretary of Defense should propose to Congress
a restructuring plan for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, which would abolish the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and create a new office of an
Assistant Secretary dedicated to Strategy and Planning (S/P).
We believe that a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is no longer needed, for
these activities are now widely integrated into our strategy, plans, and
forces. Special operations can and should be addressed like all other mature
missions within the department's Major Force Program process. The other
regional activities of SOLIC would be transferred to other parts of the policy
office. But a new office of Strategy and Planning (S/P) should be created, with
responsibility for leading and coordinating DoD planning processes. This office
would also support the Secretary of Defense in the NSC-led strategic planning
process as well as the Joint Staff's military contingency planning process.
Structural Reform
Past efforts to reform the Defense Department have
emphasized the following three general principles.*55 DoD civilian and military
staffs need to focus on their core roles and responsibilities. The department
should eliminate unnecessary layers, avoid duplication of activities, and
encourage the delegation of authority. Many defense support activities should
be outsourced to the private sector and others fully privatized. The Commission
supports these overall goals and, more specifically, recommends the following:
* 25: Based on a review of the core roles and
responsibilities of the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Joint Staff, the military services, and the CINCs, the Secretary of Defense
should reorganize and reduce those staffs by ten to fifteen percent.*56
A comprehensive review of staff sizes and structures must
follow from clear definitions of each staff's mission, and core competencies
should be established around those missions. All activities peripheral to a
staff's main missions should be curtailed or eliminated.*57 In the Commission's
view, mandatory reductions will force the staffs to eliminate redundancies
among them and unnecessary layers within them. Staff activities that can be
downsized include:
-OSD program management involving special operations,
humanitarian assistance, and counter-drug programs;
-Joint Staff regional and manpower offices, as well as
their use of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) processes, to evaluate infrastructure
and service support programs;
-Service regional planning offices, some acquisition
oversight, as well as the duplicate manpower activities of the military and OSD
staffs;
-CINC program analysis activities and some sub-unified
and component command headquarters.
In the case of
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Commission strongly urges that its
responsibilities be carefully defined and limited. Many Joint Staff activities
have been divested to JFCOM and new missions have been added, including
homeland security, joint training, and joint experimentation. Some have
suggested further that JFCOM represent the CINCs in the requirements definition
process. Since the JFCOM commander is already dual-hatted as NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander-Atlantic (SACLANT), a span of control problem looms with the
steady expansion of his duties. But realigning these staffs is not enough.
DoD's supporting infrastructure needs to be reduced as well, both because it
holds the promise of giving better support to the nation's military forces and
because it will free up significant resources for modernization.*58
Roughly half of DoD's infrastructure falls into two
categories: central logistics and installation support. More than 75 percent of
DoD's infrastructure resides within the military services and, in this fiscal
year, will consume $134 billion. This system consists of approximately
two-dozen defense agencies and field activities whose accounts are scattered across
various program and budgeting elements.
Since these infrastructure activities do not operate
according to market forces, it should come as no surprise that business costs
and practices are not competitive with the civilian sector. Most defense agencies
place little emphasis on achieving performance goals based on measurable
outputs. Many also suffer from conflicting supervision from OSD and the
military services, while at the same time receiving strong advocacy from the
Congress bent on protecting local constituent jobs and installations. Several
defense agencies and field activities have a combat support role, which adds
the difficulty of having to harmonize business efficiency with military
effectiveness.
Efforts over the years to reduce DoD's infrastructure
have focused in part on outsourcing various activities to the private sector.
Outsourcing guidelines are found in OMB Circular A-76, but the process is
cumbersome and bureaucratic, often taking two to four years to complete for
each major initiative. Moreover, the Circular A-76 process involves competition
between the private sector and an ongoing government activity. The
"competition" is inherently biased against private business because
the government's "bid" deflates true operating costs and hides
overhead expenses. This sharply limits the applicability of the Circular A-76
process.
Given the significant obstacles to reducing,
consolidating, and restructuring the Defense Department's supporting
infrastructure, the Commission recommends the following:
* 26: The Secretary of Defense should establish a
ten-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20 to 25 percent through
outsourcing and privatizing as many DoD support agencies and activities as
possible.
Given the political sensitivities surrounding such steps,
an independent and bipartisan commission should be established to produce a
plan to achieve this goal. We propose that implementation of the plan rely on a
joint Executive-Legislative Branch mechanism similar to the Base Realignment
and Closures (BRAC) process.
In putting together such a plan, this new commission will
need to explain to Congress what the process will entail. This plan should
develop common definitions of what constitutes a "support activity."
It should include all the various categories of supporting infrastructure,
including both Service and civilian DoD agencies. It should then define in
general terms what should remain as government owned and operated, what should
be outsourced, and what should be privatized.*59 In principle, it would seem
that intelligence, acquisition, and criminal investigation should be
consolidated, but remain government owned and operated. Some aspects of health,
personnel, and many support functions on local installations should be outsourced.
Logistics, accounting, auditing, aspects of defense communications, military
exchanges and commissaries should be privatized.*60 Finally, the plan should
lay out a five-year road map for accomplishing the outsourcing, and a ten-year
road map for privatization-recognizing that outsourcing can be a useful step
toward privatization.
In the meantime, DoD and the Office of Management and
Budget need to revamp the Circular A-76 guidelines in ways to make the
selection process quicker and the competition more equitable. This will require
working with Congress, because steps to privatize substantial portions of the
DoD infrastructure will invite intense Congressional scrutiny.
The failure to significantly reduce DoD's infrastructure
could prove very injurious in the long run. Attempts to save money merely by
squeezing savings from the current system-but without fundamentally
restructuring that system-will eventually jeopardize the provision of adequate
funding for core needs such as modernization and personnel. If the Congress
will not provide the funding needed to compensate for departmental
inefficiencies, then it will need to explain why it also hamstrings the
department's own efforts to become more efficient.
Process Reform
Three major areas of DoD responsibility cry out for
particular scrutiny: the programming and budgeting process, the acquisition
process, and the force planning process. We take these in turn.
For the past thirty years, the Defense Department has
produced its budget through its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) process. Theoretically, the PPBS process is top-down in design,
beginning with the National Security Strategy (NSS) as guidance for both the
National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).*61 In
reality, however, the PPBS process is predominantly a "bottom-up"
system driven by existing programs and budgets. The problems of the PPBS
process are well known. The PPBS phases operate semi- autonomously rather than
supportively, creating unnecessary turbulence and encouraging the repeated
revisiting of prior decisions. Guidance to the Services and other DoD
components for program and budget development tends to be both vague and late.
Major program decisions are often delayed until the end of the budget
development phase, in turn causing hurried and often inaccurate adjustments to
budgets and to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Frequently, long-term
modernization plans are disrupted during annual budget cycles. Minor details
receive inordinate attention. As a result, the PPBS process fails to provide
the Secretary with the means to guide the budget process strategically. It has
contributed much to the department's tendency to replicate existing force
structure and its inability to advance the transformation of U.S. forces to
deal with a post-Cold War environment.
The PPBS must be restructured to link it directly to
strategic goals and to reduce its obsession with mundane program and budgeting
details. The department's planning should be informed by the strategic guidance
emanating from the President and NSC principals, as specified above in Section
III.A, and then the Secretary of Defense should translate that guidance into
the various internal DoD processes that produce Defense programs and budgets.
The most critical step is for the Secretary of Defense to
produce defense policy and planning guidance that defines specific goals and
establishes relative priorities. He would need to do this through a
departmental process that involves serious analysis and debate of the most
critical issues. Real strategic choices must be defined and decisions made. The
program review phase of the PPBS could then measure progress in achieving his
policy and planning objectives. This Secretarial guidance would also provide
the basis for defining the National Military Strategy and for conducting the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
The Commission believes that the QDR should then become
the foundation of the PPBS. To be truly effective, we recommend:
* 27: The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should
move the Quadrennial Defense Review to the second year of a Presidential term.
By statute, the QDR is to be completed in the first year
of a new administration. Such a deadline, however, does not allow the time or
the means for an incoming administration to influence the QDR's outcome. The
Presidential appointment process now extends six to nine months.*62 The new
President's overall vision and strategic goals also take time to develop and so
cannot inform the review. Meanwhile, the new team inherits the supporting
analysis from the previous administration and Joint Staff. Past practice
suggests that the DoD bureaucracy has figured out how to use the QDR process to
preserve the status quo, while outgoing senior officials have rarely taken any
stake in the process. Postponing the QDR until the second year would remedy
these problems, and would still be available in time to influence the second of
four budgets that an administration develops entirely on its own.
For the department to be able to develop true strategic
alternatives, it will need to focus on resources. We therefore recommend a
second change in the QDR.
Despite the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a
newer, less certain strategic environment, the percentage of budget resources
that is allotted to the Services and defense agencies-called Total Obligation
Authority (TOA) in the Defense budget-has not changed appreciably over the last
ten years. Only minor force structure alternatives have been generated; defense
programs remain essentially unchanged, and modernization funding keeps getting
pushed into the future. Therefore, we recommend the following:
* 28: The Secretary of Defense should introduce a new
process that would require the Services and defense agencies to compete for the
allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget.
A structured process of competition for resources, moored
within the QDR process and focused on the allocation of TOA, can change this.
One way this competition could be accomplished is for OSD to retain five to ten
percent of the TOA and then reallocate it during the QDR to promising systems
and initiatives-be they those of the Services, DARPA, or Joint programs. The
Secretary and his OSD staff must accompany the TOA holdback with the
identification of high priority programs that fill key strategic requirements.
This is necessary to insure funding for strategic lift and space programs as
well as joint interoperability programs, such as C4ISR. In this process, the
Services and defense agencies would be required to identify their highest and
lowest priority programs.*63 This would give the Secretary a vehicle to stretch
or kill low-priority programs and begin the process of reallocating funds to
more promising areas during subsequent PPBS cycles.
For any TOA reallocation process to be viable, two things
must happen. First, the Secretary will need to rely on his OSD staff, and not
rely only on the Service and Joint Staffs. The OSD staff will also need to
coordinate the analysis that will inform the discussion of the alternatives.
OSD internal reforms will be key to their ability to carry out these tasks.
The Commission proposes a final change to improve the QDR
process. The QDR should be restructured so that it defines defense
modernization requirements for two distinct planning horizons: near-term (one
to three years) and long-term (four to fifteen years). The CINCs should have
primary influence on readiness in the near-term execution horizon. The Services
should focus on modernization, personnel, and infrastructure throughout the
long-term planning horizon. The Joint Staff should focus on joint issues and
force interoperability planning. The OSD staff would exercise broad oversight
and ensure that QDR planning followed the President's and the Secretary's
strategic guidance and was based on realistic political and resource
assumptions.
Flowing from the QDR process, the PPBS process must be
reoriented in ways to conform to political reality and achieve better
coordination among the civilian and military staffs. To do this, the calendar
should be revamped. Policy and planning guidance should be issued biennially
and prior to when the Services start building their initial programs and
budgets. The Joint Staff and OSD would then develop the most critical issues
for review by the Secretary in the April to August time frame. Final decisions
would then be postponed until after Congress had done its markup of the
previous year's budget, so as to integrate their decisions into the upcoming
budget. Final Presidential approval would occur by the end of the year.
High-speed computers now allow the programming and budgeting phases to be
compressed and to take account of Congressional action. The PPBS need not be
wholly linear in execution.
The United States equips its military forces through a
complex process that depends to a large degree on the private sector, but also
involves an enormous number of laws and regulations that compose a thick web of
government oversight. The acquisition process is a hybrid process, with
characteristics of both a free enterprise system and a government arsenal
system. Operating within this environment is a small group of primarily
defense-oriented companies, a larger number of basically commercial companies
with some involvement in defense procurement, and a growing number of
companies, particularly high-tech companies, to which dealing with the
Department of Defense is an anathema. Importantly, all of these companies must
compete in the open marketplace for both financial capital and skilled workers
and managers.
A worrisome number of studies in recent years have
pointed to the precarious health of many of the nation's most critical defense
suppliers.64 Many businesses are unable to work profitably with DoD under the
weight of its auditing, contracting, profitability, investment, and inspection
regulations. These regulations also impair DoD's ability to keep abreast of the
current pace of technological innovation. Weapons development cycles today
average nine years in an environment where technology changes markedly every
twelve to eighteen months in Silicon Valley-and the trend lines continue to
diverge.
Competition is essential within the defense sector to
achieve both affordability and innovation. Yet the current low level of
modernization activity often makes competition impractical. In addition,
competition is affected adversely by the exacting social and ethical standards
to which DoD is held. Such standards impose restrictions that make it virtually
impossible for DoD to be efficient and aggressive in achieving cost savings.
Despite some recent improvements, the trends of the last
decade are very troubling and, if they continue, could severely endanger
America's long-term military capability. A strategy of standing back and
totally relying on the forces of the marketplace will likely fail. The United
States must look to the health of the U.S. defense industrial base just as it
takes responsibility for the viability of its Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard. This does not mean government management of the defense
industrial base. It does mean creating an environment where good performers can
succeed and prosper.
In place of a specialized "defense industrial
base," the nation needs a national industrial base for defense composed of
a broad cross-section of commercial firms as well as the more traditional
defense firms. The "new technology" sectors must be attracted to work
with the government on sound business and professional grounds; the more
traditional defense suppliers, who fill important needs unavailable in the
commercial sector, must be given incentives to innovate and operate more
efficiently.
If this is to be accomplished, the defense acquisition
process will need fundamental reform. To guide this reform, the Commission
offers these overarching principles.
* The nation needs to restore the balance of funding
among modernization, readiness, and force structure. The procurement
"holiday" affecting modernization has produced a highly unbalanced
force for the future.
* The government should encourage small, agile, high-tech
companies to enter defense competitions, as they represent both a source of
innovation and an inspiration to new efficiencies.
* The department's overall modernization strategy should
give priority to fundamental research; substantially increase prototyping;
stress the evolutionary upgrading of platforms throughout their life; and keep
commitments to long-term, stable production.
* To the extent practicable, the acquisition system needs
to be open to continuous competition, and open to new ideas from companies of
all sizes. It should focus on "outputs"-i.e., measurable products,
time, and cost-as opposed to "process."
* The weapons development process should rely on
competition to solve performance problems and keep down costs, with
commensurate rewards for those who succeed.
* The acquisition system should use the market to
decrease system costs and improve schedule and system performance. The current
system of centralized planning, the inappropriate use of government agencies to
perform commercial tasks, and the lack of managerial accountability stifles
efficiency.
* The government, not the private sector, should pay the
costs that result from explicit government demands and requirements in the
acquisition process. At the same time, companies deserve no proprietary
entitlement to publicly-financed designs and technology.
Turning to more specific recommendations, this Commission
is concerned that the current acquisition system does not support the timely
introduction of new technologies. Developing and producing weapon systems takes
too long.65 Some major systems are not even completed before the parts they
depend on from the commercial sector are outmoded and no longer available.
Worse, while the commercial world is shortening cycle times, DoD is not-so the
gap between commercial and government practice continues to widen. This is the
case in large part because of the inflexibility built into federal regulations.
We therefore recommend the following:
* 29: The Secretary of Defense should establish and
employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a second,
"fast track" for a limited number of potential breakthrough systems,
especially in the area of command and control.
The two-track system would accept an accelerated,
higher-risk approach to the development of breakthrough capabilities,
especially in areas undergoing rapid change in the state of the art.
Simultaneously, a more conservative approach is appropriate for more
conventional programs. One size does not fit all.
The Commission also believes that the development of new
technologies must be emphasized and properly financed. Development programs
should generally be administered through contracts that pay for the costs plus
a fee, with the fee being tied not only to system performance but also to
meeting the schedule within costs. We must eliminate the pressures whereby
firms need to recover R&D costs and losses during the production phase.
Full funding of R&D programs is an essential part of the acquisition
process. Correspondingly, fixed-price contracts are appropriate for programs
whose scope and risk are well understood and manageable. As we have already
suggested in Section II above, the nation must also invest heavily in basic
research in university, corporate, and government laboratories. Prototyping of
a weapon system, which allows the possibility that some attempts will fail, and
then developing and producing the most promising concepts, will get the
"kinks" out of systems early and shorten the development cycle time.
The initial costs would be higher to the Services, which is why prototyping is
often resisted, but the total program costs promise to be lower. In addition,
it will help create and maintain viable defense suppliers and their critical
design teams, even in a low-production environment. We therefore recommend the
following:
* 30: The Secretary of Defense should foster innovation
by directing a return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of
selected weapons and support systems.
Prototyping should be paired with incremental delivery
and evolutionary upgrades of existing operational systems. This will allow the
product to remain current with continuing technological developments. It has
the further advantages of reducing the time to deliver a new capability to the
war fighter and of decreasing production risks significantly.
The Defense Department cannot depend entirely on speeding
up its integration with the commercial sector. The nation also needs to invest
in selected research programs where military systems have no commercial
counterparts. Unfortunately, large and complex DoD research and development projects
generally suffer from a distortion of cost competition since companies often
underbid the R&D phase in hopes of securing funding in more profitable
production phases. The Commission thus recommends that the laws prohibiting the
use of Independent R&D (IR&D) funding for program support be more
broadly interpreted and more strictly enforced.
Program turbulence, often stemming from lack of funds or
from budgetary instability, is the primary cause of inefficiencies and cost
overruns in DoD programs. This budgetary instability has several sources. One
is the current reality of the resource allocation process itself within DoD,
which unfortunately often takes all resources into account during budget
reductions-including acquisition programs. This normally results in a known and
deliberate underfunding of previously approved programs. Another problem is the
acquisition system itself, which suffers from cost overruns and program
extensions. Lastly, the Congress often uses small "takes" from large programs
to reallocate funds to other priorities without realizing or understanding the
problems this creates in having to reprogram funds, write new contracts, and
establish new schedules.
We realize that many commissions, and ever more studies,
over the past several years have recommended two-year budgeting and multiyear
procurement as a way of limiting program turbulence. If these forms of
budgeting were introduced, the disincentive to disrupt acquisition programs
would appropriately be very high. We also know that Congress has doggedly
refused to take such proposals seriously. Congress lacks confidence in DoD's
ability to execute such a budget given past weapons cost overruns. Furthermore,
appropriating funds on a yearly basis gives Congress a greater ability to influence
the Defense Department's policies and programs. Therefore, rather than propose
two-year budgeting across the entire Department of Defense, we focus on the
single area where two-year budgeting makes the most sense and stands to do the
most good. We recommend the following:
* 31: Congress should implement two-year defense
budgeting solely for the modernization element of the DoD budget
(R&D/procurement) because of its long-term character, and it should expand
the use of multiyear procurement.
Such steps would markedly increase the stability of
weapons development programs and result in budgetary savings in the billions of
dollars. For this to happen, however, the Secretary of Defense must impose
discipline in the decision-making process. It is already difficult to start new
engineering development programs. It should be made even more demanding,
ensuring that the military requirements are understood and enduring, and that
the technology, concepts, and funding are all well in hand. Once a program is
approved, it should be equally difficult to change it. The Commission also
notes that it is sometimes better to eliminate some programs early than to
absorb the costs of constantly extending programs and procuring limited numbers
of weapons at high unit costs. To accomplish this, Congress will need to let
decisions to kill programs stand as well as support DoD budgeting and
procurement reforms.
If the government will not take the measures to improve
program stability by introducing two-year budgeting in modernization and
R&D accounts, and more broadly adopt multiyear funding, it cannot expect
private industry to obligate itself to suppliers, or to assume risks on its own
investments with little prospect of long-term returns.
Estimating costs is very difficult, especially in the
early stages of weapons development. As a result, costs often escalate
significantly. Introducing immature technologies and concepts into engineering
development can lead to a major waste of resources. Constant modifications in program
specifications can significantly drive up costs. The acquisition system today
is characterized by underfunding, turbulence, occasional lack of competition,
and a propensity to follow routine processes rather than focus on producing
on-time results. In addition, the current system gives incentives to program
offices to spend all their annual appropriation regardless of need. We
therefore recommend that the Defense Department allocate resources for weapon
development programs by phase rather than in annual increments.
This approach to resource allocation within DoD should
include the provision of financial reserves to resolve unanticipated problems,
as is common commercial practice. This can be accomplished by providing
contingency funds in advance to deal with program uncertainties. To ensure
their proper use, such funds should be placed not in the program office, but
under the control of the Service acquisition official. Fully funding programs
during each phase-and especially the early phases-will decrease program
turbulence and provide a basis for more reliable budget and schedule
forecasting. It will also allow better program management and produce
significant cost savings.
Robust experimentation and exploration of innovative
technologies are essential, but there must also be an effective screening
process for the selection of mature, affordable technologies before entering
full-scale development. DoD currently uses a complex acquisition schedule,
where problems associated with technology generation, prototyping, and
engineering development often migrate into production. The acquisition system
inadequately addresses concurrent risk. Worst of all, testing procedures are
generally viewed (and feared) as report cards in the weapon development
process. This discourages program managers from using tests to attain
knowledge, demonstrate technology maturity, and assure the viability of key
manufacturing processes.
We therefore recommend that the recently adopted
three-phase acquisition process be institutionalized. Those three phases are
technology development, product development, and production. Testing should be
a key part of the technology development process as well as the last two
phases.
A three-phase system would focus on maturing robust
technologies prior to decisions on development, and then on identifying
problems earlier in engineering development to minimize risk and cost in
production. Some overlap between phases is inevitable, but steps can be taken
to control the concurrent risk. This will require that DoD adopt a
"knowledge-based" evaluation and testing procedure to establish
technology maturity, to evaluate risks, costs and operational limitations.
Testing should follow commercial practices, which test early, hard, and often
to identify problems, to generate "knowledge," and to guide
subsequent program development. Commercial testing is also more systematic.
Subcomponents are thoroughly tested before they are combined into components,
components are thoroughly tested before they are combined into subsystems, and
so forth.
We believe that a clear three-phrase process-with bright
red stop signs erected to prevent premature entry into subsequent phases-will
help in every respect, and we applaud DoD's recent move in this direction. More
importantly, this Commission recommends that program reviews focus on the need,
merit, and maturity of the program, and not be used by individuals to reopen
past debates about the wisdom of the original program approval.
Congress and others have put in place an accumulation of
laws and regulations to protect against fraud, waste, and abuse, the net effect
of which is to create a system of requirements and acquisition oversight that
creates the very waste it was intended to prevent.
The "regulation cost" in DoD and the defense
industry has been estimated by various observers to be on the order of 30
percent of the acquisition budget, while the indirect management and oversight
burden in the nation's commercial sector ranges from 5 to 15 percent-and is
falling. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC) employ a "division equivalent" of auditors,
and these are complemented by multitudes of various Service auditing
organizations. They create costly inefficiencies and often lead to inferior
products.
Moreover, the DoD oversight process, by engendering an
adversarial system, encourages timid decision-making and forces industry to go
to extremes in accounting and business procedures. This system, which is based
on institutional and individual distrust, needs to be replaced with one that
conforms better to normal business practices. The Defense Department needs to
mimic the nation's private sector-again, to the extent possible-in reducing
costs, improving product development cycles, and adapting rapidly to new
technologies.
Specifically, federal acquisition regulations must no
longer weigh down business with so much gratuitous paperwork and regulation
that they discourage firms from doing business with the government. While the
requirement for public accountability can never allow the defense acquisition
system to mirror image the private sector completely, excess regulation can and
should be significantly reduced. We therefore recommend the following:
* 32: Congress should modernize Defense Department
auditing and oversight requirements by rewriting relevant sections of U.S.
Code, Title 10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs).
The goal should be to reduce the numbers of auditors and
inspectors for the DoD weapons acquisition system to a level commensurate with
the marginal benefits produced by such auditing and inspection. Compared to
leading companies in the commercial sector, this would entail an approximate
reduction within DoD of 50 to 60 percent.
Rewriting the FARs should be premised on two principles.
First, the government must pay for the legitimate costs that it causes to be
incurred for what it demands in the acquisition process. The government must
reimburse legitimate costs so that contractors may invest in new technology.
The government must also share cost savings to create incentives for
efficiency. Progress payments, covering a legitimate cost of business, should
be automatically indexed to interest rates. Second, FARs must encourage competition
and give incentives for timely production. The rewritten FARs must have the
flexibility that promote a profit policy under which firms that perform well
are rewarded well-and firms that perform poorly are penalized or terminated, or
both.*66
To make this recommendation work, DoD will have to
exercise significant leadership and work with Congress and industry to change
the existing culture throughout the acquisition and procurement infrastructure.
But that is not the only problem. Both industry and government officials often
fail to take advantage of flexibilities in government regulations because it is
less risky for them to follow old procedures. Positive actions taken in the
past decade have paid off only when both DoD program managers and industry changed
their way of doing business.
DoD's goal to expand participation in the defense
industrial base will be helped significantly by introducing competition,
placing emphasis on timely output versus process, increasing the funding for
technology experimentation, transitioning more quickly from technology
development into production, fostering program stability, reducing the
oversight burden, changing regulations, and revamping the penalty focus of
today's system.*66
It might be appropriate for the revised FARs to test a
modified version of the award fee process tied to schedule, cost, and
performance. This discretionary award could range from a higher-than-present
level to a moderately negative level. The determining evaluation would be based
upon separate periodic input from the program manager, the contractor, and
outside auditors who would advise either the Service acquisition official or an
independent board with authority to determine the fee.
Finally, amidst the other structure and process recommendations,
this Commission would offer its suggestions on the force structure process. As
the Commission indicated in its Phase Two report, the concept of fighting two
major theater wars (2MTW) near- simultaneously, the current threat basis for
U.S. military force planning, is not producing the capabilities this nation
requires.*67 It is difficult to envision, at this period in history, two
opponents capable of challenging the United States at the theater level of
conflict, although we see the value in maintaining the capability to deter
opportunists who might seek advantage while the United States was otherwise
engaged. Indeed, the commitment for concurrent, all-out engagement in two
regions of the world, without strategic prioritizing and sequencing of campaigns,
is in itself an extraordinary notion. We believe it more useful to plan and
retain readiness for a major conflict, while also securing the homeland and
responding to small or medium-scale conflicts, international terrorism,
peacekeeping, humanitarian actions, and other commitments requiring U.S.
support.
We conclude that the concept of two major, coincident
wars is a remote possibility supported neither by actual intelligence estimates
nor by this Commission's view of the likely future.Thus, it is no longer an
appropriate basis for our force structure planning and should be replaced by a
new approach that accelerates the transformation to capabilities and forces
better suited to the security environment that predominantly exists today.
The Commission believes that the world of the next ten to
twenty years will be much like that of the last decade. While the United States
has no peer competitor, it faces threats to its homeland from a widening array
of actors on the global stage with access to weapons of mass destruction and
disruption. The likelihood of interstate conflict threatening to U.S. interests
is diminished, while intrastate conflict in areas important to U.S. security is
on the rise.
This Commission believes the United States should maintain
full capabilities of the kind it now possesses to prevail against the possible
emergence of a theater-level opponent. The United States, however, must further
improve its ability to deal with small to medium violent conflicts, often
occurring simultaneously, which require very rapid, forced entry response
capabilities, as well as long term stability operations in tense, post-conflict
scenarios. We should thus strive to achieve land, sea and air capabilities
suitable to this security environment that possess speed, agility, lethality,
ease of deployment and sustainment, and highly networked connectivity. Demand
for peacekeeping and humanitarian duties will likely continue, with their
inherent constabulary requirements, and the United States must organize and
train for these missions. Finally, new emphasis must be placed on the special
needs of homeland security. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that:
* 33: The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to
shift from the threat-based, 2MTW force sizing process to one which measures
requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence
estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security
objectives as defined in the new administration's national security strategy-once
formulated.
In such a capability-based sizing process, force
structure planning would proceed from a strategic vision of the current and
projected security environment and the national security objectives the new
administration seeks to achieve. Sizing would take into account intelligence
projections of potential adversary's capabilities plus actual operational
activity trends, reflecting recent demands. Finally, adoption of updated
modeling techniques, which this Commission recommends, would value the
synergistic effects of Joint forces with modern weapons that are employable in
a networked environment.
It would be inappropriate for the Commission to dictate
the exact number and type of divisions, wings, and naval battle groups that
this nation needs to execute its strategy. We can, however, provide guidance
and a mechanism to help the Department move in the necessary direction.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the Secretary should revise the
current categories of Major Force Programs (MFPs) used in the Defense Program
Review to focus on providing a different mix of military capabilities. Given
the need for transformation, the Major Force Programs should be updated, and
new ones created corresponding to the five military capabilities the Commission
prescribed in its Phase II report. We expand on those capabilities below.
Strategic nuclear forces must retain the capability to
perform the classic role of nuclear deterrence. The future security environment
and probable strategic nuclear arms reduction efforts, however, likely will
call for appropriately smaller numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Homeland security forces must possess the ability to deter, protect, and
respond to threats to the American homeland. Homeland security is not just a
military function; it requires the capabilities and expertise of numerous
government agencies, best integrated by this Commission's proposed National
Homeland Security Agency. For DoD's contribution to this vital mission, the
Commission recommends that reserve component forces should be assigned a
primary role. They should be trained and equipped to respond as deployable
forces to natural, manmade, and/or WMD-triggered disasters. Active duty
military forces should be trained to perform these missions in augmenting the
reserve component forces.
Conventional forces must be sized and tailored to threats
defined by realistic needs and updated force modeling. For the near future,
conventional forces of the types now possessed can provide this capability.
Fewer such forces, however, will be required to dominate potential threats than
have been previously required by current assumptions and models. Given likely
limitations on strategic air mobility assets, fast sealift and pre-positioned
equipment in regions at risk should receive higher funding priority.
Expeditionary capabilities should be distinguished from
"current conventional capabilities" insofar as they are designed to
respond to crises very rapidly, operate with much lower logistic requirements
in a network-centric environment, and possess technological superiority to
dominate any potential adversary in the foreseeable future. Rapid power
projection with forced entry ability, from forward locations and afar, must
characterize these capabilities which, in the Commission's view, describes few
of the forces the U.S. now possesses.
Humanitarian relief and constabulary operations will
involve all the military services, including the support that has been
customarily provided by naval, air, and ground forces. Other government and
non-government organizations will undoubtedly be involved, and this should be
anticipated in preparing for such missions. The constabulary capabilities
should be vested primarily in Army and Marine Corps elements trained and
equipped with weapons and mobility resources that will enhance the conduct of
such missions, which should be additive to other force structure requirements.
This Commission recognizes the transformation process
will produce these five capabilities over time, yet some must mature at a
faster rate. Ultimately, the transformation process will blur the distinction
between expeditionary and conventional forces, as both types of capabilities
will eventually possess enhanced mobility. For the near term, however, those we
call expeditionary capabilities require the most emphasis. Consequently, we
recommend that:
* 34: The Defense Department should devote its highest
priority to improving and further developing its expeditionary capabilities.
This Commission has identified what our military needs to
achieve for the future-how to get there is best left to the responsible
experts. We may discover that a transformed U.S. force structure will require a
resource and capabilities baseline that is actually higher than that derived
through the current 2MTW construct. Moreover, these transformed forces will be
the ones this nation uses to fight all its conflicts, large and small, one at a
time or simultaneously. Clearly, the transformation process will require a
reprioritization of current resources. Ultimately, the result may be a larger
force, or a smaller one, but we are confident that it will be a better force,
appropriate to the environment in which it must serve.
The President and the Secretary of Defense can accomplish
many of these structural reforms within and among the DoD staffs as well as
reform of the budgeting and force planning processes. The structural reforms
recommended for the defense infrastructure will require Congressional support
and enabling legislation. Acquisition reform will require both DoD policy and
statutory changes.
E. SPACE POLICY
In its earlier work, this Commission has recognized space
as a critical national security environment.68 In so doing, it affirms current
U.S. National Security Strategy, which considers "unimpeded access to and
use of space" a vital national interest.*69
The United States relies on space for the viability of
both its economy and its national defense. Space technologies, such as the
Global Positioning System, are already revolutionizing several major
industries. The nation's military and intelligence activities, too, depend
increasingly on space. U.S. superiority in space makes possible a military
doctrine based on information superiority. U.S. military forces exploit space
as the "high ground" for command, control, computers, communications,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) activities. The U.S.
military cannot undertake any major operation, anywhere in the world, without
relying on systems in space. Key elements of the U.S. strategic deterrent
posture will be maintained in space as will the nation's ISR systems critical
to avoiding strategic surprise. Space will be a crucial component to any
layered defense the United States may construct in the next quarter century
against ballistic missiles.
That is why the nation's space architecture-the
infrastructure required to conduct space activities-must serve a multiplicity
of commercial, civil, military, and intelligence purposes. Its protection must
also be assured against threats that are clearly on the horizon.
Unfortunately, the superiority the United States enjoys
today in space is unlikely to persist. Many countries have space capability or
access to space. A few states already have the satellite and weapons technology
to threaten U.S. space assets, and more will acquire such technology in due
course.
In terms of defining its space strategy, the United
States must balance two related goals. On the one hand, it seems prudent for
the United States to seek space superiority, defined by the Defense Department
as "that degree of dominance in space of one force over another, which
permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and
air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the
opposing force."*70 On the other hand, the United States should continue
to support general international norms that protect space as an international
domain where all participants are free to pursue peaceful activities. The
problem is that unilateral U.S. steps taken to assure military superiority in
space may be seen by others as implying an ability to deny access to space and
freedom of action there. Even if that ability is never used, it could complicate
the ability of the United States to shape a benign international environment.
The United States recognizes space as a global commons, but if it does so
without qualification, it risks being surprised and overtaken militarily in a
crucial environment by some future adversary.
At the very least, this Commission believes that the
United States should pursue a robust ground- and space-based C4ISR
capability.*71 Because space capabilities take a long time to develop, the
United States must also take, in the near- and middle-term, the steps necessary
to protect its space assets within the current international legal framework
should the need arise.*72
In our view, now is the time to reevaluate how both space
activities and assets serve broader U.S. national security needs, and then how
the U.S. government is organized to manage these. The first is required because
science and technology are generating a rapid rate of innovation, and that
innovation has both commercial and military implications the interplay of which
we do not yet fully comprehend. The second is required because, frankly, the
current state of affairs is inadequate.
As it happens, other commissions or boards have recently
addressed or are currently addressing space issues, and they are doing so in a
more comprehensive way than this Commission.*73 We endorse their work and offer
recommendations that bear, in particular, on issues of structure and process.
This Commission finds serious problems with the way the
existing interagency procedures in the U.S. government deal with space. No
standing interagency process for space exists. Neither the NSC staff nor the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy is adequately manned to
coordinate space issues. This means that space issues are addressed as they
arise on an ad hoc basis. Neither the NSC, the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC), or the National Economic Council (NEC) integrates U.S. space
activities. Hence, the Commission recommends the following:
* 35: The President should establish an Interagency
Working Group on Space (IWGS) at the National Security Council to coordinate
all aspects of the nation's space policy, and place on the NSC staff those with
the necessary expertise in this area.
Such a working group would include key representatives
from the Executive Office of the President (NSC, OSTP, OMB) and stakeholder
representatives: the Departments of Defense, State, Transportation, and
Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.*74 The creation of the IWGS would allow space to be considered
systematically and consistently as a critical element of U.S. national security
policy.
The global presence and responsibilities of the United
States, and the demands of the information age, have placed enormous new
requirements for space and information infrastructures. These will create major
demands for resources in both the Defense Department and the intelligence
community. The problem is that the nation has not developed the concept of a
comprehensive national space architecture to guide the allocation of
resources.*75
A national intelligence Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)
does exist, but it has been given woefully inadequate means either to fully
process or to disseminate the information collected for its clients in the
intelligence community, DoD, and other agencies.*76 Rectifying these problems
is estimated to cost several billion dollars and no funds have so far been
earmarked for this purpose. At present, then, the system for national
intelligence imagery collection, processing, and dissemination is not fully
integrated. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA) have failed to provide imagery capability that meets
U.S. security needs.*77 As currently envisioned, too, the National Missile
Defense (NMD) architecture focuses solely on engagement, not on an architecture
that integrates the entire spectrum of national and defense-related
intelligence, or that covers pre- engagement and post-strike assessments and
reconstitution activities. Other space activities, such as those of NASA and
NOAA, have been given little attention in thinking about the nation's space
architecture. This is also the case for commercial space activities.
There is within the Defense Department a National
Security Space Architect (NSSA) with responsibility for the design and
oversight of the nation's defense and intelligence space infrastructure.*78 But
this official lacks the means to affect the non-DoD/intelligence space
architecture, much less influence decisions in other departments and agencies.
The NSSA does not directly influence programs and budgets and, hence, cannot
influence the allocation of resources. This Commission therefore recommends that
the existing National Security Space Architect (NSSA) should be transferred
from DoD to the NSC staff and take the lead in this effort.
Moreover, the problem of organizing for space policy must
also be addressed at levels below the interagency. In the Department of
Defense, responsibility for space policy and oversight is dispersed among
various elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) staff. We
recommend establishing one office responsible for oversight of the department's
R&D, acquisition, and launch/operation of its space assets. Coordination of
military intelligence activities and long-range intelligence requirements, both
within the department and with the intelligence community, should reside in
this office. This official would therefore develop all defense-specific space,
intelligence, and space architecture policy for DoD, and coordinate these
issues at the interagency level. Accordingly, we recommend the Department of
Defense create an Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence, and
Information by consolidating current functions on the OSD staff.*79 One of the
nation's most valuable forms of critical infrastructure is its space-based
satellite constellation and ground support facilities. It is also our most
vulnerable. Nowhere else does our defense capability rest on such an insecure
firmament, even though warning and imagery are unquestionably critical. The
concept of critical infrastructure protection highlighted in Section I must be
extended to U.S. space networks as well. In light of U.S. reliance on these
assets and the present dearth of means to protect them, the Commission endorses
the conclusions of the recent Commission to Assess U.S National Security Space
Management and Organization, and recommends increased investment in the
protection of U.S. space assets, including deployment of a space-based
surveillance network.
Such a network will require, first, that the United
States be able to detect when its systems are being attacked and then respond.
Protective methods must be developed and fielded. Second, the nation's access
to space must be expanded in ways that are more cost-effective. The more robust
U.S. space launch capability, the more able the United States will be to retain
its space superiority, reconstitute systems after attack, and reduce its
vulnerabilities. The Commission strongly recommends that the modernization of
the nation's space-launch capability be accelerated.
F. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The basic structure of the U.S. intelligence community
does not require change. The community has implemented many of the
recommendations for reform made by other studies. This Commission's focus is on
those changes in intelligence policy, operations, and resources needed for the
full implementation of recommendations found elsewhere within this report.
While the intelligence community is generally given high
marks for timely and useful contributions to policymaking and crisis
management, it failed to warn of Indian nuclear tests or to anticipate the rapidity
of missile developments in Iran and North Korea. U.S. intelligence has, at
times, been unable to respond to the burgeoning requirements levied by more
demanding consumers trying to cope with a more complex array of problems. Steep
declines in human intelligence resources over the last decade have been forcing
dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of important countries, regions, and
functional challenges. Warfighters in theater are often frustrated because the
granulated detail of intelligence that they need rarely gets to them, even
though they know that it exists somewhere in the intelligence system.
It is a commonplace that the intelligence community lost
its focus when the Berlin Wall fell. Since then, three other problems have
compounded its challenges. First, the world is a more complex place, with more
diffuse dangers requiring different kinds of intelligence and new means of
acquiring them. Second, its resources-personnel and monetary-have been reduced.
Third, the dangers of terrorism and proliferation, as well as ethnic conflicts
and humanitarian emergencies, have led to a focus on providing warning and
crisis management, rather than on long-term analysis.
The result of these three developments is an intelligence
community that is more demand-driven than it was two decades ago. That demand
is also more driven by military consumers and, therefore, what the intelligence
community is doing is narrower and more short- term than it was two decades
ago. Given the paucity of resources, this means that important regions and
trends are not receiving adequate attention and that the more comprehensive
analytical tasks that everyone agrees the intelligence community should be
performing simply cannot be done properly.
This Commission has emphasized that strategic planning
needs to be introduced throughout the national security institutions of the
U.S. government. We have also emphasized the critical importance of preventive
diplomacy. Both require an intelligence community that can support such
innovations, but current trends are leading in the opposite direction.
This Commission has also stressed the increasing
importance of diplomatic and especially economic components in U.S. statecraft.
The intelligence community as a whole needs to maintain its level of effort in
military domains, but also to do much more in economic domains. In a world
where proprietary science and technology developments are increasingly the
sinews of national power, the intelligence community needs to be concerned more
than ever with U.S. technological security, not least in cyberspace. And here,
too, the trends within the intelligence community point not toward, but away
from, the country's essential needs. Resources devoted to handling such
economic and technical issues are not increasing, but declining.
To respond to these challenges, some have recommended
strengthening the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) through organizational
changes, such as vesting greater budgetary authority in him and giving him
greater control over personnel throughout the community. We believe, however,
that current efforts to strengthen community management while maintaining the
ongoing relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense are bearing
fruit. We recommend no major structural changes, but offer certain
recommendations to strengthen the DCI's role and the efficiency of the process.
The National Security Act of 1947 gave the National
Security Council responsibility for providing guidance with respect to
intelligence functions. In practice, however, administrations have varied
widely in their approach to this function-sometimes actively setting priorities
for intelligence collection and analysis and sometimes focusing simply on
coordinating intelligence response in times of crisis.
To achieve the strategy envisioned in our Phase II
report, and to make the budgetary recommendations of this section most
effective, more consistent attention must be paid to the setting of national
intelligence priorities. To do this, we recommend the following:
* 36: The President should order the setting of national
intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the
Director of Central Intelligence. In recommending this, we echo the conclusion
of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States
Intelligence Community (the Brown-Rudman Commission).
While we do not want to dictate how future Presidents
might use the National Security Council, we believe this is a crucial function
that must be filled in some way. The President's authority to set strategic
intelligence priorities should be exercised through continuous NSC engagement
with the DCI, from which the DCI can establish appropriate collection and
analysis priorities. Such an approach would ensure consistent policymaker input
into the intelligence effort and, if policymakers come to feel a part of the
intelligence process, it should enable greater support for the intelligence
community, as well. We believe that this function would be best fulfilled by a true
strategic planning staff at the NSC-as per our recommendation 14. The point is
that policy and strategic guidance for intelligence should be formulated in
tandem.
We have emphasized the importance of securing the
homeland in this new century and have urged, specifically in recommendation 4,
that it be a higher intelligence priority. Making it so means greatly
strengthening U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. This involves
ensuring the quality of those entering the community's clandestine service, as
well as the recruitment of foreign nationals as agents with the best chance of
providing crucial information about terrorism and other threats to the
homeland.
Along with the National Commission on Terrorism, we
believe that guidelines for the recruitment of foreign nationals should be
reviewed to ensure that, while respecting legal and human rights concerns, they
maximize the intelligence community's ability to collect intelligence on
terrorist plans and methods. We recognize the need to observe basic moral
standards in all U.S. government conduct, but the people who can best help U.S.
agents penetrate effectively into terrorist organizations, for example, are not
liable to be model citizens of spotless virtue. Operative regulations in this
respect must balance national security interests with concern for American
values and principles. We therefore recommend the following:
* 37: The Director
of Central Intelligence should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence
sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community's highest priorities,
and ensure that operational guidelines are balanced between security needs and
respect for American values and principles.
The DCI must also give greater priority to the analysis
of economic and science and technology trends where the U.S. intelligence
community's capabilities are inadequate. While improvements have been made,
especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the global economic and
scientific environments are changing so rapidly and dramatically that the
United States needs to develop new tools merely to understand what is happening
in the world. The Treasury Department has made important strides in this
regard, but it has a long way to go. Treasury and CIA also need to coordinate better
efforts in this critical area. We therefore recommend the following:
* 38: The intelligence community should place new
emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security
concerns, and incorporate more open- source intelligence into analytical
products. Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing significantly
the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and
analysis.
In order to maintain U.S. strength in traditional areas
while building new capabilities, the President and the Congress should give
priority to economic and science/technology intelligence. We need to increase
overall funding in these areas significantly and the DCI needs to emphasize
improvement in the collection and analysis of this intelligence. This will
require, in turn, a major investment in the community's long-term analytical
capacities, but these capacities are crucial in any event to supporting the
strategic planning that we have emphasized throughout this report.
Better analysis in non-military areas also means ensuring
that %open-source intelligence is a vital part of all-source analysis. Many new
challenges, but especially economic, scientific, and technological ones, call
for greater attention to the wealth of openly available information. Analyses
of the failure of the community to anticipate India's nuclear tests, when clear
indications were available in open-source publications, demonstrate that this
capability has relevance for traditional security issues as well.
We thus urge the strengthening of HUMINT capabilities,
the broadening of analytical efforts across a range of issues, and the
incorporation of more open-source information into all-source analysis. Meeting
the nation's future intelligence needs, however, will also require changes in
the community's technological capabilities.
Technological superiority has long been a hallmark of
U.S. intelligence. Yet some agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program spend as little as three to four percent of their budget on all aspects
of research and development, and as little as one percent on advanced research
and development. This reflects a decline in overall intelligence expenditures
in real terms, while salaries and benefits for intelligence personnel have been
on the rise. Concerted effort is needed to ensure that research and development
receive greater funding.
At the same time, the intelligence community must think
about its technological capabilities in new ways. During the Cold War, the
National Security Agency (NSA) and other agencies derived a great wealth of
information through signals and communications intelligence. In today's
%Internet age, global networks, cable, and wireless communications are
increasingly ubiquitous, with attendant improvements in encryption
technologies. Together these trends make signal intelligence collection
increasingly difficult. The United States must possess the best platforms and
capabilities to ensure that it can collect necessary information consistent
with respecting Americans' privacy. It must also have high-quality technical
and scientific personnel able to respond to future challenges. To these ends,
we recommend that the DCI should provide the President a strategic assessment
of the effectiveness of current technical intelligence capabilities to ensure
the fullest range of collection across all intelligence domains, particularly
as they relate to cyberspace and new communications technologies.
Should the U.S. intelligence community lack a full-spectrum
capability either in collection or analysis, the United States would forfeit
the depth of intelligence coverage it enjoyed during the Cold War. Maintaining
this edge will require greater funding and expertise in the information and
communication sciences. %We must also pursue innovative approaches with the
private sector to establish access to new technologies as they become
available.
This Commission, in sum, urges an overall increase in the
NFIP budget to accommodate greater priority placed on %non-military
intelligence challenges. Military intelligence needs also remain critical,
however, so a simple reallocation of existing resources will not suffice. To
ensure the continuing technological strength of the community, and to build
cutting-edge intelligence platforms, there is no escaping the need for an
increase in overall resources for the intelligence community.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Part 4 http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf 4-20-1
IV. The Human
Requirements for National Security
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The
maintenance of American power in the world depends on the quality of U.S. government
personnel, civil and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in
the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet future challenges.
In its Phase I report, this Commission asserted that
"the ability to carry out effective foreign and military policies requires
not only a skilled military, but talented professionals in all forms of public
service as well."80 We reaffirm here our conviction that the quality of
personnel serving in government is critically important to U.S. national
security in the 21st century. The excellence of American public servants is the
foundation upon which an effective national security strategy must rest-in
large part because future success will require the mastery of advanced
technology, from the economy to combat, as well as leading-edge concepts of
governance. We therefore repeat our conclusion from the Phase II report, that
the United States "must strengthen government (civil and military)
personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention, and effectiveness
at all levels."*81
In this light, the declining orientation toward
government service as a prestigious career is deeply troubling. The problem
manifests itself in different ways throughout various departments, agencies,
and the military services, yet all face growing difficulties in recruiting and
retaining America's most promising talent. These deficits are traceable to
several sources, one of which is that the sustained growth of the U.S. economy
has created private sector opportunities with salaries and advancement
potential well beyond those provided by the government. This has a particular
impact in shaping career decisions in an era of rising student debt loads. The
contrast with the private sector is also organizational. In government,
positions of responsibility and the ability to advance are hemmed in by
multiple layers, even at senior levels; in the private sector, both often come
more quickly. Rigid, lengthy, and arcane government personnel procedures-
including those germane to application, compensation, promotion, retirement,
and benefits systems-also discourage some otherwise interested applicants.
Another source of the problem is that there is no single overarching motivation
to entice patriotic Americans into public service as there was during the Cold
War. Careers in government no longer seem to hold out the prospect for highly
regarded service to the nation. Meanwhile, the private and non-profit sectors
are now replete with opportunities that have broad appeal to idealistic
Americans who in an earlier time might have found a home within government
service. Government has to compete with the private sector not only in salary
and benefits, then, but often in terms of the intrinsic interest of the work
and the sense of individual efficacy and fulfillment that this work bestows.
At the same time, the trust that Americans have in their
government is buffeted by worrisome cynicism. Consistent criticism of
government employees and agencies by politicians and the press has magnified
public dissatisfaction and lowered regard for the worthiness of government
service. Political candidates running "against Washington" have
fueled the impression that all government is prone to management and services
of a quality below that of similar organizations in the private sector. This is
not the case, but virtually every Presidential candidate in the past thirty
years has deployed campaign rhetoric criticizing "the bloated
bureaucracy" as a means of securing "outsider" status in the
campaign. Neither critics nor their audiences often differentiate between
performance failures based on political maneuvering and the efforts of
apolitical professional public servants striving to implement policy. The
cumulative effect of this rhetoric on public attitudes toward the government is
demonstrated in a 1999 study highlighting American frustration with "the
poor performance of government" and "the absence of effective public
leadership."*82
A final reality is that today's technological age has
created sweeping expectations of speed, accuracy, and customization for every
product and service. Government is not immune to these expectations, but its
overall reputation remains that of a plodding bureaucracy. Talented people
seeking careers where they can quickly make a difference see government as the
antithesis to best management practices, despite many government improvements
in this area. Part of the recruitment and retention problem, therefore, flows
from the image of overall government management and must be addressed by making
government more effective and responsive at every level.
The effect of these realities on recruiting and retention
problems is manifest. The number of applicants taking the Foreign Service
entrance exam, for example, is down sharply and the State Department shows
signs of a growing retention problem. The national security community also
faces critical problems recruiting and retaining scientific and information
technology professionals in an economy that has made them ever more valuable.
The national security elements of the Civil Service face similar problems, and
these problems are magnified by the fact that the Civil Service is doing little
recruiting at a time when a retirement wave of baby-boomers is imminent.
For the armed services, the aforementioned trends have
widened the cultural gap, between the military and the country at large, that
continues to be affected by the abolition of the draft in the 1970s. While
Americans admire the military, they are increasingly less likely to serve in
it, to relate to its real dangers and hardships, or to understand its profound
commitment requirements. With a total active strength of 1.4 million, only
one-half of one percent of the nation serves in the military. Military life and
values are thus virtually unknown to the vast majority of Americans.
The military's capabilities, professionalism, and unique
culture are pillars of America's national strength and leadership in the world.
Without a renewed call to military service and systemic internal personnel
reform to retain quality people, the requisite leadership and professionalism
necessary for an effective military will be in jeopardy. For this reason, the
Commission asserted in its Phase II report that the "United States must
strengthen the bonds between the American people and those of its members who
serve in the armed forces."*83 We reaffirm that assertion here.
A. A NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN FOR SERVICE TO THE NATION
To remedy these problems, the Commission believes that a
national campaign to reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the
nation is necessary to attract the best Americans to military and civilian
government service. The key step in such a campaign must be to revive a
positive attitude toward public service. It has to be made clear from the
highest levels that frustrations with particular government policies or
agencies should not be conveyed through the denigration of federal employees en
masse. Calls for smaller government, too, should not be read as indictments of
the quality of government servants. Instead, specific issues should be
addressed on the merits, while a broader campaign should be waged to stress the
importance of public service in a democracy.
Implementing such a campaign requires strong and
consistent Presidential commitment, Congressional legislation, and innovative
departmental actions throughout the federal government. We know this is a tall
order, but we take heart in previous examples of such leadership. The clarion
call of President John F. Kennedy, encompassed in but a few well-chosen remarks
spread over several speeches, had enormous impact and inspired an entire
generation to public service. We also remember how President Ronald Reagan
reinvigorated the spirit of the U.S. military after the tragedies of the
Vietnam War and subsequent periods of low funding and plummeting morale. What
the President says, and how he says it, matters. Moreover, only the President
can shape the Executive Branch agenda to undertake the changes needed in U.S.
personnel systems.
While the President's involvement is central, other
leaders must help build a new foundation for public service. %Congress must be
convinced not only to pass the legislative remedies proffered below, but also
to change its own rhetoric to support national service. It must work with
department heads and other affected institutions to ensure that a common
message is conveyed, and that Executive departments and agencies have the
flexibility they need to make real improvements.
Rhetoric alone, however, will not bring America's best
talent to public service. The Commission believes that unless government
service is made competitively rewarding to 21st century future leaders, words
will surely fade to inaction. Section II of this report highlighted the urgent
national need for outstanding science and technology professionals. So, too,
does government need high-quality people with expertise in the social sciences,
foreign languages, and humanities. The decreased funding available for these programs
from universities and foundations may threaten the ability of the government to
produce future leaders with the requisite knowledge-in foreign languages,
economics, and history to take several examples-to meet 21st century security
challenges.
Therefore this Commission proposes a complement to the
National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) presented in
recommendation 11 of this report. As in the case of the NSSTEA, which applies
to math and hard science majors, we would extend scholarship and debt relief
benefits to those social science, foreign language, and humanities students who
serve the nation. We therefore make the following recommendation:
* 39: Congress
should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to
include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in
exchange for military and civilian service to the nation.*84
The current National Security Education Act (NSEA) of
1991 provides limited undergraduate scholarships and graduate fellowships for
students to study certain subjects, including foreign language and foreign area
studies. The Act also allows the use of funds at institutions of higher
learning to develop faculty expertise in the languages and cultures of less
commonly studied countries. Recipients of these funds incur an obligation
either to work for an office or agency of the federal government involved in
national security affairs, or to pursue careers as educators for a period equal
to the time covered by the scholarship.*85
An expanded Act would increase the subjects currently
designated for study, offering one- to four-year scholarships good for study at
qualified U.S. universities and colleges. Upon completion of their studies,
recipients could fulfill their service in a number of ways: in the active duty
U.S. military; in National Guard or Reserve units; in national security
departments and agencies of the Civil Service; or in the Foreign Service. To
prepare students to fulfill their service requirements, the scholarship program
should include a training element. One model of this training might be a
civilian equivalent of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) or Platoon
Leader Course (PLC).*86
The Act should also provide for those who choose government
service after completing their education. In those cases, the Act could offer
several sorts of incentives in lieu of scholarships foregone. One such
incentive would be the deferral of educational loan repayment while individuals
serve in government. Another would reduce school loan principal amounts by a
set percentage for every year the individual stays in government service up to
complete repayment.*87 In such cases, the government would assume the financial
obligations of the graduate, so that neither financial nor educational
institutions suffer. The Commission believes the combination of the NSSTEA for
math and science, and for other majors this significantly expanded NSEA will
prepare Americans for many forms of service and more generally help recruit
high-quality civil service and military personnel.
B. THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
A concerted campaign to improve the attractiveness of
service to the nation is the first step in ensuring that talented people
continue to serve in government. However, fundamental changes are also needed
to personnel management systems throughout the national security agencies of
government. Not least among the institutions needing reform is the Presidential
appointments system.
The problem with government personnel starts at the top.
Unlike many other countries, the United States staffs the high levels of its
national government with many outside, non-career personnel. The most senior of
these are Presidential appointees whose positions require Senate confirmation.
While career personnel provide much-needed expertise, continuity, and
professionalism, Presidential appointees are a source of many valuable
qualities as well-fresh ideas, experience outside government, specialized
expertise, management skills, and often an impressive personal dynamism. They
also ensure political accountability in policy execution, by transmitting the
President's policies to the departments and agencies of government. Indeed, the
tradition of public-spirited citizens coming in and out of government is an old
and honorable one, serving the country well from the days of George Washington.
This infusion of outside skills is truly indispensable today, when the private
sector is the source of so much of the country's managerial and technological
innovation.
What a tragedy, then, that the system for recruiting such
outside talent has broken down. According to a recent study, "the
Founders' model of presidential service is near the breaking point" and
"the presidential appointments process now verges on complete
collapse."*88 The ordeal to which outside nominees are subjected is so
great-above and beyond whatever financial or career sacrifice is involved-as to
make it prohibitive for many individuals of talent and experience to accept
public service. To take a vivid recent example: "The Clinton
Administration . . . had great difficulty filling key Energy Department
positions overseeing the disposal of nuclear waste because most experts in the
field came directly or indirectly from the nuclear industry and were thus
rejected for their perceived conflicts of interest."*89 The problem takes
several forms.
First, there are extraordinary-and lengthening-delays in
the vetting and confirmation process. On average, the process for those appointees
who required Senate confirmation has lengthened from about two and one-half
months in the early 1960s to an extraordinary eight and one-half months in
1996-suggesting that many sub-cabinet positions in the new administration will
be fortunate to be in place by the fall of 2001.*90 As Norman Ornstein and
Thomas Donilon point out: "The lag in getting people into office seriously
impedes good governance. A new president's first year-clearly the most
important year for accomplishments and the most vulnerable to mistakes-is now
routinely impaired by the lack of supporting staff. For executive agencies,
leaderless periods mean decisions not taken, initiatives not launched, and
accountability not upheld."*91 The result is a gross distortion of the Constitutional
process; the American people exert themselves to elect a President and yet he
is impeded from even beginning to carry out his mandate until one-sixth of his
term has elapsed.
Second, the ethics rules-conflict of interest and
financial disclosure requirements-have proliferated beyond all proportion to
the point where they are not only a source of excessive delay but a prohibitive
obstacle to the recruitment of honest men and women to public service. Stacks
of different background forms covering much of the same information must be
completed for the White House, the Senate, and the FBI (in addition to the
financial disclosure forms for the Office of Government Ethics). These
disclosure requirements put appointees through weeks of effort and often significant
expense. The Defense Department and Senate Armed Services Committee routinely
force nominees to divest completely their holdings related to the defense
industry instead of exploring other options such as blind trusts, discretionary
waivers, and recusals.*92 This impedes recruiting high-level appointees whose
knowledge of that industry should be regarded as a valuable asset to the
office, not reason for disqualification. The complexity of the ethics rules is
not only a barrier and a time-consuming burden before confirmation; it is a
source of traps for unwary but honest officials after confirmation. This is
despite the fact that the U.S. federal government is remarkable for the rarity
of real corruption in high office compared to many other advanced societies.
Yet we proliferate "scandals" because of appearances of
improprieties, or inadvertent breaches of highly technical provisions. Worse,
these rules are increasingly matters of criminal rather than administrative
remedies. It appears to us that those who have written these conflict of
interest regulations themselves have little experience in such matters.
Third, and closely related, are the post-employment
restrictions that a new recruit knows he or she must endure, particularly
appointees subject to Senate confirmation. We will simply cease to attract
talented outsiders who have a track record of success if the price for a few
years of government service is to forsake not only income but the very fields
in which they had demonstrated talent and found success. The recent trend has
been to add to the restrictions. However, we applaud the recent revocation of
Executive Order 12834 as an important step in removing some unnecessary
restrictions.*93
A fourth dimension of the problem is the proliferation of
Presidential-appointee positions. In the last 30 years, the number of
Senate-confirmable Presidential-appointee positions throughout the federal
government has quadrupled, from 196 to 786. Within the Defense Department, the
figure has risen from 31 to 45 during the same period.*94 The growing number of
appointees contributes directly to the backlog that slows the confirmation
process. It also makes public service in many of these positions less
attractive; as the Defense Science Board noted in the case of the Defense
Department, "an assistant secretary post may be less attractive buried
several layers below the secretary than as a number two or three job."*95
Moreover, Presidential appointments can hardly serve as a transmission belt of
Presidential authority if multiple layers of political appointees diffuse
accountability and make departments and agencies more cumbersome and less
responsive. And it runs glaringly counter to the trend in today's private
sector toward flatter and leaner management structures. Finally, the
appointments process feeds the pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism
about government service. The encrustation of complex rules is based on the
presumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or
contact with the private sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked. Congress
and, especially, the media relish accusations or suspicions, whether
substantiated or not. Yet the U.S. government will not be able to function
effectively unless public service is restored to a place of honor and prestige,
especially for private citizens who have achieved success in their chosen
fields.
We need to rebuild the present system nearly from the
ground up, and the beginning of a new administration is the ideal time to
start. Our recommendations support those made in the Defense Science Board's
Human Resource Study, in the joint survey undertaken by the Brookings
Institution and the Heritage Foundation, and by Norman Ornstein and Thomas
Donilon. We therefore recommend the following:
* 40: The Executive and Legislative Branches should
cooperate to revise the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the
impediments that have made high- level public service undesirable to many
distinguished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number of Senate
confirmed and non-career SES positions by 25 percent; shorten the appointment
process; and moderate draconian ethics regulations.
Reducing non-career positions would, as the Defense
Science Board has noted, "allow more upward career mobility for Senior
Executive Service employees and provide greater continuity and corporate memory
in conducting the day-to-day business affairs of the Defense Department during
the transition between administrations."*96 Recommendation 43 below to
create a National Security Service Corps should help ensure that career
employees develop the qualifications to be eligible to hold senior positions
throughout the government.
The aim of reducing the number of Presidential appointees
is not to weaken Presidential political authority over the bureaucracy, but to
eliminate the excessive layering that clogs the government's functioning in
addition to slowing the appointment process. That said, an exact balance
between political and career appointees cannot be specified in the abstract.
Both groups include skilled and talented people. But Presidents should be held
to a qualitative standard-that political appointees, whether for Ambassadors or
for policymaking positions in Washington, should be chosen for the real talents
they will bring and not the campaign contributions they brought. [See
recommendation 23]
To streamline and shorten the current appointment
process, the President and leaders of the new Congress should meet as soon as
possible to agree on the following measures.
* CONFIRM THE NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM FIRST. By tradition,
the Senate foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees hold
hearings before inauguration on the nominees for Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and vote on inauguration day.
This practice should continue. Future Presidents should also present to the
Senate no later than inauguration day his nominees for the top ten positions at
State and at Defense and the top three posts at CIA. Leaders of the relevant
committees should agree to move the full slate of appointments to the full
Senate within 30 days of receiving the nomination (barring some serious
legitimate concern about an individual nominee).*97
* REDUCE AND STANDARDIZE PAPERWORK REQUIREMENTS. The
"Transition to Governing Project" jointly undertaken by the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution is developing software that
will enable appointees to collect information once and direct it to the
necessary forms. The new President should direct all relevant agencies and
authorities to accept these computerized forms and to streamline the paperwork
requirements for future appointees.*98
* REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NOMINEES SUBJECT TO FULL FBI BACKGROUND
CHECKS. Full field investigations should be required only for national security
or other sensitive top- level posts. Most other appointees need only
abbreviated background checks, and part- time or lesser posts need only simple
identification checks.99 The risks to the Republic of such an approach are
minor and manageable, and are far outweighed by the benefit that would accrue
in saved resources and expedited vetting.
* LIMIT ACCESS TO FULL FBI FILES. Distribution of raw FBI
files should be severely restricted to the chairman and ranking minority member
of the confirming Senate committee.100 Nothing deters the recruitment of senior
people more than the fear that their private lives will be shredded by the
leakage of such material to the national media. To significantly revise current
conflict-of-interest and ethics regulations, the President and Congressional
leaders should meet quickly and instruct their top aides to make
recommendations within 90 days of January 20, 2001. This Commission endorses retention
of basic laws and regulations that prevent bribery and corrupt practices as
well as the restrictions in the U.S. Code that ban former officials from
lobbying their former agencies for one year. We also endorse lifetime
prohibitions against acting as a representative of a foreign government and
against making a formal appearance in reference to a "particular
matter" in which he or she participated personally and substantially, or a
matter under his or her official responsibilities. However, the Commission
recommends two important actions:
* Conduct a comprehensive review of the regulations and
statutory framework covering Presidential appointments to ensure that
regulations do not exceed statutory requirements.
* Make blind trusts, discretionary waivers, and recusals
more easily available as alternatives to complete divestiture of financial and
business holdings of concern.
The conflict of interest regime should also be
decriminalized. Technical or inadvertent misstatements on complex disclosure
forms, or innocent contacts with the private sector, should not be
presumptively criminal. The Office of Government Ethics should be enabled and
encouraged to enforce the disclosure and post-employment statutes as civil or
administrative matters; to decide questions expeditiously; and to see its job
as clearing the innocent, as well as pursuing wrongdoers.
These recommendations can be accomplished through
Executive Branch action, such as that which rescinded Executive Order 12834.
Other recommendations, however, will require Congressional concurrence and
action. We therefore urge the new President to take the initiative immediately
with Congress to agree on future statutory reforms.
C. THE FOREIGN SERVICE
An effective and motivated Foreign Service is critical to
the success of the Commission's restructuring proposal for the State Department
[see Section III above].Yet among career government systems, the Foreign
Service, which is set apart from other civilian personnel systems by its
specialized entrance procedures and up-or-out approach to promotion, is most in
need of repair.
While some believe the Foreign Service has retained much
of its historical allure and cachet, many close observers contend that the
Foreign Service no longer attracts or retains the quality of people needed to
meet the diplomatic challenges of the 21st century. Overall educational
competence in areas crucial to a quality Foreign Service-including history,
geography, economics, humanities, and foreign languages-is declining, resulting
in a shrinking pool of those with the requisite knowledge and skills for this
service.*101 The proposed revision to the National Security Education Act
[recommendation 39 above] is one response to this deficit.
Data indicate that recruitment is currently the Foreign
Service's major concern.*102 There are now 25 percent fewer people taking the
entrance exam as there were in the mid-1980s. Other careers, in corporations
and non-governmental organizations, now offer many of the same opportunities on
which the Foreign Service used to hold the monopoly: living overseas, learning
foreign languages, and developing negotiating experience. These other
opportunities generally pay better, do not entail the same level of austerity
and danger often faced by Foreign Service officers posted abroad, and do not
impose the same constraints on two-career families.
Beyond this lack of flexibility, many of the State
Department's own policies are detrimental to attracting and keeping the highest
quality people. The recruiting process is exceedingly slow, often taking two
years from written exam to the first day of work. At a time when potential
officers have many other career choices they may elect, this is a fatal
weakness.
The oral exam also works at odds with the goal of
attracting those with the range of knowledge (foreign policy, economics,
cultural studies) and skills (languages, leadership, technology) necessary to
an effective Foreign Service. The exam's "blindfolding" policy,
whereby the examiners who decide who enters the Service know nothing about an
applicant's background, has the admirable goal of ensuring a level playing
field. But it runs completely counter to common sense in selecting the most
qualified applicants.
The lack of professional educational opportunities
currently afforded Foreign Service officers is also a problem both for the
quality of those who stay and as a reason for those who leave. While the
Foreign Service certainly needs more training in languages and emerging global
issues, recent studies find an additional problem involving the lack of
effective management and leadership throughout the State Department.*103 We
therefore recommend the following:
* 41: The President should order the overhauling of the
Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically
improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a
core value of the State Department.
In order to revamp
the exam process, changes must be made to shorten the hiring process dramatically
without compromising the competitiveness of the system. The Commission is
encouraged by the use of the shorter Alternative Examination Program (AEP)
which allows applicants (now limited to current government employees) to
advance to the oral examination on the basis of their professional experience.
Contingent upon evaluation of its success, this program should be broadened and
other innovative approaches encouraged. If the written exam is retained, it
might be administered by computer, allowing applicants to sit for the test at
different times throughout the year.
In addition, the oral exam's blindfolding policy should
end. While we sympathize with the aim of fair consideration for all, and with
the State Department's eagerness to avoid legal harassment, this approach
seriously damages the effectiveness of the examination process. It omits
consideration of the professional and other experiences candidates may bring to
the Foreign Service. It also makes it impossible for examiners to counsel
applicants on the appropriateness of their backgrounds to particular cones
(political, economic, consular, public diplomacy, or administrative). There is
no legal requirement for this practice.
A successful Foreign Service also requires officers who
are consistently building new knowledge and skills. As we recommend below for
the Civil Service, the Commission endorses a ten to fifteen percent increase in
personnel to allow for that proportion of the overall service to be in training
at any given point.104 Current State Department professional development,
focused mostly on languages, must be greatly expanded to ensure a diplomatic
corps on the cutting edge of 21st century policy and management skills. We
agree with the recommendations of McKinsey and the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel that call for a full range of mandatory educational courses in functional
topics, languages, leadership, and management. Training milestones should be
met in advance of promotions or advancements to supervisory positions. Beyond
problems with the exam process and the lack of professional development
programs, all levels of the State Department suffer from a lack of focus on
leadership and management. Improvements will require a cultural shift that must
flow from the top. We urge future Presidents and Secretaries of State in
selecting senior State Department officials to consider management strengths
and departmental leadership abilities in addition to substantive expertise. Our
proposal for restructuring the State Department [recommendation 19] is also
aimed at fostering better management skills.
At lower levels, too, the State Department must develop
sound talent management practices. We endorse many of the McKinsey report's
findings: allow leaders more discretion in making key talent decisions; reduce
time-in-grade requirements to allow the best performers to advance more
quickly; and improve feedback to allow managers to gain from insights provided
both from above and below.
Most of these problems can be handled effectively by the
State Department without additional legislative mandate; yet some of these
changes, particularly promoting professional education, require Congress to
appropriate additional funds. The Department of State estimates that it would
cost $200 million annually to create a ten to fifteen percent training float.
The Commission endorses such an investment. Additionally, the Commission
believes we must restore the external reputation of those who serve our nation
through diplomatic careers. As a means of achieving this, we recommend changing
the Foreign Service's name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service. This rhetorical
change will serve as a needed reminder that this group of people does not serve
the interest of foreign states, but is a pillar of U.S. national security.
D. THE CIVIL
SERVICE*105
While there is disagreement as to the extent of the
crisis in Civil Service quality, there are clearly specific problems requiring
substantial and immediate attention.*106 These include: the aging of the
federal workforce; the institutional challenges of bringing new workers into
government service; and critical gaps in recruiting and retaining information
technology professionals and those with less-common language skills. Most
striking is how many of these problems are self-inflicted to the extent that
departmental authority already provides some remedy if only the institutional
will and budgetary resources were also available. Fixing these problems will
make a major contribution to improving recruitment and retention.
A prominent problem confronting all of the Civil Service
is its aging workforce. The post-World War II baby-boomer generation heeded
President Kennedy's call to government service in unprecedented numbers, but
the first of this age cohort will turn 55 in 2001. A retirement wave that will
continue for the next eighteen years will reach crisis proportions in many
departments. Nearly 60 percent of the entire civilian workforce is eligible for
early or regular retirement today.*107 Within that overall figure, 27 percent
of the career Senior Executive Service (SES) is eligible for regular retirement
now; 70 percent will be eligible within five years.*108 This growing retirement
wave is exacerbated by the small numbers of employees in their twenties and
thirties in most agencies. When agencies such as the Department of Defense and
those within the Intelligence Community chose to downsize through hiring
freezes, they contributed to this trend.
While some have argued that the "Generation X"
cohort is less inclined toward government employment, our analysis suggests
that this cohort does see government as one of several desirable career tracks.
If recruiting were resumed, many within this age group would seek federal jobs.
This is suggested by the fact that the one current mechanism for bringing
graduate students into government-the Presidential Management Internship
program-has remained highly competitive.*109
Yet there are still two major problems in converting
interest in government positions to actual service. First, many young adults
have completed or are enrolled in graduate school, and thus carry a much
heavier student loan burden than their predecessors. Our recommendations for
expanding student loan forgiveness programs [recommendations 11 and 39] should
help mitigate this problem.
Second, the length and complexity of most application and
security clearance processes is devastating in an economy where private sector
firms can make on-the-spot offers. In a survey of employees from the
Departments of Commerce and the Treasury, fully 54 percent of Treasury
respondents and 73 percent of Commerce respondents reported that it took at
least four months to receive an offer from the time they submitted an
application.*110 Departments must shorten the appointment and security
clearance process. Yet a third major problem for the civil service is the
difficulty of attracting and retaining information technology (IT)
professionals who are in great demand throughout the economy. To meet expected
demand, the nation will need an additional 130,000 new IT workers each year
through at least 2006. The federal government will also need more IT
capability, requiring constant hiring to keep up with requirements. The strong
demand for IT professionals in the private sector will insure a continuing pay
gap between public and private opportunities, making it even more difficult for
the government to attract needed talent. This is compounded by a growing
"speed-to-seat metric"-a measure of the time taken to recruit, hire,
and place an employee. It means that some government IT projects with
compressed life-cycles, including some too sensitive to contract out, may
expire before a new hire can even start the project.*111
Beyond recruiting difficulties, the federal government
faces significant IT retention challenges. Deficiencies in governmental
occupational structures and position descriptions contribute to the loss of IT
personnel to the private sector. Corporations can alter the role of IT
personnel rapidly as technology advances, while government position structures
are comparatively sluggish. As a result, IT position descriptions in the
government often do not match those in the private sector.*112
These trends pose particular problems for the national
security community. IT professionals are needed not only for crucial support
functions but also to help run sophisticated intelligence platforms. Lengthy
security clearance processes and less competitive compensation packages make
recruiting high-quality IT personnel for these purposes very difficult. There
are also retention problems as younger IT civil servants are lured away by the
private sector. The National Security Agency (NSA) reports growing attrition
rates particularly among young professionals, the group most skilled in new
technologies and most in demand.*113
There is a corresponding problem, though of lesser
magnitude, for less common ("low density") languages. The United
States faces a broader range of national security challenges in the post-Cold
War world, requiring policy analysts and intelligence personnel with expertise
in more countries, regions, and issues. The people most likely to bring these
skills are native speakers of other languages with direct cultural experiences;
yet members of this group often face the greatest difficulties in getting a
security clearance. We therefore recommend the following:
* 42: The President should order the elimination of
recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring
process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention
programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.
The federal government must significantly increase
recruiting programs through programs like the National Security Education Act
[recommendation 39], which will link educational benefits to a service
requirement. To anticipate the coming bow wave of retirements, the government
needs to adopt a range of policies that make hiring and promotion practices
more flexible. Some progress has been made, particularly in the IT field, in
shortening the length of the hiring process. This is crucial to improving
government competitiveness. Organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency
(for its non-clandestine employees) have authorized recruiters to negotiate
on-the-spot offers-including compensation packages-contingent upon successful
completion of background investigation and polygraph requirements. These
programs should be generalized throughout the national security community, not
least for critical science and technology personnel. The security clearance
process itself must be revamped to provide for more efficient and timely
processing of applications. There are several ways to go about this. One is to
re-code intelligence community positions to allow some employees to start work
before receiving the most sensitive security clearances. A bipartisan
Executive-Legislative commission could be helpful in examining other methods of
streamlining the security clearance process, while maintaining the rigor
required for national security positions.
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and
individual agency personnel offices have designed many incentive programs to
recruit and retain quality employees.*114 But many departments and agencies
have not used these programs for lack of funds. Because all incentive programs
are drawn from the same pool of money as that for salaries, administrators must
trade off incentives for some employees against the ability to hire additional
personnel. Additional funds must be provided to maximize agencies' options in
recruiting and retaining high-quality personnel.
Similarly, existing authorities provide funds for
professional education. Such opportunities are crucial in maintaining a
knowledgeable cadre of national security professionals. Supporting employees'
desire for professional development is also a means of ensuring retention. Yet
the degree of downsizing in national security agencies has yielded a system
whereby the workload of an employee on training must be split among others in the
office, creating a powerful disincentive for managers to allow their best
employees to pursue these opportunities. As a complement to proposals made for
the Foreign Service, the Commission would apply the recommendation of the U.S.
Overseas Presence Panel to all national security departments and agencies: that
"the workforce structure and resources available for staff should take
into account the ten to fifteen percent of employees who will be in training. .
.at any given time."*115 Thus "full staffing" of a department or
agency should be defined as a number ten to fifteen percent greater than the
number of available positions.
We also need to give special priority to measures to
secure and retain information technology (IT) talent in the most mission-critical
areas while finding ways to outsource support functions.
For the mission-critical areas, this means using existing
and seeking additional authorities to allow direct-hiring and to provide for
more market-based compensation. While the government cannot completely close
the pay gap with the private sector, higher salaries, signing bonuses, and
performance rewards can narrow it. Some agencies have begun this effort by
paying senior IT professionals market-based salaries.*116
Further, the Commission endorses the recommendation of
the CIO Council, a group of departmental and agency Chief Information Officers,
to use and expand existing OPM authorities to lift pay cap restrictions on
former Civil Service and military employees.*117 For entry-level talent, we
recommend expanding the newly authorized Cyber Corps, akin to the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, whereby the government would pay for two
years of a student's schooling in exchange for two years of governmental IT
service.
Efforts to retain young IT professionals should recognize
that their career plans will likely not include a 30-year or even a ten-year
stint in government service. OPM developed departmental flexibility for Y2K
programs, including temporary appointments (one to four years) within the
competitive service.*118 We believe such authorities should be instituted and
expanded for IT professionals. In its own interest, the government needs to
maximize the ease with which transitions can be made between government service
and the private sector. Young employees' interest in staying may be prolonged
through performance-based retention bonuses and through the establishment of a
unique and adaptive career path for IT professionals that includes rotational
assignments and better opportunities for education and responsibility. Such an
effort might also permit the government to move IT capabilities more fluidly
across departments and agencies.
Where appropriate, outsourcing IT support functions is
still needed. NSA has already turned development and management of
non-classified technology over to a private-sector contractor, allowing NSA to
focus its in-house IT talent on developing and overseeing core intelligence
technologies. More programs like this can be used to supplement the other steps
outlined here.
The implementation of these proposals for the civil
service will require a multifaceted approach. We believe the endorsement of
these recommendations by the President would set a proper tone of importance
and urgency. Because many recommendations will affect many departments, an
interagency coordinating group should be convened to help OPM develop new
provisions. From there, heads of departments and agencies can take steps to
implement them. We know that some recommendations, such as improving the
recruitment and retention of IT professionals, cannot be fully implemented in
the near term. In such cases, we urge departments to set timelines for reaching
goals and, for those issues that cross agency lines such as IT needs, departments
and agencies should work collaboratively.
These recommendations also presuppose greater
Congressional appropriations devoted to making these changes possible. The
preceding analysis demonstrates that, in order to allow for critical
professional education, agency end-strengths must be increased by ten to
fifteen percent, requiring a significant increase in personnel funding.
Beyond training, an aggressive recruitment campaign will
require additional funds as well. In proposing the information technology
"cyber corps" program, the Clinton Administration requested $25
million annually to pay for two years of college for 300 students. IT positions
that pay close to market rates will have considerably higher salaries than is
currently the case; however, this group would be relatively small. Finally, IT
outsourcing proposals are likely to save the government money on a net basis
since the cost of contracted labor is less than that of paying civil servant
salaries, benefits, and retirement contributions.*119 The national security
component of the Civil Service is faced with an additional problem: the need to
develop professionals with breadth of experience in the interagency process,
and with depth of knowledge about substantive policy issues. Both elements are
crucial to ensuring the highest quality policy formulation and analysis for the
United States across a range of issues. They are also key to maintaining a
robust national security workforce as professionals seek a diversity of
experiences along their career paths.
The Commission's Phase II report argued that
"traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff)
will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury,
Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work closely with the
national security community."*120 Better integration of these agencies in
policy development and execution requires a human resource strategy that
achieves the following objectives: expanded opportunities to gain expertise and
to experience the culture of more than one department or agency; an assignment
and promotion system that rewards those who seek broad-based, integrative
approaches to problem solving instead of those focused on departmental turf
protection; and the erasure of artificial barriers among departments.
The current Civil Service personnel system does not
achieve these objectives because career civilians in the national security
field rarely serve outside their parent department.*121 We therefore recommend
the following:
* 43: The Executive Branch should establish a National
Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide
a corps of policy experts with broad- based experience throughout the Executive
Branch.
Such a National Security Service Corps would broaden the
experience base of senior departmental managers and develop leaders skilled at
producing integrative solutions to U.S. national security policy problems.
Participating departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce,
Justice, Energy, and the new National Homeland Security Agency-the departments
essential to interagency policymaking on key national security issues. Members
of the NSSC would not hold every position within these departments. Rather,
each department would designate Corps positions. Members of the participating
departments could choose to stay in positions outside the NSSC without career
penalty. They would continue to be governed by the current Civil Service
system. In order to preserve the firewall that exists between intelligence
support to policy and policymaking, intelligence community personnel would not
be part of the NSSC. A limited number of rotational spots, however, should be
held in selected interagency intelligence community centers (such as the
Non-Proliferation Center and the Counter-Terrorism Center) to allow members of
the Corps to understand better intelligence products and processes.
While the Foreign Service will remain separate from the
NSSC, an organic relationship between the Foreign Service and the NSSC needs to
exist. Members of the Corps would be eligible to compete for all policy
positions at the Department of State's headquarters while Foreign Service
officers would be able to compete for NSSC positions in all the participating departments.
In addition, NSSC personnel could fill select positions in some overseas
embassies and at military unified commands. Over time, the difference between
the Foreign Service and the NSSC could blur.
A rotational system and robust professional education
programs would characterize the NSSC. In designating positions for Corps
members, departments will need to identify basic requirements in education and
experience. Rotations to other departments and interagency professional
education would be required in order to hold certain positions or to be
promoted to certain levels.*122 Of course, a limited number of waivers could be
granted to allow departments to fill particular gaps as necessary.
While the participating departments would still retain
control over their personnel and would continue to make promotion decisions, an
interagency advisory group will be key to the NSSC's success. This group would
ensure that promotion rates for those within the NSSC were at least comparable
to those elsewhere in the Civil Service. They would help establish the
guidelines for rotational assignments needed for a Corps member to hold a given
position and for the means of meeting the members' educational requirements.
Such guidance and oversight will help ensure that there are compelling
incentives for professionals to join the NSSC. For this type of interagency
program to be successful, employees must see it as being in their own best
interest to meet these new requirements.
The Commission believes such a Corps can be established
largely through existing departmental authorities and through new regulations
from OPM. Specific legislative authority is not necessary.
E. MILITARY PERSONNEL Today the military is having even
greater difficulty recruiting quality people than the civilian sector of the
government. Despite significant post-Cold War force reductions in recruiting
goals, the Services have missed their quotas in some recent years.*123
Moreover, recruiting costs have risen by nearly one-third over the last four years,
while DoD quality indicators of those enlisting have declined by 40
percent.*124 Some Services, struggling to fill ROTC programs with officer
candidates, will continue to fall short for the next three years despite a much
larger college population and reduced quotas for officer accessions.*125
Even more ominous are the problems in retaining quality
personnel. Increased operational commitments are being carried out by a smaller
number of military forces, which- along with aging equipment, stringent budgets,
depleted family benefits, healthcare deficiencies, and spousal
dissatisfaction-has engendered an atmosphere of widespread frustration
throughout military ranks.*126 Job satisfaction has declined significantly, and
increasing numbers of quality people are leaving military service well in
advance of retirement, or, in other cases, are retiring as soon as they are
eligible.*127 Moreover, data indicate that it is not just the junior officers
who are leaving; retention of senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has
declined as well.*128
The Commission believes retention in the Services is a
growing problem in part because the triple systems of "up-or-out"
promotion, retirement, and compensation do not fit contemporary realities. The
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 *129 mandates
retirement at a specific time in an officer's career depending on rank,*130 or,
in many cases, separation before retirement in cases of non-promotion up until
the grade of O-4. This system itself stems, in part, from a 1947 assumption of
a virtually unlimited pool of manpower geared for total war mobilization. The
current environment, however, is very different. The supply of incoming
personnel is limited and the skills required more specialized. Moreover, older
people are not "unfit" for many of today's critical military tasks,
and the country cannot afford to squander the investment in training and
experience that military professionals possess. The military services do not
need to retain everyone, but they do need most of all to retain superior talent
for longer periods. Without decentralizing the career management systems,
introducing new compensation incentives, and providing an array of
institutional rewards for military service, the Commission believes that the
United States will be unable to recruit and retain the technical and educated
professionals it needs to meet 21st century military challenges.
These problems call for four sets of changes. First, the
enhancement of the professional military must proceed hand in hand with the
reinvigorization of the citizen soldier. Indeed, confronting many threats to
our national security, including those to the American homeland will
necessarily rely heavily on reserve military components, as we have specified
above in Section I, recommendation 6 in particular.
Second, we must change the ways we recruit military
personnel. This means putting greater effort into seeking out youth on college
campuses and providing grants and scholarships for promising candidates. The
military must also innovate in such areas as rapid promotion, atypical career
paths and patterns, and flexible compensation to attract and retain talented
candidates. The Services must also offer a greater variety of enlistment
options, including short enlistments designed to appeal to college youth, and
far more attractive educational inducements.*131 This may include scholarships,
college debt deferral and relief, and significantly enhanced GI Bill rewards in
exchange for military service.
Third, we must change the promotion system. Promotion has
been, and remains, a primary way to reward performance. But the rigidity of the
promotion system often has the effect of either taking those with technical
specialties away from the job for which they are most valuable, or failing to
provide timely and sufficient incentives for quality personnel to stay in
military service. In the Commission's view, the promotion system needs to be
more flexible. Current law states that promotion rates must comply with Congressionally-mandated
grade tables, which specify the number of personnel permitted in each grade by
Service.*132 This denies needed flexibility. Moreover, promotion should be only
one of many rewards for military service. The Services need the flexibility,
beyond new forms of fair and competitive compensation, to provide institutional
benefits, including more flexible assignments, incentive retirement options,
advanced education, alternative career paths, negotiable leaves of absence, and
rewards for career- broadening experiences. Promotion is an important tool to
shape the force and enhance professionalism, but it should not be the only
tool.
The fourth set of changes must address the military
retirement system, which is centered on a twenty-year career path. If one
serves fewer than twenty years or fails promotion to minimum grades, no
retirement benefits are forthcoming either for officers or those in the
enlisted ranks.*133 In this "all-or-nothing" system, junior personnel
have to commit themselves to a long- duration career. For those who make a
twenty-year career choice, the system induces them to leave the military in
their early forties.134 In other words, the current system either requires
separation at mandatory points for each grade, or actively entices all
personnel who do make it to twenty years of service to leave at or just beyond
that point.*135
Talented people in uniform, generally in their early
forties, thus confront a choice between working essentially at "half
pay," or beginning a second career at a time when they are generally most
marketable.*136 To those with particularly marketable skills (e.g., pilots,
information technology professionals, and medical personnel), the inducements
to leave often prove irresistible. But such cases are only the most visible
portion of a widespread problem that induces high performers of every
description to abandon the military profession. Thus the armed services lose
enormous investments in training, education, and experience at the very moment
that many mid-grade officers and mid-grade and senior NCOs are poised to make
their most valuable contributions.
We urge the President and the Congress to give the
Services the flexibility to adapt and dramatically reshape their personnel
systems to meet 21st century mission needs. The 1947/1954/1980 legislation*137
that defines military career management, coupled with legislation that governs
military retirement and compensation, gives the Services too little authority
to modernize and adapt their personnel systems at a time of accelerating
change.138 Mandatory promotion rates, officer grade limitations for each
Service, required separation points under "up- or-out," rigid
compensation levels, special pay restrictions and retirement limits, collectively
bind the Services to the point of immobility. Similar restrictions and
disincentives apply to enlisted careers and particularly affect senior NCOs and
technical specialists.
Earlier in this section we strongly recommended a major
expansion of the National Security Education Act (NSEA), as well as the
creation of the National Security Science and Technology Education Act
(NSSTEA), to provide significantly better incentives for quality personnel to
serve in government-civil and military. The Commission believes that these Acts
are especially relevant to the recruitment of high-caliber military personnel.
In particular, programs offering either college scholarships or college loan
repayments in exchange for service after graduation will make uniformed service
more attractive to all segments of the population.
National Defense Authorization Act 1999 (Public Law
106-65; U.S. Code, Title 10, §1409 (b) which restored to the military
service members who entered military service after July 31, 1986, 50 percent of
the highest three years average basic pay for twenty years of active duty
service, rather than 40 percent under REDUX. Also, it provided for full cost of
living adjustments (COLAs) rather than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus one
percentage point under REDUX.
In addition to the
enactment of an expanded NSEA and the creation of a NSSTEA, we propose the
following complement:
* 44: Congress should significantly enhance the
Montgomery GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending
legislation supporting benefits-including transition, medical, and
homeownership-for qualified veterans.
The current version of the Montgomery GI Bill (hereafter
GI Bill) is an educational program in which individuals first perform military
service and then are eligible for educational benefits. While in military
service, participants must authorize deductions from their salaries, to which
the government then adds its contribution.*139 To receive benefits while still
in service, service men and women must remain on active duty for the length of
their enlistment. To receive benefits after service, one must receive an
honorable discharge. The GI Bill is both a strong recruitment tool and, more
importantly, a valuable institutional reward for service to the nation in uniform.
Another important source of reward for military service is Title 38, which
provides a range of veterans' benefits including medical and dental care,
transition training, and authorization for Veterans Administration (VA)
homeownership loans. Collectively, VA benefits are an institutional reward for
honorable military service and integral to the covenant between those who serve
in the military and the nation itself. Given the historical value, relevance,
and proven utility of these programs, we recommend restoration and enhancements
to them as a way of rewarding and honoring military service.
GI Bill entitlements should equal, at the very least, the
median education costs of four- year U.S. colleges, and should be indexed to
keep pace with increases in those costs.*140 Such a step would have the
additional social utility of seeding veterans among the youth at elite
colleges. The Bill should accelerate full-term payments to recipients, extend
eligibility from ten to twenty years, and support technical training
alternatives. The GI Bill's structure should be an institutional entitlement
that does not require payments or cost-sharing from Service members. It should
allow transferability of benefits to qualified dependents of those Service
members who serve more than fifteen years on active duty. In addition, it
should carry a sliding scale providing automatic full benefits for Reserve and
National Guard personnel who are called to active duty for overseas contingency
operations.
We also believe that funding for these GI Bill
institutional entitlements is not sufficient and should be separated within the
Defense budget to give the department more flexibility.*141 Additionally, Title
38, should be modified to reinforce medical, transition, and VA homeownership
benefits for career and retired service members. We support recently proposed
legislation on this and other veterans benefits, but believe that additional
measures are still needed. Taken together, such changes would fulfill the
nation's promise of real educational opportunities and place greater value on
the service of military personnel. In addition, those in uniform are likely to
serve longer to secure these greater benefits.
The laws that make military personnel systems rigid and
overly centralized must be altered to provide the required flexibility to meet
21st century challenges. The Commission recommends the following:
* 45: Congress and the Defense Department should
cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of
enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.
Specifically, revised legislation should include the following acts:
* 1980 DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT (DOPMA):
Provide Service Secretaries increased authority to selectively exempt personnel
from "up-or out" career paths, mandatory flight assignment gates, the
double pass-over rule,*142 mandatory promotion and officer/enlisted grade
sizes, the mandatory retirement "flowpoints" by grade, and active
duty service limits. The individual Services should be funded to test
alternative career and enlistment paths that are fully complemented by modified
compensation, promotion, and retirement/separation packages.
* 1999 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: Permit testing
of a conversion of the defined benefit systems to a partial defined
contribution system, as well as early vesting schedules and other progressive
alternatives to the current military retirement system. Allow the Services to
shape modified retirement plans to complement alternative career paths and
specialty service.
* U.S. CODE TITLE 37 (Compensation): Correct immediately
the pay compression of senior NCOs in all the Services and test merit pay
systems and alternative pay schedules based on experience, performance, and
seniority.*143 Allow Service Secretaries discretion concerning continued flight
pay for pilots undergoing non-flying career-broadening billets by modifying the
1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act.
* SYSTEM INTEGRATION: Reconcile a new DOPMA system
(active duty) with ROPMA (Reserves), with the Technician Act (1968), the Guard
AGR Act (National Guard), and with Civil Service personnel systems to
facilitate and encourage increased movement among branches. This Commission
understands that implementing these recommendations will take time and require
the support of the President, Congress, senior military officers, and Defense
Department civilian leadership. We urge the creation of an
Executive-Legislative working group that would set guidelines for
service-centered trial programs. The working group should also evaluate new
forms of enlistment options, selective performance pay, new career patterns,
modified retirements for extended careers, and other initiatives that may
support the Services. The group should undertake to estimate the projected
costs as well as assess any unintended consequences that may result. At the
same time, the Congressional Budget Office should further define and detail the
costs of our proposed enhancements to the GI Bill and other veterans' benefits.
These recommendations will cost money. Treating the GI
Bill's benefits as an entitlement, indexing tuition allotments with rising
education costs, extending benefits to dependents, and enhancing veteran
benefits to include medical, dental, and homeownership benefits will incur
substantial costs. But we believe that the cost of inaction would be far more
profound. If we do not change the present system, the United States will have
to spend increasingly more money for increasingly lower-quality personnel.
Moreover, balanced against the initial costs of an enhanced National Security
Education Act and a National Security Science and Technology Education Act
would be long-term gains in recruiting and retaining quality personnel that would
more than offset these costs. A 1986 Congressional Research Service study
indicated that the country recouped between $5.00 and $12.50 for every dollar
invested in the original GI Bill enacted after World War II.*144 We believe
this would also be the case under our proposed legislation. Moreover, there
will be significant budgetary savings associated with reducing this high
first-term attrition, as well as with improving the retention of both mid-level
enlisted personnel and junior officers, particularly in technical
specialties.*145
In sum, the Commission recommends major personnel policy
reforms for both the civilian and the military domains. For the former, we
emphasize the urgent need to revamp the Presidential appointment process for
senior leadership, to attract talented younger cohorts to government service,
to fix the Foreign Service, and to establish a National Security Service Corps
that strengthens the government's ability to integrate the increasingly
interconnected facets of national security policy. With respect to military
personnel, our recommendations point to increasing the attractiveness of
government service to high-quality youth, providing enhanced rewards for that
service, and modernizing military career management, retirement, and
compensation systems. Each of this Commission's recommendations aims to expand
the pool of quality individuals, to decrease early attrition, and to increase
retention. The need is critical, but these reforms will go along way to avert
or ameliorate the crisis. In a bipartisan spirit, we call upon the President
and Congress to confront the challenge. Let it be their legacy that they
stepped up to this challenge and rebuilt the foundation of the nation's long-
term security.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Part 4 http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf 4-20-1
IV. The Human
Requirements for National Security
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The
maintenance of American power in the world depends on the quality of U.S.
government personnel, civil and military, at all levels. We must take immediate
action in the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet future challenges.
In its Phase I report, this Commission asserted that
"the ability to carry out effective foreign and military policies requires
not only a skilled military, but talented professionals in all forms of public
service as well."80 We reaffirm here our conviction that the quality of
personnel serving in government is critically important to U.S. national
security in the 21st century. The excellence of American public servants is the
foundation upon which an effective national security strategy must rest-in
large part because future success will require the mastery of advanced
technology, from the economy to combat, as well as leading-edge concepts of
governance. We therefore repeat our conclusion from the Phase II report, that
the United States "must strengthen government (civil and military)
personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention, and effectiveness
at all levels."*81
In this light, the declining orientation toward
government service as a prestigious career is deeply troubling. The problem
manifests itself in different ways throughout various departments, agencies,
and the military services, yet all face growing difficulties in recruiting and
retaining America's most promising talent. These deficits are traceable to
several sources, one of which is that the sustained growth of the U.S. economy
has created private sector opportunities with salaries and advancement
potential well beyond those provided by the government. This has a particular
impact in shaping career decisions in an era of rising student debt loads. The
contrast with the private sector is also organizational. In government,
positions of responsibility and the ability to advance are hemmed in by
multiple layers, even at senior levels; in the private sector, both often come
more quickly. Rigid, lengthy, and arcane government personnel procedures-
including those germane to application, compensation, promotion, retirement,
and benefits systems-also discourage some otherwise interested applicants.
Another source of the problem is that there is no single overarching motivation
to entice patriotic Americans into public service as there was during the Cold
War. Careers in government no longer seem to hold out the prospect for highly
regarded service to the nation. Meanwhile, the private and non-profit sectors
are now replete with opportunities that have broad appeal to idealistic
Americans who in an earlier time might have found a home within government
service. Government has to compete with the private sector not only in salary
and benefits, then, but often in terms of the intrinsic interest of the work
and the sense of individual efficacy and fulfillment that this work bestows.
At the same time, the trust that Americans have in their
government is buffeted by worrisome cynicism. Consistent criticism of
government employees and agencies by politicians and the press has magnified
public dissatisfaction and lowered regard for the worthiness of government
service. Political candidates running "against Washington" have
fueled the impression that all government is prone to management and services
of a quality below that of similar organizations in the private sector. This is
not the case, but virtually every Presidential candidate in the past thirty
years has deployed campaign rhetoric criticizing "the bloated
bureaucracy" as a means of securing "outsider" status in the
campaign. Neither critics nor their audiences often differentiate between
performance failures based on political maneuvering and the efforts of
apolitical professional public servants striving to implement policy. The
cumulative effect of this rhetoric on public attitudes toward the government is
demonstrated in a 1999 study highlighting American frustration with "the
poor performance of government" and "the absence of effective public
leadership."*82
A final reality is that today's technological age has
created sweeping expectations of speed, accuracy, and customization for every
product and service. Government is not immune to these expectations, but its
overall reputation remains that of a plodding bureaucracy. Talented people
seeking careers where they can quickly make a difference see government as the
antithesis to best management practices, despite many government improvements
in this area. Part of the recruitment and retention problem, therefore, flows
from the image of overall government management and must be addressed by making
government more effective and responsive at every level.
The effect of these realities on recruiting and retention
problems is manifest. The number of applicants taking the Foreign Service
entrance exam, for example, is down sharply and the State Department shows
signs of a growing retention problem. The national security community also
faces critical problems recruiting and retaining scientific and information
technology professionals in an economy that has made them ever more valuable.
The national security elements of the Civil Service face similar problems, and
these problems are magnified by the fact that the Civil Service is doing little
recruiting at a time when a retirement wave of baby-boomers is imminent.
For the armed services, the aforementioned trends have
widened the cultural gap, between the military and the country at large, that
continues to be affected by the abolition of the draft in the 1970s. While
Americans admire the military, they are increasingly less likely to serve in
it, to relate to its real dangers and hardships, or to understand its profound
commitment requirements. With a total active strength of 1.4 million, only
one-half of one percent of the nation serves in the military. Military life and
values are thus virtually unknown to the vast majority of Americans.
The military's capabilities, professionalism, and unique
culture are pillars of America's national strength and leadership in the world.
Without a renewed call to military service and systemic internal personnel
reform to retain quality people, the requisite leadership and professionalism
necessary for an effective military will be in jeopardy. For this reason, the
Commission asserted in its Phase II report that the "United States must
strengthen the bonds between the American people and those of its members who
serve in the armed forces."*83 We reaffirm that assertion here.
A. A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
FOR SERVICE TO THE NATION
To remedy these problems, the Commission believes that a
national campaign to reinvigorate and enhance the prestige of service to the
nation is necessary to attract the best Americans to military and civilian
government service. The key step in such a campaign must be to revive a
positive attitude toward public service. It has to be made clear from the
highest levels that frustrations with particular government policies or
agencies should not be conveyed through the denigration of federal employees en
masse. Calls for smaller government, too, should not be read as indictments of
the quality of government servants. Instead, specific issues should be
addressed on the merits, while a broader campaign should be waged to stress the
importance of public service in a democracy.
Implementing such a campaign requires strong and
consistent Presidential commitment, Congressional legislation, and innovative
departmental actions throughout the federal government. We know this is a tall
order, but we take heart in previous examples of such leadership. The clarion
call of President John F. Kennedy, encompassed in but a few well-chosen remarks
spread over several speeches, had enormous impact and inspired an entire
generation to public service. We also remember how President Ronald Reagan
reinvigorated the spirit of the U.S. military after the tragedies of the
Vietnam War and subsequent periods of low funding and plummeting morale. What
the President says, and how he says it, matters. Moreover, only the President
can shape the Executive Branch agenda to undertake the changes needed in U.S.
personnel systems.
While the President's involvement is central, other
leaders must help build a new foundation for public service. Congress must be
convinced not only to pass the legislative remedies proffered below, but also
to change its own rhetoric to support national service. It must work with
department heads and other affected institutions to ensure that a common
message is conveyed, and that Executive departments and agencies have the
flexibility they need to make real improvements.
Rhetoric alone, however, will not bring America's best
talent to public service. The Commission believes that unless government
service is made competitively rewarding to 21st century future leaders, words
will surely fade to inaction. Section II of this report highlighted the urgent
national need for outstanding science and technology professionals. So, too,
does government need high-quality people with expertise in the social sciences,
foreign languages, and humanities. The decreased funding available for these
programs from universities and foundations may threaten the ability of the
government to produce future leaders with the requisite knowledge-in foreign
languages, economics, and history to take several examples-to meet 21st century
security challenges.
Therefore this Commission proposes a complement to the
National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) presented in
recommendation 11 of this report. As in the case of the NSSTEA, which applies
to math and hard science majors, we would extend scholarship and debt relief
benefits to those social science, foreign language, and humanities students who
serve the nation. We therefore make the following recommendation:
* 39: Congress
should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to
include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in
exchange for military and civilian service to the nation.*84
The current National Security Education Act (NSEA) of
1991 provides limited undergraduate scholarships and graduate fellowships for
students to study certain subjects, including foreign language and foreign area
studies. The Act also allows the use of funds at institutions of higher
learning to develop faculty expertise in the languages and cultures of less
commonly studied countries. Recipients of these funds incur an obligation
either to work for an office or agency of the federal government involved in
national security affairs, or to pursue careers as educators for a period equal
to the time covered by the scholarship.*85
An expanded Act would increase the subjects currently
designated for study, offering one- to four-year scholarships good for study at
qualified U.S. universities and colleges. Upon completion of their studies,
recipients could fulfill their service in a number of ways: in the active duty
U.S. military; in National Guard or Reserve units; in national security
departments and agencies of the Civil Service; or in the Foreign Service. To
prepare students to fulfill their service requirements, the scholarship program
should include a training element. One model of this training might be a
civilian equivalent of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) or Platoon
Leader Course (PLC).*86
The Act should also provide for those who choose
government service after completing their education. In those cases, the Act
could offer several sorts of incentives in lieu of scholarships foregone. One
such incentive would be the deferral of educational loan repayment while
individuals serve in government. Another would reduce school loan principal
amounts by a set percentage for every year the individual stays in government
service up to complete repayment.*87 In such cases, the government would assume
the financial obligations of the graduate, so that neither financial nor
educational institutions suffer. The Commission believes the combination of the
NSSTEA for math and science, and for other majors this significantly expanded
NSEA will prepare Americans for many forms of service and more generally help
recruit high-quality civil service and military personnel.
B. THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
A concerted campaign to improve the attractiveness of service
to the nation is the first step in ensuring that talented people continue to
serve in government. However, fundamental changes are also needed to personnel
management systems throughout the national security agencies of government. Not
least among the institutions needing reform is the Presidential appointments
system.
The problem with government personnel starts at the top.
Unlike many other countries, the United States staffs the high levels of its
national government with many outside, non-career personnel. The most senior of
these are Presidential appointees whose positions require Senate confirmation.
While career personnel provide much-needed expertise, continuity, and
professionalism, Presidential appointees are a source of many valuable qualities
as well-fresh ideas, experience outside government, specialized expertise,
management skills, and often an impressive personal dynamism. They also ensure
political accountability in policy execution, by transmitting the President's
policies to the departments and agencies of government. Indeed, the tradition
of public-spirited citizens coming in and out of government is an old and
honorable one, serving the country well from the days of George Washington.
This infusion of outside skills is truly indispensable today, when the private
sector is the source of so much of the country's managerial and technological
innovation.
What a tragedy, then, that the system for recruiting such
outside talent has broken down. According to a recent study, "the Founders'
model of presidential service is near the breaking point" and "the
presidential appointments process now verges on complete collapse."*88 The
ordeal to which outside nominees are subjected is so great-above and beyond
whatever financial or career sacrifice is involved-as to make it prohibitive
for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service. To take
a vivid recent example: "The Clinton Administration . . . had great
difficulty filling key Energy Department positions overseeing the disposal of
nuclear waste because most experts in the field came directly or indirectly
from the nuclear industry and were thus rejected for their perceived conflicts
of interest."*89 The problem takes several forms.
First, there are extraordinary-and lengthening-delays in
the vetting and confirmation process. On average, the process for those
appointees who required Senate confirmation has lengthened from about two and
one-half months in the early 1960s to an extraordinary eight and one-half
months in 1996-suggesting that many sub-cabinet positions in the new
administration will be fortunate to be in place by the fall of 2001.*90 As
Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon point out: "The lag in getting people
into office seriously impedes good governance. A new president's first
year-clearly the most important year for accomplishments and the most
vulnerable to mistakes-is now routinely impaired by the lack of supporting
staff. For executive agencies, leaderless periods mean decisions not taken,
initiatives not launched, and accountability not upheld."*91 The result is
a gross distortion of the Constitutional process; the American people exert
themselves to elect a President and yet he is impeded from even beginning to
carry out his mandate until one-sixth of his term has elapsed.
Second, the ethics rules-conflict of interest and
financial disclosure requirements-have proliferated beyond all proportion to
the point where they are not only a source of excessive delay but a prohibitive
obstacle to the recruitment of honest men and women to public service. Stacks
of different background forms covering much of the same information must be
completed for the White House, the Senate, and the FBI (in addition to the
financial disclosure forms for the Office of Government Ethics). These
disclosure requirements put appointees through weeks of effort and often
significant expense. The Defense Department and Senate Armed Services Committee
routinely force nominees to divest completely their holdings related to the
defense industry instead of exploring other options such as blind trusts,
discretionary waivers, and recusals.*92 This impedes recruiting high-level
appointees whose knowledge of that industry should be regarded as a valuable
asset to the office, not reason for disqualification. The complexity of the
ethics rules is not only a barrier and a time-consuming burden before
confirmation; it is a source of traps for unwary but honest officials after
confirmation. This is despite the fact that the U.S. federal government is
remarkable for the rarity of real corruption in high office compared to many
other advanced societies. Yet we proliferate "scandals" because of
appearances of improprieties, or inadvertent breaches of highly technical
provisions. Worse, these rules are increasingly matters of criminal rather than
administrative remedies. It appears to us that those who have written these
conflict of interest regulations themselves have little experience in such
matters.
Third, and closely related, are the post-employment
restrictions that a new recruit knows he or she must endure, particularly
appointees subject to Senate confirmation. We will simply cease to attract
talented outsiders who have a track record of success if the price for a few
years of government service is to forsake not only income but the very fields
in which they had demonstrated talent and found success. The recent trend has
been to add to the restrictions. However, we applaud the recent revocation of
Executive Order 12834 as an important step in removing some unnecessary
restrictions.*93
A fourth dimension of the problem is the proliferation of
Presidential-appointee positions. In the last 30 years, the number of
Senate-confirmable Presidential-appointee positions throughout the federal
government has quadrupled, from 196 to 786. Within the Defense Department, the
figure has risen from 31 to 45 during the same period.*94 The growing number of
appointees contributes directly to the backlog that slows the confirmation
process. It also makes public service in many of these positions less
attractive; as the Defense Science Board noted in the case of the Defense
Department, "an assistant secretary post may be less attractive buried
several layers below the secretary than as a number two or three job."*95
Moreover, Presidential appointments can hardly serve as a transmission belt of
Presidential authority if multiple layers of political appointees diffuse
accountability and make departments and agencies more cumbersome and less
responsive. And it runs glaringly counter to the trend in today's private
sector toward flatter and leaner management structures. Finally, the
appointments process feeds the pervasive atmosphere of distrust and cynicism
about government service. The encrustation of complex rules is based on the
presumption that all officials, and especially those with experience in or
contact with the private sector, are criminals waiting to be unmasked. Congress
and, especially, the media relish accusations or suspicions, whether
substantiated or not. Yet the U.S. government will not be able to function
effectively unless public service is restored to a place of honor and prestige,
especially for private citizens who have achieved success in their chosen
fields.
We need to rebuild the present system nearly from the
ground up, and the beginning of a new administration is the ideal time to
start. Our recommendations support those made in the Defense Science Board's
Human Resource Study, in the joint survey undertaken by the Brookings
Institution and the Heritage Foundation, and by Norman Ornstein and Thomas
Donilon. We therefore recommend the following:
* 40: The Executive and Legislative Branches should
cooperate to revise the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the
impediments that have made high- level public service undesirable to many
distinguished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number of Senate
confirmed and non-career SES positions by 25 percent; shorten the appointment
process; and moderate draconian ethics regulations.
Reducing non-career positions would, as the Defense
Science Board has noted, "allow more upward career mobility for Senior
Executive Service employees and provide greater continuity and corporate memory
in conducting the day-to-day business affairs of the Defense Department during
the transition between administrations."*96 Recommendation 43 below to
create a National Security Service Corps should help ensure that career
employees develop the qualifications to be eligible to hold senior positions
throughout the government.
The aim of reducing the number of Presidential appointees
is not to weaken Presidential political authority over the bureaucracy, but to
eliminate the excessive layering that clogs the government's functioning in
addition to slowing the appointment process. That said, an exact balance
between political and career appointees cannot be specified in the abstract.
Both groups include skilled and talented people. But Presidents should be held
to a qualitative standard-that political appointees, whether for Ambassadors or
for policymaking positions in Washington, should be chosen for the real talents
they will bring and not the campaign contributions they brought. [See
recommendation 23]
To streamline and shorten the current appointment
process, the President and leaders of the new Congress should meet as soon as
possible to agree on the following measures.
* CONFIRM THE NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM FIRST. By tradition,
the Senate foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees hold
hearings before inauguration on the nominees for Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and vote on inauguration day.
This practice should continue. Future Presidents should also present to the
Senate no later than inauguration day his nominees for the top ten positions at
State and at Defense and the top three posts at CIA. Leaders of the relevant
committees should agree to move the full slate of appointments to the full
Senate within 30 days of receiving the nomination (barring some serious
legitimate concern about an individual nominee).*97
* REDUCE AND STANDARDIZE PAPERWORK REQUIREMENTS. The
"Transition to Governing Project" jointly undertaken by the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution is developing software that
will enable appointees to collect information once and direct it to the
necessary forms. The new President should direct all relevant agencies and
authorities to accept these computerized forms and to streamline the paperwork requirements
for future appointees.*98
* REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NOMINEES SUBJECT TO FULL FBI
BACKGROUND CHECKS. Full field investigations should be required only for
national security or other sensitive top- level posts. Most other appointees
need only abbreviated background checks, and part- time or lesser posts need
only simple identification checks.99 The risks to the Republic of such an
approach are minor and manageable, and are far outweighed by the benefit that
would accrue in saved resources and expedited vetting.
* LIMIT ACCESS TO FULL FBI FILES. Distribution of raw FBI
files should be severely restricted to the chairman and ranking minority member
of the confirming Senate committee.100 Nothing deters the recruitment of senior
people more than the fear that their private lives will be shredded by the
leakage of such material to the national media. To significantly revise current
conflict-of-interest and ethics regulations, the President and Congressional
leaders should meet quickly and instruct their top aides to make
recommendations within 90 days of January 20, 2001. This Commission endorses
retention of basic laws and regulations that prevent bribery and corrupt
practices as well as the restrictions in the U.S. Code that ban former
officials from lobbying their former agencies for one year. We also endorse
lifetime prohibitions against acting as a representative of a foreign
government and against making a formal appearance in reference to a
"particular matter" in which he or she participated personally and
substantially, or a matter under his or her official responsibilities. However,
the Commission recommends two important actions:
* Conduct a comprehensive review of the regulations and
statutory framework covering Presidential appointments to ensure that
regulations do not exceed statutory requirements.
* Make blind trusts, discretionary waivers, and recusals
more easily available as alternatives to complete divestiture of financial and
business holdings of concern.
The conflict of interest regime should also be
decriminalized. Technical or inadvertent misstatements on complex disclosure
forms, or innocent contacts with the private sector, should not be
presumptively criminal. The Office of Government Ethics should be enabled and
encouraged to enforce the disclosure and post-employment statutes as civil or
administrative matters; to decide questions expeditiously; and to see its job
as clearing the innocent, as well as pursuing wrongdoers.
These recommendations can be accomplished through Executive
Branch action, such as that which rescinded Executive Order 12834. Other
recommendations, however, will require Congressional concurrence and action. We
therefore urge the new President to take the initiative immediately with
Congress to agree on future statutory reforms.
C. THE FOREIGN SERVICE
An effective and motivated Foreign Service is critical to
the success of the Commission's restructuring proposal for the State Department
[see Section III above].Yet among career government systems, the Foreign
Service, which is set apart from other civilian personnel systems by its
specialized entrance procedures and up-or-out approach to promotion, is most in
need of repair.
While some believe the Foreign Service has retained much
of its historical allure and cachet, many close observers contend that the
Foreign Service no longer attracts or retains the quality of people needed to
meet the diplomatic challenges of the 21st century. Overall educational
competence in areas crucial to a quality Foreign Service-including history,
geography, economics, humanities, and foreign languages-is declining, resulting
in a shrinking pool of those with the requisite knowledge and skills for this
service.*101 The proposed revision to the National Security Education Act [recommendation
39 above] is one response to this deficit.
Data indicate that recruitment is currently the Foreign
Service's major concern.*102 There are now 25 percent fewer people taking the
entrance exam as there were in the mid-1980s. Other careers, in corporations
and non-governmental organizations, now offer many of the same opportunities on
which the Foreign Service used to hold the monopoly: living overseas, learning
foreign languages, and developing negotiating experience. These other
opportunities generally pay better, do not entail the same level of austerity
and danger often faced by Foreign Service officers posted abroad, and do not
impose the same constraints on two-career families.
Beyond this lack of flexibility, many of the State
Department's own policies are detrimental to attracting and keeping the highest
quality people. The recruiting process is exceedingly slow, often taking two
years from written exam to the first day of work. At a time when potential
officers have many other career choices they may elect, this is a fatal
weakness.
The oral exam also works at odds with the goal of
attracting those with the range of knowledge (foreign policy, economics,
cultural studies) and skills (languages, leadership, technology) necessary to
an effective Foreign Service. The exam's "blindfolding" policy,
whereby the examiners who decide who enters the Service know nothing about an
applicant's background, has the admirable goal of ensuring a level playing
field. But it runs completely counter to common sense in selecting the most
qualified applicants.
The lack of professional educational opportunities
currently afforded Foreign Service officers is also a problem both for the
quality of those who stay and as a reason for those who leave. While the Foreign
Service certainly needs more training in languages and emerging global issues,
recent studies find an additional problem involving the lack of effective
management and leadership throughout the State Department.*103 We therefore
recommend the following:
* 41: The President should order the overhauling of the
Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically
improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a
core value of the State Department.
In order to revamp
the exam process, changes must be made to shorten the hiring process
dramatically without compromising the competitiveness of the system. The
Commission is encouraged by the use of the shorter Alternative Examination
Program (AEP) which allows applicants (now limited to current government
employees) to advance to the oral examination on the basis of their
professional experience. Contingent upon evaluation of its success, this
program should be broadened and other innovative approaches encouraged. If the
written exam is retained, it might be administered by computer, allowing
applicants to sit for the test at different times throughout the year.
In addition, the oral exam's blindfolding policy should
end. While we sympathize with the aim of fair consideration for all, and with
the State Department's eagerness to avoid legal harassment, this approach
seriously damages the effectiveness of the examination process. It omits
consideration of the professional and other experiences candidates may bring to
the Foreign Service. It also makes it impossible for examiners to counsel
applicants on the appropriateness of their backgrounds to particular cones
(political, economic, consular, public diplomacy, or administrative). There is
no legal requirement for this practice.
A successful Foreign Service also requires officers who
are consistently building new knowledge and skills. As we recommend below for
the Civil Service, the Commission endorses a ten to fifteen percent increase in
personnel to allow for that proportion of the overall service to be in training
at any given point.104 Current State Department professional development,
focused mostly on languages, must be greatly expanded to ensure a diplomatic
corps on the cutting edge of 21st century policy and management skills. We
agree with the recommendations of McKinsey and the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel that call for a full range of mandatory educational courses in functional
topics, languages, leadership, and management. Training milestones should be
met in advance of promotions or advancements to supervisory positions. Beyond
problems with the exam process and the lack of professional development
programs, all levels of the State Department suffer from a lack of focus on
leadership and management. Improvements will require a cultural shift that must
flow from the top. We urge future Presidents and Secretaries of State in
selecting senior State Department officials to consider management strengths
and departmental leadership abilities in addition to substantive expertise. Our
proposal for restructuring the State Department [recommendation 19] is also
aimed at fostering better management skills.
At lower levels, too, the State Department must develop
sound talent management practices. We endorse many of the McKinsey report's
findings: allow leaders more discretion in making key talent decisions; reduce
time-in-grade requirements to allow the best performers to advance more
quickly; and improve feedback to allow managers to gain from insights provided
both from above and below.
Most of these problems can be handled effectively by the
State Department without additional legislative mandate; yet some of these
changes, particularly promoting professional education, require Congress to
appropriate additional funds. The Department of State estimates that it would
cost $200 million annually to create a ten to fifteen percent training float.
The Commission endorses such an investment. Additionally, the Commission
believes we must restore the external reputation of those who serve our nation
through diplomatic careers. As a means of achieving this, we recommend changing
the Foreign Service's name to the U.S. Diplomatic Service. This rhetorical
change will serve as a needed reminder that this group of people does not serve
the interest of foreign states, but is a pillar of U.S. national security.
D. THE CIVIL
SERVICE*105
While there is disagreement as to the extent of the
crisis in Civil Service quality, there are clearly specific problems requiring
substantial and immediate attention.*106 These include: the aging of the
federal workforce; the institutional challenges of bringing new workers into
government service; and critical gaps in recruiting and retaining information
technology professionals and those with less-common language skills. Most
striking is how many of these problems are self-inflicted to the extent that
departmental authority already provides some remedy if only the institutional
will and budgetary resources were also available. Fixing these problems will
make a major contribution to improving recruitment and retention.
A prominent problem confronting all of the Civil Service
is its aging workforce. The post-World War II baby-boomer generation heeded
President Kennedy's call to government service in unprecedented numbers, but
the first of this age cohort will turn 55 in 2001. A retirement wave that will
continue for the next eighteen years will reach crisis proportions in many
departments. Nearly 60 percent of the entire civilian workforce is eligible for
early or regular retirement today.*107 Within that overall figure, 27 percent
of the career Senior Executive Service (SES) is eligible for regular retirement
now; 70 percent will be eligible within five years.*108 This growing retirement
wave is exacerbated by the small numbers of employees in their twenties and
thirties in most agencies. When agencies such as the Department of Defense and
those within the Intelligence Community chose to downsize through hiring
freezes, they contributed to this trend.
While some have argued that the "Generation X"
cohort is less inclined toward government employment, our analysis suggests
that this cohort does see government as one of several desirable career tracks.
If recruiting were resumed, many within this age group would seek federal jobs.
This is suggested by the fact that the one current mechanism for bringing
graduate students into government-the Presidential Management Internship
program-has remained highly competitive.*109
Yet there are still two major problems in converting
interest in government positions to actual service. First, many young adults
have completed or are enrolled in graduate school, and thus carry a much
heavier student loan burden than their predecessors. Our recommendations for
expanding student loan forgiveness programs [recommendations 11 and 39] should
help mitigate this problem.
Second, the length and complexity of most application and
security clearance processes is devastating in an economy where private sector
firms can make on-the-spot offers. In a survey of employees from the
Departments of Commerce and the Treasury, fully 54 percent of Treasury
respondents and 73 percent of Commerce respondents reported that it took at
least four months to receive an offer from the time they submitted an
application.*110 Departments must shorten the appointment and security
clearance process. Yet a third major problem for the civil service is the
difficulty of attracting and retaining information technology (IT)
professionals who are in great demand throughout the economy. To meet expected
demand, the nation will need an additional 130,000 new IT workers each year
through at least 2006. The federal government will also need more IT
capability, requiring constant hiring to keep up with requirements. The strong
demand for IT professionals in the private sector will insure a continuing pay
gap between public and private opportunities, making it even more difficult for
the government to attract needed talent. This is compounded by a growing
"speed-to-seat metric"-a measure of the time taken to recruit, hire,
and place an employee. It means that some government IT projects with
compressed life-cycles, including some too sensitive to contract out, may
expire before a new hire can even start the project.*111
Beyond recruiting difficulties, the federal government
faces significant IT retention challenges. Deficiencies in governmental
occupational structures and position descriptions contribute to the loss of IT
personnel to the private sector. Corporations can alter the role of IT
personnel rapidly as technology advances, while government position structures
are comparatively sluggish. As a result, IT position descriptions in the
government often do not match those in the private sector.*112
These trends pose particular problems for the national
security community. IT professionals are needed not only for crucial support
functions but also to help run sophisticated intelligence platforms. Lengthy
security clearance processes and less competitive compensation packages make
recruiting high-quality IT personnel for these purposes very difficult. There
are also retention problems as younger IT civil servants are lured away by the
private sector. The National Security Agency (NSA) reports growing attrition
rates particularly among young professionals, the group most skilled in new
technologies and most in demand.*113
There is a corresponding problem, though of lesser
magnitude, for less common ("low density") languages. The United
States faces a broader range of national security challenges in the post-Cold
War world, requiring policy analysts and intelligence personnel with expertise
in more countries, regions, and issues. The people most likely to bring these
skills are native speakers of other languages with direct cultural experiences;
yet members of this group often face the greatest difficulties in getting a
security clearance. We therefore recommend the following:
* 42: The President should order the elimination of
recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring
process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention
programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.
The federal government must significantly increase
recruiting programs through programs like the National Security Education Act
[recommendation 39], which will link educational benefits to a service
requirement. To anticipate the coming bow wave of retirements, the government
needs to adopt a range of policies that make hiring and promotion practices
more flexible. Some progress has been made, particularly in the IT field, in
shortening the length of the hiring process. This is crucial to improving
government competitiveness. Organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency
(for its non-clandestine employees) have authorized recruiters to negotiate
on-the-spot offers-including compensation packages-contingent upon successful
completion of background investigation and polygraph requirements. These
programs should be generalized throughout the national security community, not
least for critical science and technology personnel. The security clearance
process itself must be revamped to provide for more efficient and timely
processing of applications. There are several ways to go about this. One is to
re-code intelligence community positions to allow some employees to start work
before receiving the most sensitive security clearances. A bipartisan
Executive-Legislative commission could be helpful in examining other methods of
streamlining the security clearance process, while maintaining the rigor
required for national security positions.
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and
individual agency personnel offices have designed many incentive programs to
recruit and retain quality employees.*114 But many departments and agencies
have not used these programs for lack of funds. Because all incentive programs
are drawn from the same pool of money as that for salaries, administrators must
trade off incentives for some employees against the ability to hire additional
personnel. Additional funds must be provided to maximize agencies' options in
recruiting and retaining high-quality personnel.
Similarly, existing authorities provide funds for
professional education. Such opportunities are crucial in maintaining a
knowledgeable cadre of national security professionals. Supporting employees'
desire for professional development is also a means of ensuring retention. Yet
the degree of downsizing in national security agencies has yielded a system
whereby the workload of an employee on training must be split among others in
the office, creating a powerful disincentive for managers to allow their best
employees to pursue these opportunities. As a complement to proposals made for
the Foreign Service, the Commission would apply the recommendation of the U.S.
Overseas Presence Panel to all national security departments and agencies: that
"the workforce structure and resources available for staff should take
into account the ten to fifteen percent of employees who will be in training. .
.at any given time."*115 Thus "full staffing" of a department or
agency should be defined as a number ten to fifteen percent greater than the
number of available positions.
We also need to give special priority to measures to
secure and retain information technology (IT) talent in the most
mission-critical areas while finding ways to outsource support functions.
For the mission-critical areas, this means using existing
and seeking additional authorities to allow direct-hiring and to provide for
more market-based compensation. While the government cannot completely close
the pay gap with the private sector, higher salaries, signing bonuses, and
performance rewards can narrow it. Some agencies have begun this effort by
paying senior IT professionals market-based salaries.*116
Further, the Commission endorses the recommendation of
the CIO Council, a group of departmental and agency Chief Information Officers,
to use and expand existing OPM authorities to lift pay cap restrictions on
former Civil Service and military employees.*117 For entry-level talent, we
recommend expanding the newly authorized Cyber Corps, akin to the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, whereby the government would pay for two
years of a student's schooling in exchange for two years of governmental IT
service.
Efforts to retain young IT professionals should recognize
that their career plans will likely not include a 30-year or even a ten-year
stint in government service. OPM developed departmental flexibility for Y2K
programs, including temporary appointments (one to four years) within the
competitive service.*118 We believe such authorities should be instituted and
expanded for IT professionals. In its own interest, the government needs to
maximize the ease with which transitions can be made between government service
and the private sector. Young employees' interest in staying may be prolonged
through performance-based retention bonuses and through the establishment of a
unique and adaptive career path for IT professionals that includes rotational
assignments and better opportunities for education and responsibility. Such an
effort might also permit the government to move IT capabilities more fluidly
across departments and agencies.
Where appropriate, outsourcing IT support functions is
still needed. NSA has already turned development and management of
non-classified technology over to a private-sector contractor, allowing NSA to
focus its in-house IT talent on developing and overseeing core intelligence
technologies. More programs like this can be used to supplement the other steps
outlined here.
The implementation of these proposals for the civil
service will require a multifaceted approach. We believe the endorsement of
these recommendations by the President would set a proper tone of importance
and urgency. Because many recommendations will affect many departments, an
interagency coordinating group should be convened to help OPM develop new
provisions. From there, heads of departments and agencies can take steps to
implement them. We know that some recommendations, such as improving the
recruitment and retention of IT professionals, cannot be fully implemented in
the near term. In such cases, we urge departments to set timelines for reaching
goals and, for those issues that cross agency lines such as IT needs,
departments and agencies should work collaboratively.
These recommendations also presuppose greater
Congressional appropriations devoted to making these changes possible. The
preceding analysis demonstrates that, in order to allow for critical
professional education, agency end-strengths must be increased by ten to
fifteen percent, requiring a significant increase in personnel funding.
Beyond training, an aggressive recruitment campaign will
require additional funds as well. In proposing the information technology
"cyber corps" program, the Clinton Administration requested $25
million annually to pay for two years of college for 300 students. IT positions
that pay close to market rates will have considerably higher salaries than is
currently the case; however, this group would be relatively small. Finally, IT
outsourcing proposals are likely to save the government money on a net basis
since the cost of contracted labor is less than that of paying civil servant
salaries, benefits, and retirement contributions.*119 The national security
component of the Civil Service is faced with an additional problem: the need to
develop professionals with breadth of experience in the interagency process,
and with depth of knowledge about substantive policy issues. Both elements are
crucial to ensuring the highest quality policy formulation and analysis for the
United States across a range of issues. They are also key to maintaining a robust
national security workforce as professionals seek a diversity of experiences
along their career paths.
The Commission's Phase II report argued that
"traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff)
will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury,
Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work closely with the
national security community."*120 Better integration of these agencies in
policy development and execution requires a human resource strategy that
achieves the following objectives: expanded opportunities to gain expertise and
to experience the culture of more than one department or agency; an assignment
and promotion system that rewards those who seek broad-based, integrative
approaches to problem solving instead of those focused on departmental turf
protection; and the erasure of artificial barriers among departments.
The current Civil Service personnel system does not
achieve these objectives because career civilians in the national security
field rarely serve outside their parent department.*121 We therefore recommend
the following:
* 43: The Executive Branch should establish a National
Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide
a corps of policy experts with broad- based experience throughout the Executive
Branch.
Such a National Security Service Corps would broaden the
experience base of senior departmental managers and develop leaders skilled at
producing integrative solutions to U.S. national security policy problems.
Participating departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce,
Justice, Energy, and the new National Homeland Security Agency-the departments
essential to interagency policymaking on key national security issues. Members of
the NSSC would not hold every position within these departments. Rather, each
department would designate Corps positions. Members of the participating
departments could choose to stay in positions outside the NSSC without career
penalty. They would continue to be governed by the current Civil Service
system. In order to preserve the firewall that exists between intelligence
support to policy and policymaking, intelligence community personnel would not
be part of the NSSC. A limited number of rotational spots, however, should be
held in selected interagency intelligence community centers (such as the
Non-Proliferation Center and the Counter-Terrorism Center) to allow members of
the Corps to understand better intelligence products and processes.
While the Foreign Service will remain separate from the
NSSC, an organic relationship between the Foreign Service and the NSSC needs to
exist. Members of the Corps would be eligible to compete for all policy
positions at the Department of State's headquarters while Foreign Service
officers would be able to compete for NSSC positions in all the participating
departments. In addition, NSSC personnel could fill select positions in some
overseas embassies and at military unified commands. Over time, the difference
between the Foreign Service and the NSSC could blur.
A rotational system and robust professional education
programs would characterize the NSSC. In designating positions for Corps
members, departments will need to identify basic requirements in education and experience.
Rotations to other departments and interagency professional education would be
required in order to hold certain positions or to be promoted to certain
levels.*122 Of course, a limited number of waivers could be granted to allow
departments to fill particular gaps as necessary.
While the participating departments would still retain
control over their personnel and would continue to make promotion decisions, an
interagency advisory group will be key to the NSSC's success. This group would
ensure that promotion rates for those within the NSSC were at least comparable
to those elsewhere in the Civil Service. They would help establish the
guidelines for rotational assignments needed for a Corps member to hold a given
position and for the means of meeting the members' educational requirements.
Such guidance and oversight will help ensure that there are compelling
incentives for professionals to join the NSSC. For this type of interagency
program to be successful, employees must see it as being in their own best
interest to meet these new requirements.
The Commission believes such a Corps can be established
largely through existing departmental authorities and through new regulations
from OPM. Specific legislative authority is not necessary.
E. MILITARY PERSONNEL Today the military is having even
greater difficulty recruiting quality people than the civilian sector of the
government. Despite significant post-Cold War force reductions in recruiting
goals, the Services have missed their quotas in some recent years.*123
Moreover, recruiting costs have risen by nearly one-third over the last four
years, while DoD quality indicators of those enlisting have declined by 40
percent.*124 Some Services, struggling to fill ROTC programs with officer
candidates, will continue to fall short for the next three years despite a much
larger college population and reduced quotas for officer accessions.*125
Even more ominous are the problems in retaining quality
personnel. Increased operational commitments are being carried out by a smaller
number of military forces, which- along with aging equipment, stringent
budgets, depleted family benefits, healthcare deficiencies, and spousal
dissatisfaction-has engendered an atmosphere of widespread frustration
throughout military ranks.*126 Job satisfaction has declined significantly, and
increasing numbers of quality people are leaving military service well in
advance of retirement, or, in other cases, are retiring as soon as they are
eligible.*127 Moreover, data indicate that it is not just the junior officers
who are leaving; retention of senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has
declined as well.*128
The Commission believes retention in the Services is a
growing problem in part because the triple systems of "up-or-out" promotion,
retirement, and compensation do not fit contemporary realities. The Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 *129 mandates retirement at a
specific time in an officer's career depending on rank,*130 or, in many cases,
separation before retirement in cases of non-promotion up until the grade of
O-4. This system itself stems, in part, from a 1947 assumption of a virtually
unlimited pool of manpower geared for total war mobilization. The current
environment, however, is very different. The supply of incoming personnel is
limited and the skills required more specialized. Moreover, older people are
not "unfit" for many of today's critical military tasks, and the
country cannot afford to squander the investment in training and experience that
military professionals possess. The military services do not need to retain
everyone, but they do need most of all to retain superior talent for longer
periods. Without decentralizing the career management systems, introducing new
compensation incentives, and providing an array of institutional rewards for
military service, the Commission believes that the United States will be unable
to recruit and retain the technical and educated professionals it needs to meet
21st century military challenges.
These problems call for four sets of changes. First, the
enhancement of the professional military must proceed hand in hand with the
reinvigorization of the citizen soldier. Indeed, confronting many threats to
our national security, including those to the American homeland will
necessarily rely heavily on reserve military components, as we have specified
above in Section I, recommendation 6 in particular.
Second, we must change the ways we recruit military
personnel. This means putting greater effort into seeking out youth on college
campuses and providing grants and scholarships for promising candidates. The
military must also innovate in such areas as rapid promotion, atypical career
paths and patterns, and flexible compensation to attract and retain talented
candidates. The Services must also offer a greater variety of enlistment
options, including short enlistments designed to appeal to college youth, and
far more attractive educational inducements.*131 This may include scholarships,
college debt deferral and relief, and significantly enhanced GI Bill rewards in
exchange for military service.
Third, we must change the promotion system. Promotion has
been, and remains, a primary way to reward performance. But the rigidity of the
promotion system often has the effect of either taking those with technical
specialties away from the job for which they are most valuable, or failing to
provide timely and sufficient incentives for quality personnel to stay in
military service. In the Commission's view, the promotion system needs to be
more flexible. Current law states that promotion rates must comply with
Congressionally-mandated grade tables, which specify the number of personnel
permitted in each grade by Service.*132 This denies needed flexibility.
Moreover, promotion should be only one of many rewards for military service.
The Services need the flexibility, beyond new forms of fair and competitive
compensation, to provide institutional benefits, including more flexible
assignments, incentive retirement options, advanced education, alternative
career paths, negotiable leaves of absence, and rewards for career- broadening
experiences. Promotion is an important tool to shape the force and enhance
professionalism, but it should not be the only tool.
The fourth set of changes must address the military
retirement system, which is centered on a twenty-year career path. If one
serves fewer than twenty years or fails promotion to minimum grades, no
retirement benefits are forthcoming either for officers or those in the enlisted
ranks.*133 In this "all-or-nothing" system, junior personnel have to
commit themselves to a long- duration career. For those who make a twenty-year
career choice, the system induces them to leave the military in their early
forties.134 In other words, the current system either requires separation at
mandatory points for each grade, or actively entices all personnel who do make
it to twenty years of service to leave at or just beyond that point.*135
Talented people in uniform, generally in their early
forties, thus confront a choice between working essentially at "half
pay," or beginning a second career at a time when they are generally most
marketable.*136 To those with particularly marketable skills (e.g., pilots,
information technology professionals, and medical personnel), the inducements
to leave often prove irresistible. But such cases are only the most visible
portion of a widespread problem that induces high performers of every
description to abandon the military profession. Thus the armed services lose
enormous investments in training, education, and experience at the very moment
that many mid-grade officers and mid-grade and senior NCOs are poised to make
their most valuable contributions.
We urge the President and the Congress to give the Services
the flexibility to adapt and dramatically reshape their personnel systems to
meet 21st century mission needs. The 1947/1954/1980 legislation*137 that
defines military career management, coupled with legislation that governs
military retirement and compensation, gives the Services too little authority
to modernize and adapt their personnel systems at a time of accelerating
change.138 Mandatory promotion rates, officer grade limitations for each
Service, required separation points under "up- or-out," rigid
compensation levels, special pay restrictions and retirement limits,
collectively bind the Services to the point of immobility. Similar restrictions
and disincentives apply to enlisted careers and particularly affect senior NCOs
and technical specialists.
Earlier in this section we strongly recommended a major
expansion of the National Security Education Act (NSEA), as well as the
creation of the National Security Science and Technology Education Act
(NSSTEA), to provide significantly better incentives for quality personnel to
serve in government-civil and military. The Commission believes that these Acts
are especially relevant to the recruitment of high-caliber military personnel.
In particular, programs offering either college scholarships or college loan
repayments in exchange for service after graduation will make uniformed service
more attractive to all segments of the population.
National Defense Authorization Act 1999 (Public Law
106-65; U.S. Code, Title 10, §1409 (b) which restored to the military
service members who entered military service after July 31, 1986, 50 percent of
the highest three years average basic pay for twenty years of active duty
service, rather than 40 percent under REDUX. Also, it provided for full cost of
living adjustments (COLAs) rather than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus one
percentage point under REDUX.
In addition to the
enactment of an expanded NSEA and the creation of a NSSTEA, we propose the
following complement:
* 44: Congress should significantly enhance the
Montgomery GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending
legislation supporting benefits-including transition, medical, and
homeownership-for qualified veterans.
The current version of the Montgomery GI Bill (hereafter
GI Bill) is an educational program in which individuals first perform military
service and then are eligible for educational benefits. While in military
service, participants must authorize deductions from their salaries, to which
the government then adds its contribution.*139 To receive benefits while still
in service, service men and women must remain on active duty for the length of
their enlistment. To receive benefits after service, one must receive an
honorable discharge. The GI Bill is both a strong recruitment tool and, more
importantly, a valuable institutional reward for service to the nation in
uniform. Another important source of reward for military service is Title 38,
which provides a range of veterans' benefits including medical and dental care,
transition training, and authorization for Veterans Administration (VA)
homeownership loans. Collectively, VA benefits are an institutional reward for
honorable military service and integral to the covenant between those who serve
in the military and the nation itself. Given the historical value, relevance,
and proven utility of these programs, we recommend restoration and enhancements
to them as a way of rewarding and honoring military service.
GI Bill entitlements should equal, at the very least, the
median education costs of four- year U.S. colleges, and should be indexed to
keep pace with increases in those costs.*140 Such a step would have the
additional social utility of seeding veterans among the youth at elite
colleges. The Bill should accelerate full-term payments to recipients, extend
eligibility from ten to twenty years, and support technical training
alternatives. The GI Bill's structure should be an institutional entitlement
that does not require payments or cost-sharing from Service members. It should
allow transferability of benefits to qualified dependents of those Service
members who serve more than fifteen years on active duty. In addition, it
should carry a sliding scale providing automatic full benefits for Reserve and
National Guard personnel who are called to active duty for overseas contingency
operations.
We also believe that funding for these GI Bill
institutional entitlements is not sufficient and should be separated within the
Defense budget to give the department more flexibility.*141 Additionally, Title
38, should be modified to reinforce medical, transition, and VA homeownership
benefits for career and retired service members. We support recently proposed
legislation on this and other veterans benefits, but believe that additional measures
are still needed. Taken together, such changes would fulfill the nation's
promise of real educational opportunities and place greater value on the
service of military personnel. In addition, those in uniform are likely to
serve longer to secure these greater benefits.
The laws that make military personnel systems rigid and
overly centralized must be altered to provide the required flexibility to meet
21st century challenges. The Commission recommends the following:
* 45: Congress and the Defense Department should
cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of
enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.
Specifically, revised legislation should include the following acts:
* 1980 DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT (DOPMA):
Provide Service Secretaries increased authority to selectively exempt personnel
from "up-or out" career paths, mandatory flight assignment gates, the
double pass-over rule,*142 mandatory promotion and officer/enlisted grade
sizes, the mandatory retirement "flowpoints" by grade, and active
duty service limits. The individual Services should be funded to test
alternative career and enlistment paths that are fully complemented by modified
compensation, promotion, and retirement/separation packages.
* 1999 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: Permit testing
of a conversion of the defined benefit systems to a partial defined
contribution system, as well as early vesting schedules and other progressive
alternatives to the current military retirement system. Allow the Services to
shape modified retirement plans to complement alternative career paths and
specialty service.
* U.S. CODE TITLE 37 (Compensation): Correct immediately
the pay compression of senior NCOs in all the Services and test merit pay
systems and alternative pay schedules based on experience, performance, and
seniority.*143 Allow Service Secretaries discretion concerning continued flight
pay for pilots undergoing non-flying career-broadening billets by modifying the
1974 Aviation Career Incentive Act.
* SYSTEM INTEGRATION: Reconcile a new DOPMA system
(active duty) with ROPMA (Reserves), with the Technician Act (1968), the Guard
AGR Act (National Guard), and with Civil Service personnel systems to facilitate
and encourage increased movement among branches. This Commission understands
that implementing these recommendations will take time and require the support
of the President, Congress, senior military officers, and Defense Department
civilian leadership. We urge the creation of an Executive-Legislative working
group that would set guidelines for service-centered trial programs. The
working group should also evaluate new forms of enlistment options, selective
performance pay, new career patterns, modified retirements for extended
careers, and other initiatives that may support the Services. The group should
undertake to estimate the projected costs as well as assess any unintended
consequences that may result. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office
should further define and detail the costs of our proposed enhancements to the
GI Bill and other veterans' benefits.
These recommendations will cost money. Treating the GI
Bill's benefits as an entitlement, indexing tuition allotments with rising education
costs, extending benefits to dependents, and enhancing veteran benefits to
include medical, dental, and homeownership benefits will incur substantial
costs. But we believe that the cost of inaction would be far more profound. If
we do not change the present system, the United States will have to spend
increasingly more money for increasingly lower-quality personnel. Moreover,
balanced against the initial costs of an enhanced National Security Education
Act and a National Security Science and Technology Education Act would be
long-term gains in recruiting and retaining quality personnel that would more
than offset these costs. A 1986 Congressional Research Service study indicated
that the country recouped between $5.00 and $12.50 for every dollar invested in
the original GI Bill enacted after World War II.*144 We believe this would also
be the case under our proposed legislation. Moreover, there will be significant
budgetary savings associated with reducing this high first-term attrition, as
well as with improving the retention of both mid-level enlisted personnel and
junior officers, particularly in technical specialties.*145
In sum, the Commission recommends major personnel policy
reforms for both the civilian and the military domains. For the former, we
emphasize the urgent need to revamp the Presidential appointment process for
senior leadership, to attract talented younger cohorts to government service,
to fix the Foreign Service, and to establish a National Security Service Corps
that strengthens the government's ability to integrate the increasingly
interconnected facets of national security policy. With respect to military
personnel, our recommendations point to increasing the attractiveness of
government service to high-quality youth, providing enhanced rewards for that
service, and modernizing military career management, retirement, and
compensation systems. Each of this Commission's recommendations aims to expand
the pool of quality individuals, to decrease early attrition, and to increase retention.
The need is critical, but these reforms will go along way to avert or
ameliorate the crisis. In a bipartisan spirit, we call upon the President and
Congress to confront the challenge. Let it be their legacy that they stepped up
to this challenge and rebuilt the foundation of the nation's long- term
security.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Part 5 http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf 4-20-1
V. The Role of
Congress
This Commission has recommended substantial change in
Executive Branch institutions, change that is needed if America is to retain
its ability to lead the world and to assure the nation's safety. A number of
prominent leaders have exhausted themselves and frustrated their careers by too
aggressively seeking to reform the House or Senate. The Legislative Branch,
however, must change as well.
It is one thing to appeal to Congress to reform the State
Department or the Defense Department, quite another to call on Congress to
reform itself. Over the years since World War II, the Legislative Branch has
been reformed and modernized much less than the Executive Branch. Indeed, the
very nature of power in Congress makes it difficult for legislators to reform
their collective institution. Yet American national security in the 21st
century, and the prominent role of daily global involvement that is the nature
of American life in our generation, mandates a serious reappraisal of both the
individual and collective efforts of Congress and its members.
Such a reappraisal must begin with a shared understanding
of the Legislative Branch's role in the development and assessment of post-Cold
War foreign policy. Divided Constitutional responsibilities require the
Executive and Legislature to work together in order for U.S. foreign policy to
have coherence. Yet the Executive Branch has at times informed rather than
consulted Congress. It has often treated Congress as an obstacle rather than as
a partner, seeking Congressional input mostly in times of crisis rather than in
an ongoing way that would yield support when crises occur. For its part,
Congress has not always taken full responsibility for educating its members on
foreign policy issues. It is not often receptive to consultation with the
Executive Branch, as well, and has sustained a structure that undermines rather
than strengthens its ability to fulfill its Constitutional obligations in the
foreign policy arena.
Several measures are needed to address these shortcomings
and they are described below. But as an immediate first step we recommend that:
* 46: The Congressional leadership should conduct a
thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to
national security and foreign policy. The Speaker of the House, the Majority
and Minority leaders of the House, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the
Senate should form a bipartisan, bicameral working group with select staff and
outside advisory panels to review the totality of Executive-Legislative
relations in the real-time global information age we are entering. Only by
having the five most powerful members of the Congress directly involved is
there any hope of real reform. They should work methodically for one year and,
by the beginning of the second session of this Congress, they should report on
proposed reforms to be implemented by the next Congress. The President, the
Vice President, the National Security Advisor, and senior cabinet officers
should work directly with this unique panel to rethink the structure of
Executive-Legislative relations in the national security and foreign policy
domains. With that as a basis, reforms can and must be undertaken in three
crucial areas: improving the foreign policy and national security expertise of
individual members of Congress; undertaking organizational and process changes
within the Legislative Branch; and achieving a sustained and effective
Executive-Legislative dialogue on national security issues.
Despite the range of foreign policy challenges facing the
United States, many current members of Congress are poorly informed in this
area. Their main electoral priorities are generally within domestic policy;
foreign policy concerns are often limited to issues of concern to special
interests or to prominent ethnic groups in their districts. Once in office,
attention to foreign policy issues generally focuses on pending votes and
looming crises. To build a broad base of informed and involved members on
foreign policy issues, we recommend the following:
* 47: Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must
build programs to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and
experience in both national security and foreign policy.
In particular, this means that:
* The Congressional leadership should educate its members
on foreign policy and national security matters beyond the freshman orientation
provided for new members. Such education should emphasize Congress' foreign
policy roles and responsibilities. We must reinforce the principle of minimal
partisanship on foreign policy issues: that politics stops at the water's edge.
Effective education of members will ensure a more knowledgeable debate and
better partnership with the Executive Branch on foreign policy issues. It also
will allow members to become more effective educators of their constituencies
about the importance of national security concerns.
* Members should be encouraged to travel overseas for
serious purposes and each member should get letters from the President or from
the head of their body formally asking them to undertake trips in the national
interest. A concerted effort should be made to distinguish between junkets
(pleasure trips at taxpayer expense) and the serious work that members need to
undertake to learn about the world. A major effort should be made to ensure
that every new member of Congress undertakes at least one serious trip in his
or her first term, and is involved in one or more trips each year from the
second term on.
* Legislature-to-legislature exchanges and visits should
be encouraged and expanded. More funding and staffing should be provided to
both accommodate foreign legislators visiting the United States and to
encourage American legislators and their spouses to visit foreign legislatures.
Much is to be gained by strengthening the institutions of democracy and by
improving understanding among elected officials. This should get a much greater
emphasis and much more institutional support than it currently does.
* The wargaming center at the National Defense University
should be expanded so that virtually every member of Congress can participate
in one or more war games per two- year cycle. By role-modeling key
decision-makers (American and foreign), members of Congress will acquire a
better understanding of the limits of American power, and of the reality that
any action the United States takes invariably has multiple permutations abroad.
Giving members of Congress a reason to learn about a region, about the
procedures and systems of Executive Branch decision-making, and about crisis
interactions will lead eventually to a more sophisticated Legislative Branch.
On occasion, particularly useful or insightful games should lead to a meeting
between the participating Congressmen and Senators and key Executive Branch
officials.
Members' increased fluency in national security issues is
a positive step but one that must be accompanied by structural reforms that
address how Congress organizes itself and conducts its business. Several
recommendations concerning Congressional structure have already been made in
this report: to create a special Congressional body to deal with homeland
security issues (recommendation 7); to consider all of the State Department's
appropriations within the Foreign Operations subcommittee (recommendation 22);
and to move to a two-year budget cycle for defense modernization programs
(recommendation 31). To meet the challenges of the next quarter century, we
recommend Congress take additional steps.
* 48: Congress should rationalize its current committee
structure so that it best serves U.S. national security objectives;
specifically, it should merge the current authorizing committees with the
relevant appropriations subcommittees.
Our discussion of homeland security highlights the
complexity and overlaps of the current committee structure. The Congressional
leadership must review its structure systematically in light of likely 21st
century security challenges and of U.S. national security priorities. This is
to ensure both that important issues receive sufficient attention and oversight
and the unnecessary duplication of effort by multiple committees is minimized.
Such an effort would benefit the Executive Branch, as
well, which currently bears a significant burden in terms of testimony. The
number of times that key Executive Branch officials are required to appear on
the same topics in front of different panels is a minor disgrace. At a minimum,
we recommend that a public record should be kept of these briefings and
published annually. If that were done, it would become obvious to all observers
that a great deal of testimony could be given in front of joint panels and, in
some cases, bicameral joint panels. While we emphasize the need for strong
consultation with the Legislative Branch, we need a better sense of what
constitutes a reasonable amount of time that any senior Executive Branch
official should spend publicly educating Congress.
Specifically, in terms of committee structure, we believe
action must be taken to streamline the budgeting and appropriations processes.
In 1974, Congress developed its present budget process as a way of establishing
overall priorities for the various authorizations and appropriations
committees. Over time, however, the budget process has become a huge
bureaucratic undertaking and the authorization process has expanded to cover
all spending areas. In light of this, there is no longer a compelling rationale
for separate authorization and appropriations bills.
This is why we believe that the appropriations
subcommittees should be merged with their respective authorizing committees.
The aggregate committee (for example, the Senate Armed Services Committee)
should both authorize and appropriate within the same bill. This will require
realigning appropriations subcommittees. For example, appropriations relating
to defense are currently dealt with in three subcommittees (defense, military
construction, and energy and water); under this proposal, all appropriations
would be made within the Senate Armed Services Committee.
This approach has at least two important merits. First,
it furthers the aim of rationalizing committee jurisdiction because all
appropriating and authorizing elements relating to a specific topic are brought
within one committee. Second, it brings greater authority to those charged with
oversight as well as appropriations. In the current system, power has shifted
from the authorizing committees to the appropriating committees with a
much-narrower budgetary focus. By combining the two functions, more effort may
be paid to examining how foreign policy laws have been implemented, what their
results have been, and how policy objectives can be better achieved. Finally,
this new structure may facilitate adoption of two-year budgeting if efforts
such as those proposed for defense modernization programs prove successful. The
merged committee could authorize, in less detail, for the two-fiscal-year
period while appropriating, in greater detail, for the first fiscal year.*146
If this important reform were undertaken, then the budget
committees in each house of Congress would consist of the Chairman and ranking
member of each new combined committee. As part of the budget function, these
two committees would distribute the macro-allocations contained in the budget
resolution.
Once Congress has gotten its own house in order, it still
remains to ensure that there is ongoing Executive-Legislative consultation and
coordination. Efforts to do so are beneficial not only so that both branches
can fulfill their Constitutional obligations but also because effective
consultation can improve the quality of U.S. policy. We have acknowledged this,
for example, in our Defense Department planning recommendation, which defers
detailed program and budget decisions until Congress has marked up the previous
year's submission.*147 Because Congress is the most representative branch of
government, Executive Branch policy that considers a range of Congressional
views is more likely to gain public support. The objections raised by differing
Congressional opinions can refine policy by forcing the administration to
respond to previously unconsidered concerns. Finally, Congress can force the
President and his top aides to articulate and explain administration policy-so
the American people and the world can better understand it.
Given these benefits, efforts must be undertaken to
improve the consultative process. Indeed, a coherent and effective foreign
policy requires easy and honest consultation between the branches. The
bicameral, bipartisan panel put forward in recommendation 46 is a good first
step in this process, but additional processes must be established to ensure
that such efforts are ongoing. Therefore, we recommend the following:
* 49: The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus
on foreign policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote
resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher
priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressional leaders as
part of this effort.
A sustained effort at consultation must be based on
mutual trust, respect, and partnership and on a shared understanding of each
branch's role. The Executive Branch must recognize Congress' role in policy
formulation and Congress must grant the Executive Branch flexibility in the day-to-day
implementation of that policy. Congress must also ensure that if it is
consulted and its criticisms are taken seriously, it will act with restraint
and allow the Executive Branch to lead. For his part, the President must convey
to administration officials the importance of ongoing, bipartisan consultation
and dialogue. Efforts must not be limited to periods of crisis. Further,
administration officials should take into consideration the differences in
knowledge and perspective among members.
Beyond these general principles, specific mechanisms can
facilitate better consultation:
* Congress should create a permanent consultative group
composed of the Congressional leadership and the Chairmen and ranking members
of the main Congressional committees involved in foreign policy. Other members
with special interest or expertise could join the group's work on certain
issues. The group would meet regularly-in informal and private sessions-with
representatives of the Executive Branch. While these may regularly be Cabinet
officials, they may often be at the Under Secretary level. This will make
possible a regular dialogue with knowledgeable administration officials,
allowing the Congressional group not only to respond to crises but to be part
of the development of preventive strategies. The agenda for these meetings
would not be strictly limited, allowing members to raise issues they are
concerned about. The group would also meet on an emergency basis whenever the
President considers military action abroad or deals with a foreign policy
crisis.
* Beyond this interaction between the leadership of both
branches, the administration must reach out to consult with a broader
Congressional group. This will involve increasing the number of administration
representatives working to consult with Congress and assigning high-quality
people to that task. The Executive must send mid-level, as well as high-level,
officials to Capitol Hill and keep closer track of the foreign policy views and
concerns of every member of Congress. Only through such concerted efforts,
combined with the aforementioned education initiatives, will there be a
critical mass of members knowledgeable of and engaged in foreign policy issues.
* Finally, in order for Congress to be most effective in
partnering with the Executive Branch, it must undertake its own consultation
with a broad group of leaders in science, international economics, defense,
intelligence, and in the high-technology, venture- capital arena. Congress is
far more accessible to this expertise than the Executive Branch and should work
to bring these insights into consultations. To do this, however, Members of
Congress need regular and direct dialogue with experts without the screen of
their staffs. The best experts in these fields are vastly more knowledgeable
than any Congressional staff member, and there needs to be a routine system for
bringing members of Congress in touch with experts in the areas in which they
will be making decisions.*48 All four parts of the National Academies of Science
should play key roles in bringing the most knowledgeable scientists and
engineers in contact with members of the Legislative Branch.*149 Policy
institutions with deep reservoirs of expertise on defense and foreign policy,
too, can help build Congressional fluency with these issues with a measure of
detachment and independent perspective. Similar institutions need to be engaged
in other areas.
An effective national security policy for the 21st
century will require the combined resources of the Executive and Legislative
Branches. While much of this report has rightly focused on the needs for reform
within Executive Branch structures and processes, corresponding efforts must be
undertaken for Congress. We believe that a tripartite effort focused on the
foreign policy education of members, the restructuring of the Congressional
committee system, and stronger Executive-Legislative consultative efforts will
go a long way to ensuring that the United States can meet any future
challenges.
A Final Word
Based on its assessment of the next 25 years (Phase I),
this Commission has devised a strategy (Phase II) and a program of reform to
aid in the achievement of that strategy (Phase III). We propose significant
change, and we know that change takes time. We also know that some proposals,
however insightful and practical they may be, are never implemented for lack of
determined leadership or appropriate method.
We are optimistic that the new administration and the new
Congress will pursue the recommendations made here because we believe those
recommendations are persuasive on the merits. We are also mindful that,
following the 2000 election, the opportunity for the Executive and Legislative
Branches together to concentrate on bipartisan efforts to advance the national
interest will be particularly appealing. Our recommendations, from a Commission
composed of seven Democrats and seven Republicans, fall entirely into that
category.
But what of a method? The President may choose any of
several models for implementing this Commission's recommendations: an
independent advisory commission overseen by the Vice President or some other
senior official; a prestigious Special Advisor working with the Executive
Office of the President; a joint Executive-Legislative commission with one
co-chairman appointed by the President and one by the House and Senate
leadership; a group of "Wise Men" drawn from former high government
officials of both parties and from the private sector; a special NSC committee;
or some combination of these possibilities.
The specific method adopted, however, is a secondary
matter. What is crucial is that the President create some mechanism to ensure
the implementation of the recommendations proffered here. We therefore
recommend the following:
* 50: The President should create an implementing
mechanism to ensure that the major recommendations of this Commission result in
the critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security and global
leadership over the next quarter century.
The reason this is necessary is that the President, along
with all of his top national security advisors, will be busy enough dealing
with immediate policy issues. Unless the job of implementing reform is taken
seriously, and unless the chosen mechanism designates senior officials to be
responsible and accountable for guiding reform, the momentum for real change
will quickly dissipate.
In our view, this would be tragic. The difference, for
example, between a properly reformed Defense Department and the one we have
today may be measured in tens of billions of dollars saved each and every year.
The difference between a more effective organization for the Department of
State and the crippled organization of today may be measured by opportunities
lost in preventing devastating crises abroad that affect American interests and
values alike. The difference between a better way of managing science and
education and the way it is done now may be measured by the capacity for U.S.
global leadership a quarter century hence. The difference between a government
personnel system that can attract and keep the highest caliber human capital
and one that cannot may be measured by the success or failure of the full range
of U.S. national security policies. The difference between modern government
organization for homeland security and the diffuse accretion of agencies and
responsibilities we have today may be measured in tens of thousands of American
lives saved or lost. The stakes of reform are very high. This Commission has
done its best to propose serious solutions for deadly serious problems. It is
now up to others to do their best to ensure that our efforts are put to their
best use for the sake of the American people. That is a task measured in
leadership.
The Phase III Report Of The U.S.Commission On National
Security/21st Century Appendix & Footnotes http://www.nssg.gov/phaseIII.pdf
4-20-1
APPENDIX 1
The
Recommendations
This appendix lists all of the Phase III Report's major
recommendations in order of their presentation. The recommendations are
numbered sequentially and grouped by Section. The page on which the
recommendation appears in the report is noted in the box. Those recommendations
in red type indicate recommendations on which Congressional action is required
for implementation. Those in blue type can be implemented by Executive Order.
Those in green type can be implemented by the head of an Executive Branch
department or agency, or by the Congressional leadership, as appropriate.
Securing the
National Homeland
1: The President should develop a comprehensive strategy
to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of
attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and
protection fail. (p. 11)
2: The President should propose, and Congress should
agree, to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility
for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities
involved in homeland security. They should use the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) as a key building block in this effort. (p. 15)
3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer
of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National
Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities. (p. 15)
4: The President should ensure that the National
Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an
area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and
produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats. (p. 23)
5: The President should propose to Congress the
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary. (p.
23)
6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's
direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National
Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately
equipped to undertake that mission. (p. 25)
7: Congress should establish a special body to deal with
homeland security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight. Members
should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence,
law enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include members of
all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio members from the
leadership of both Houses of Congress. (p. 28)
Recapitalizing
America's Strengths in Science and Education
8: The President should propose, and the Congress should
support, doubling the U.S. government's investment in science and technology
R&D by 2010. (p. 32)
9: The President should empower his Science Advisor to
establish non-military R&D objectives that meet changing national needs, and
to be responsible for coordinating budget development within the relevant
departments and agencies. (p. 34)
10: The President should propose, and the Congress should
fund, the reorganization of the national laboratories, providing individual
laboratories with new mission goals that minimize overlap. (p. 37)
11: The President should propose, and Congress should
pass, a National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) with
four sections: reduced-interest loans and scholarships for students to pursue
degrees in science, mathematics, and engineering; loan forgiveness and
scholarships for those in these fields entering government or military service;
a National Security Teaching Program to foster science and math teaching at the
K- 12 level; and increased funding for professional development for science and
math teachers. (p. 41)
12: The President should direct the Department of
Education to work with the states to devise a comprehensive plan to avert a
looming shortage of quality teachers. This plan should emphasize raising
teacher compensation, improving infrastructure support, reforming the
certification process, and expanding existing programs targeted at districts
with especially acute problems. (p. 43)
13: The President and Congress should devise a targeted
program to strengthen the historically black colleges and universities in our
country, and should particularly support those that emphasize science,
mathematics, and engineering. (p. 45)
Institutional
Redesign
14: The President should personally guide a top-down
strategic planning process and delegate authority to the National Security
Advisor to coordinate that process. (p. 48)
15: The President should prepare and present to the
Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that
emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President
should continue to submit budgets for individual national security departments
and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation. (p. 49)
16: The National Security Council (NSC) should be
responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of
national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic
law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda.
The NSC Advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central
policymaking and operational role. (p. 50)
17: The President should propose to the Congress that the
Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security
Council. (p. 51)
18: The President should abolish the National Economic
Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the
Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the
National Security Council. (p. 52)
19: The President should propose to the Congress a plan
to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with
responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe,
Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of
the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would
operate in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management. (p.
54)
20: The President should propose to the Congress that the
U.S. Agency for International Development be consolidated into the State
Department. (p. 55)
21: The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis
to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the
allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning,
Assistance, and Budget Office. (p. 56)
22: The President should ask Congress to appropriate
funds to the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget,
which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as
all expenses for personnel and operations. (p. 58)
23: The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the
requisite area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to
function effectively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan
advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees,
career and non-career alike. (p. 62)
24: The Secretary of Defense should propose to Congress a
restructuring plan for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
which would abolish the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and create a new office of an
Assistant Secretary dedicated to Strategy and Planning (S/P). (p. 64)
25: Based on a review of the core roles and
responsibilities of the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, the military services, and the CINCs, the Secretary of Defense
should reorganize and reduce those staffs by ten to fifteen percent. (p. 65)
26: The Secretary of Defense should establish a ten-year
goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20 to 25 percent through outsourcing
and privatizing as many DoD support agencies as possible. (p. 66)
27: The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should move
the Quadrennial Defense Review to the second year of a Presidential term. (p.
68)
28: The Secretary of Defense should introduce a new
process that would require the Services and defense agencies to compete for the
allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget. (p. 69)
29: The Secretary of Defense should establish and employ
a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a second,
"fast track" for a limited number of potential breakthrough systems,
especially those in the area of command and control. (p. 71)
30: The Secretary of Defense should foster innovation by
directing a return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of
selected weapons and support systems. (p. 72)
31: Congress should implement two-year defense budgeting
solely for the modernization element of the DoD budget (R&D/procurement)
because of its long-term character, and it should expand the use of multiyear
procurement. (p. 73)
32: Congress should modernize Defense Department auditing
and oversight requirements by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title
10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations. (p. 75)
33: The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to
shift from the threat-based 2MTW force sizing process to one which measures
requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence
estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security
objectives as defined in the new administration's national security
strategy-once formulated. (p. 76)
34: The Defense Department should devote its highest
priority to improving and furthering expeditionary capabilities. (p. 78)
35: The President should establish an Interagency Working
Group on Space (IWGS) at the National Security Council to coordinate all
aspects of the nation's space policy, and place on the NSC staff those with the
necessary expertise in this area. (p. 80)
36: The President should order the setting of national
intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the
Director of Central Intelligence. (p. 83)
37: The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize
the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the
intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that operational
guidelines are balanced between security needs and respect for American values
and principles. (p. 84)
38: The intelligence community should place new emphasis
on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security
concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical
products. Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing significantly
the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and
analysis. (p. 84)
The Human
Requirements for National Security
39: Congress should significantly expand the National
Security Education Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences,
humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for military and civilian service
to the nation. (p. 89)
40: The Executive and Legislative Branches should
cooperate to revise the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the
impediments that have made high-level public service undesirable to many
distinguished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number of Senate
confirmed and non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) positions by 25
percent; shorten the appointment process; and revise draconian ethics
regulations. (p. 92)
41: The President should order the overhauling of the
Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically
improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a
core value of the State Department. (p. 95)
42: The President should order the elimination of
recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring
process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention
programs are worthy of full funding by Congress. (p. 98)
43: The Executive Branch should establish a National
Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide
a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive
Branch. (p. 101)
44: Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery
GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending legislation
supporting benefits-including transition, medical, and homeownership-for
qualified veterans. (p. 106)
45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate
to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of
enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation. (p.
107)
The Role of
Congress
46: The Congressional leadership should conduct a
thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to
national security and foreign policy. (p. 110)
47: Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build
programs to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and experience in
both national security and foreign policy. (p. 111)
48: Congress should rationalize its current committee
structure so that it best serves U.S. national security objectives;
specifically, it should merge the current authorizing committees with the
relevant appropriations subcommittees. (p. 112)
49: The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on
foreign policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote
resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher
priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressional leaders as
part of this effort. (p. 113)
50: The President should create an implementing mechanism
to ensure that the major recommendations of this Commission result in the
critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security and global
leadership over the next quarter century. (p. 111)
APPENDIX 2
Charter of the
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
SEC. 1. ESTABLISHMENT AND PURPOSE.
The Department of Defense recognizes that America should
advance its position as a strong, secure, and persuasive force for freedom and
progress in the world. Consequently, there is a requirement to: 1) conduct a
comprehensive review of the early 21st Century global security environment,
including likely trends and potential "wild cards"; 2) develop a
comprehensive overview of American strategic interests and objectives for the
security environment we will likely encounter in the 21st Century; 3) delineate
a national security strategy appropriate to that environment and the nation's
character; 4) identify a range of alternatives to implement the national
security strategy, by defining the security goals for American society, and by
describing the internal and external policy instruments required to apply
American resources in the 21st Century; and 5) develop a detailed plan to
implement the range of alternatives by describing the sequence of measures
necessary to attain the national security strategy, to include recommending
concomitant changes to the national security apparatus as necessary. A
Commission, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21),
will be established to fulfill this requirement, supported by a Study Group.
Two individuals who have national recognition and significant depth of
experience and public service will oversee the efforts of this Commission and
serve as its Co-chairpersons. The study effort shall be conducted by a Study
Group, composed of individuals who will be appointed as Department of Defense
(DoD) personnel, in accordance with Section VI below. Based on the results of
this study and the Commission's consideration thereof, the USCNS/21 will
advance practical recommendations that the President of the United States, with
the support of the Congress, could begin to implement in the Fiscal Year 2002
budget, if desired.
SEC. II. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
(a) CO-CHAIRPERSONS.- The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and the Secretary of State, shall select two Co-chairpersons to oversee the
study effort and to co-chair the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century. The Co-chairpersons shall be prominent United States citizens, with
national recognition, significant depth of experience, and prior public service.
(b) MEMBERSHIP.- The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and the Secretary of State, shall select 15-17 individuals to serve as a board
of Commissioners to the study, drawing on accomplished and prominent United
States citizens and reflecting a cross-section of American public and private
sector life.
(c) OPERATION.- The Commissioners shall meet at the
discretion of the Co-chairpersons to provide visionary leadership and guidance
for the study effort, and to consider appropriate recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense and the President, based on the results of the study. The
Co-chairpersons shall provide oversight for the study effort. The USCNS/21 will
be chartered separately and operated as a Federal advisory committee in
accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463), as
amended.
(d) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.- All Commissioners
shall be appointed for the life of the study effort. Vacancies shall be filled
in the same manner as the original appointment, in accordance with the
Commission's charter.
SEC. III. DUTIES.
(a) COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.- The study will define
America's role and purpose in the first quarter of the 21st Century through an
integrated analysis, and identify the national security strategy in political,
economic, military, societal, and technological terms that must be implemented
for America to fulfill that role and achieve its purpose. This study shall
include the following: (1) A description of the national security environments
that the United States will likely encounter in the 21st Century, and an
evaluation of the security threats which can be reasonably expected in
political, economic, military, societal, and technological terms.
(2) A comprehensive overview of American domestic and
international strategic interests and objectives for the security environment
we will likely encounter in the 21st Century.
(3) Delineation of the national security strategy that
must be implemented to achieve America's objectives in the 21st Century.
(4) Identification of the range of alternatives to
implement the national security strategy, by defining the domestic security
goals for American society, and by describing the internal and external policy
instruments required to apply American resources in the 21st Century.
(5) Development of a detailed plan to implement the range
of alternatives by describing the sequence of measures necessary to attain the
national security strategy.
(b) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.- In carrying out the study,
the USCNS/21 shall develop specific findings and recommendations for each of
the following:
(1) Identification of nations, supranational groups, and
trends that may assist the fulfillment of U.S national security strategy.
(2) Identification of nations, supranational groups, and
trends that may pose military, economic, or technological threats to
fulfillment of the United States national security strategy.
(3) Identification of societal forces that enable the
attainment of United States national security strategy, and recommendations to
exploit those forces.
(4) Identification of societal forces that inhibit the
attainment of the United States national security strategy, and recommendations
to overcome those inhibitors.
(5) Identification of the roles to be played by the Armed
Forces and Federal civilian agencies of the United States in attainment of the
United States national security strategy.
(6) The adequacy of the current national security apparatus
to meet early 21st Century security challenges, and recommendations to modify
this apparatus as necessary.
(7) Examination of existing and/or required international
security arrangements, to include recommendations for modification, as
appropriate.
(8) Recommended course(s) of action to secure the active
support of an informed American public for the implementation of our national
security strategy in the 21st Century.
SEC. IV. METHODOLOGY.
The USCNS/21 will accomplish its mission in three phases,
as set forth below.
(a) PHASE ONE.- Phase One will examine and describe the
kind of nation the United States will be in the early 21st Century and the
range of likely international security environments that we can reasonably
anticipate. The goal will be to establish the domestic and international
contexts in which the United States will exist in the next century. The study
will seek to identify the most likely domestic and international trends, taking
account of less likely or "wild card" events, such as the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, technological breakthroughs, natural disasters, or
regime changes abroad. This phase will predict the possible international
security environments with consideration of the interrelationships of the various
sectors involved. Phase One will terminate with the submission by the
Co-chairpersons, after consultation with the board of Commissioners, of a
report to the Secretary of Defense describing the range of potential domestic
and international environments as they relate to national security.
(b) PHASE TWO.- Existing national interests and
objectives will be reviewed and analyzed for applicability in the early part of
the next century. If appropriate, modifications will be recommended to bring
the policy objectives into line with the anticipated global environment. Where
necessary objectives and interests have not yet been clearly articulated for
security arenas in which the United States must function in the future, the
USCNS/21 will recommend appropriate objectives. These objectives should
encompass all critical American security concerns. Delineation of national
security strategy (or strategies) for the early part of the 21st Century will
complete Phase Two of the study. A proposed strategy will be constrained by
only the following factors: it must support attainment of our national security
objectives, it must be acceptable to the American people, and it must be
feasible within current (or projected) resource availability. (For the purposes
of this study, an acceptable national security strategy is one that is
reasonably consistent with the projected values and desires of the American
people, taking into account the ability of confident national leaders to move
public opinion in the direction of rational responses to new national
challenges). The goal of Phase Two is to describe America's interests and
objectives in a comprehensive, attainable, and supportable national security
strategy that gives the Executive and Legislative Branches policy options for allocation
of national resources and for domestic and international strategic initiatives.
Phase Two will terminate upon the submission by the Co-chairpersons, after
consultation with the board of Commissioners, of a report to the Secretary of
Defense which meets this goal.
(c) PHASE THREE.- As needed, the USCNS/21 will propose
measures to adapt existing national security structures or to create new
structures where none exists. These measures must be appropriate to the range
of anticipated international environments identified in Phase One and the
national security objectives identified in Phase Two. Selected measures may
require some modification of certain institutions, processes and structures in
order to improve their relevance in the first two decades of the 2lst Century
and enhance their positive impact upon the national security process. When
appropriate, cost and time estimates to complete these improvements and a
recommended sequence of actions will be provided. The end result of Phase Three
will be an institutional road map for the early part of the 21st Century,
provided as a report from the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
to the Secretary of Defense, with detailed recommendations for each major
segment of the United States government's national security apparatus.
SEC. V. REPORTS.
All reports shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include classified annexes. The Secretary of Defense will transmit a copy
of each report to the Congress.
(a) PHASE ONE.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the
Secretary of Defense a report on Phase One of the study, as outlined in Section
IV(a), not later than September 15, 1999.
(b) PHASE TWO.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the
Secretary of Defense a report on Phase Two of the study, as outlined in Section
IV(b), not later than April 14, 2000.
(c) FINAL REPORT.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the
Secretary of Defense a final report, including assessments and recommendations
and the institutional road map outlined in Section IV(c), not later than
February 16, 2001.
SEC.VI. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. (a)
ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES.- The U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century will be supported by the Study Group and its staff. The
Study Group, as a DoD organizational element, will receive administrative and
other support services from the Director, Administration and Management,
including four individuals detailed to support the Study Group, consistent with
the budgetary parameters established in Section VIII. Additional administrative
and support services requested by the Co-chairpersons or the Executive Director
(which position is provided for in paragraph (d)(1), below) in support of the
USCNS/21 will be furnished by DoD as necessary and appropriate. These support
requirements will be administered by the Director, Administration and
Management, in conjunction with other DoD officials, as appropriate.
(b) SECURITY CLEARANCES.- Insofar as expeditious
processing of personnel security clearances is essential to the timely
completion of the study, DoD will expedite personnel security clearance
procedures for access to classified information for Study Group personnel and
staff to the extent permitted by law and Executive Order, when requested by the
Executive Director.
(c) BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.-
Commissioners of the USCNS/21, including the Co-chairpersons, who are not
full-time officers or employees of the United States shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Defense as special government employees. Such members may serve
with or without compensation and shall be allowed travel expenses, including
per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with the Board's charter.
(d) STUDY GROUP APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.
(1) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.-
The Secretary of Defense, upon advice of the Co-chairpersons, shall select an
Executive Director. The Executive Director shall be appointed to a limited term
(not to exceed three years), Senior Executive Service position within DoD. The
Executive Director shall supervise the Study Group and its staff, with full
authority, in accordance with applicable law and regulations, and merit system
principles.
(2) MEMBERSHIP.- The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
the Secretary of State and the Executive Director, will select sufficient
individuals with diverse experience and expertise to fill positions as members
of the Study Group. All Study Group members shall be United States citizens
with widely-recognized expertise in fields relevant to the Study Group's
national security objectives. Members should be innovative and creative
practitioners or strategists in their respective fields of endeavor. The Study
Group members shall be appointed under an appropriate authority which allows
for an assignment of a temporary duration. Terms for such appointments shall
not exceed the length of the study, but may be such shorter period of time as
determined by the Executive Director. Vacancies shall be filled by the
Executive Director, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
(e) STAFF APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.- The Executive
Director may select for appointment as DoD employees, in accordance with
paragraph VI(a), above, and applicable Civil Service laws and regulations and
DoD policies, up to twelve individuals. Selectees who are not currently full
time DoD military or civilian personnel will be given limited term appointments
for up to the length of the study, in accordance with section VI(a) above, to
support the study Group.
(f) TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.- The Executive
Director may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b)
of title 5, United States Code, at a rate of pay not to exceed the daily rate
of pay for a GS-15, step 10 in accordance with such title.
SEC. VII. TERMINATION OF THE STUDY.
The study will terminate not later than 30 days after the
Co-chairpersons submit the final report to the Secretary of Defense, or no
later than March 15, 2001, whichever is earlier.*50 SEC.
VIII. FUNDING.
Except as provided herein, the operating costs of the
study, including the compensation, travel, and per diem allowances for the
Commissioners and the Study Group members and staff, will be paid by the Department
of Defense. The overall cost for this project (excluding the cost of the four
detailees described in section VI(a) above) may not exceed $10.44 Mil, without
prior approval by the Secretary of Defense or designee. These funds are
expected to be obligated as follows: FY 1999-$1.43 Mil; FY 1999-$3.76 Mil; FY
2000-$3.73 Mil; and FY 2001-$1.52 Mil. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
SEPT 2, 1999
FOOTNOTES *1
Disclaimer: This Commission has striven successfully to achieve consensus on
all major issues, and each Commissioner stands by all the major recommendations
made in this report. However, as is to be expected when discussing complex
issues, not every Commissioner agrees completely with every statement in the
text that follows.
*2 See Appendix 3 for Commissioner biographies and a
staff listing.
*3 Publication consisted of two documents: Major Themes
and Implications and Supporting Research and Analysis.
*4 All of this Commission's reports may be found on its
web page at www.nssg.gov.
*5 See Appendix 2 for the full text of the Charter.
*6 The recommendations are listed together in Appendix 1,
pp. 118-123.
*7 See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the
National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 st
Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
*8 See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington,
DC: The White House, December 2000).
*9 Note in this regard Stephen E. Flynn, "Beyond
Border Control," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
*10 See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime
and Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
*11 See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform (Washington, DC: 1997).
*12 See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S.
Coast Guard Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century
(Washington, DC: December 1999).
*13 We return to this problem below in Section IV.
*14 The Chief Information Officer Council is a government
organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers in the
government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director for Management.
*15 We return to this issue in our discussion of the
Intelligence Community in Section III.F., particularly inrecommendation 37.
*16 See also the Report of the National Defense
University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC:
Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
*17 Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.
*18 See Public Law 104-201, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This legislation, known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in
July 1996.
*19 We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission
to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington, DC:
July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge William Webster's
Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement (Washington,
DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission [Report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism
(Washington, DC: June 2000)]; and an advisory panel led Virginia Governor James
Gilmore [First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
*20 The Defense Production Act was developed during the
Korean War, when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and
gas were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production Act
of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. § 2061 et seq. Title I includes
delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services based on national
defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National Defense Industrial Resources
Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements Title I of the Defense Production Act.
Congressional review should focus on the applicability of the Defense
Production Act to homeland security needs, ranging from prevention to
restoration activities. %Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 also
needs revision so that it includes the electronic media that have developed in
the past two decades. [See 48 Stat. 1104, 47 USC § 606, as amended.]
Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the breakup
of AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in %directing national communications
media during a national security emergency. It came before the Internet,
however, and does not clearly apply to it.
*21 For more than four years, multiple institutions have
called on national leadership to support laws and policies promoting %security
cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical
Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC: October
1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
*22 This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums,
such as the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnational organized
crime. See Communiqu
on principles to fight transnational
organized crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight, December
9-10, 1997.
*23 This is why it is not possible to establish a direct
correlation between educational achievement and either productivity or economic
growth indices. For the last two decades, for example, U.S. educational
achievements have lagged behind those of many other countries even as U.S.
productivity and growth measures have outdistanced them.
*24 The President's FY2001 budget allocates U.S.
government research monies to its major players as follows: 43 percent NIH, 12
percent NASA, 12 percent DOE, 11 percent DoD, 8 percent NSF, 4 percent USDA, 10
percent all others. See AAAS Report XXV, Research and Development FY2001
(Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2000),
pp. 35. These are research budget figures only, not total R&D accounts.
*25 There is, in addition, a Federally-Funded Research
and Development Center mandated by Congress-the Critical Technologies Institute
located within RAND-that acts as a think-tank for the OSTP. It plays a useful
role and should be preserved, but it cannot substitute for a more capable OSTP
itself.
*26 We believe that the creation of a counterintelligence
"czar," announced by the out-going Clinton Administration on January
4, 2001, is a step in the right direction for this purpose. But proper
inventory stewardship is a precondition for such a "czar" to be
effective.
*27 Founded in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln, the National
Academy of Sciences today consists of four parts: the National Academy of
Science, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and
the National Research Council. The NAS advises the government, but it is not a
government organization.
*28 Research accounts for approximately ten percent of
DoD's $38 billion R&D budget for fiscal year 2001. See AAAS Report XXV,
Research and Development FY 2001, p. 71.
*29 About 43 percent of the labs' physical facilities is
more than 40 years old, and 73 percent is more than twenty years old.
*30 National Commission on Mathematics and Science
Teaching for the 21st Century, Before It's Too Late (Washington, DC: September
27, 2000), p. 12.
*31 Ibid., p. 21.
*32 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics, 1993-1994 Schools and Staffing Survey (Teacher
Questionnaire) (Washington, DC: 1997), p. 26.
*33 National Science Board, Science and Engineering
Indicators-1998 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 1998), p. A-36.
*34 We discuss these shortages and their implications for
government below in Section IV.
*35 This is because the majority of public school
teachers are currently in their forties, with the normal retirement age being
around 65 years old. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics, "Schools and Staffing Survey."
*36 In 1995, the Third International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS) ranked the performance of American 12th graders in
general mathematics and science knowledge among the lowest of all participating
countries. Americans placed 19th out of 21 in general mathematics and 17th out
of 21 in general science. In advanced mathematics and physics knowledge,
American 12th graders placed 15th out of 16 in mathematics and dead last in
physics. In all content areas of physics and advanced mathematics, the American
students' performance was among the lowest of all the nations participating in
the TIMSS. Some observers question the utility of these tests on the grounds
that in many other countries only the brightest students take the test because
children are separated into vocational and college tracks at an early age. Most
believe, however, that the test results are instructive of general trends
*37 See Diana Jean Schemo, "Students in U.S. Do Not
Keep Up in Global Tests," The New York Times, December 6, 2000, pp. A1,
A18.
*38 The National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council, through its Center for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering
Education, has completed the Defense Reinvestment Initiative (DRI) funded by
the Department of Defense. The program worked with the Los Angeles Unified
School District to build a model for the transition of professional scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers from military duty, defense-related and aerospace
industries, and national laboratories into careers teaching secondary school science
and mathematics. See the Final Report to the U.S. Department of Defense on the
Defense Reinvestment Initiative, Defense Reinvestment Initiative Advisory
Board, National Research Council, 1999. http://www.nap.edu.
*39 As recommended by the National Academy of Science in
Attracting Science and Mathematics Ph.Ds to Secondary School Education
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000).
*40 The Eisenhower Professional Development Program
(Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended by the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994) focuses on the professional
development of mathematics and science teachers. See U.S. Department of
Education, Office of the Under Secretary, Planning and Evaluation Service,
Designing Effective Professional Development: Lessons from the Eisenhower
Program, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: 1999)
*41 "ETS Report Discusses Teacher Quality,"
NSTA Reports, Dec. 2000-Jan. 2001, p. 11.
*42 Before It's Too Late, pp. 19, 26-30.
*43 National Writing Project, 1999 Annual Report.
*44 In lieu of or in addition to raising salaries, which
may be restricted in some places by issues of inter- jurisdictional equity and
union complications, signing bonuses can be used to attract people to teaching.
45 We note the successful example of the Long Beach Unified School District.
Over the past five years, it has partnered with California State University
Long Beach (CSULB), and Long Beach City College, in collaboration with
additional local, regional, and national partners, to developed a seamless
(preK-18) approach that has aligned content standards, learning methodology,
and assessment from pre-school through the masters level. The aim is to ensure
coherent exit and entry expectations among the three institutions. They have
collaborated to address curriculum, preparation, and professional development
issues as well.
*45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate
to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of
enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.
*46 Two-year budgeting specifically for DoD modernization
accounts would entail authorization and appropriation for both fiscal years
simultaneously, if our recommendation 31is adopted.
*47 See the discussion on page 69 following
recommendation 28.
*48 A problem well described years ago in C.P. Snow,
Science and Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
*49 Note 5 in Section II, on page 34, lists these four
constituent parts.
*50 The termination date of the study was moved to July
31, 2001 in October 2000.
*51 Today, the Function 150 budget categories are defined
in terms of titles such as Export and Investment Assistance, Bilateral Economic
Assistance, Military Assistance, and Multilateral Economic Assistance. More
purposeful titles should be put in their place; e.g., economic development or
international security.
*52 New World Coming, p. 38.
*53 The Commission supports the recommendation of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel to upgrade immediately the State Department's
information and communications technologies by providing all overseas staff
with Internet access, e-mail, a secure unclassified Internet website, and
shared applications, permitting unclassified communications among all agencies
around the globe. See The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel,
America's Overseas Presence in the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: November
1999), p. 7.
*54 The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel made this
recommendation in November 1999. The Panel concluded that significant savings
are achievable from right-sizing U.S. embassies; e.g., a ten percent reduction
in all agencies' staff would save almost $380 million annually. The Secretary
of State has taken steps to implement this recommendation.
*55 Many studies have endorsed such principles, including
GAO studies in 1976, 1978, 1996, 1999, and 2000, as well as the Rockefeller
Committee, the Rice Report, the Packard Commission, the Senate Armed Services
Committee study leading up to Goldwater-Nichols, the Commission on Roles and
Missions, the Hicks & Associates study, the Defense Reform Initiative, and
the BENS (Business Executives for National Security) Tail-to-Tooth Commission.
*56 We are speaking only of these specific staff roles,
not of DoD civilian personnel in general. We are aware that, in this more
general category, there has been a reduction of approximately 35 percent since
1990.
*57 At the same time, our discussion of the Civil Service
in Section IV.D, specifically in recommendation 42, calls for a ten to fifteen
percent personnel float to allow for adequate professional training should be
introduced in civilian staff offices within OSD. In other words, while we
advocate cutting staff slots by ten to fifteen percent, the actual number of
civilian employees working in OSD staffs may not change significantly.
*58 Infrastructure is defined as non-combat activities
and support services that commonly operate from fixed locations (e.g.,
installation support, central training, central medical, central logistics,
acquisition infrastructure, central personnel, and central command, control,
and communications.)
*59 Outsourcing combines government ownership with
private contracting. Privatization means reducing or eliminating government
ownership and getting DoD out of the process of competing with private
industry. Outsourcing can achieve ten percent savings; privatization may
achieve savings of up to twenty percent in some sectors.
*60 Commissaries and exchanges would still exist, but
they would be privately owned and operated.
*61 Goldwater-Nichols mandated the National Security
Strategy as a way for the President to describe the country's broad national
security directions. Required by law every January, the NSS is habitually late,
and its objectives and goals have never been prioritized. By this Commission's
definition, the NSS is not a "strategy" document because it fails to
relate ends to means.
*62 In our discussion of Presidential appointments in
Section IV, we recommend shortening this period.
*63 Note the Services and defense agencies must identify
"programs" not "funds." Otherwise they will stretch
programmed procurement to free budget year "funds," but increase
future unit costs by doing so.
*64 See John Harbison, Thomas Moorman Jr., Michael Jones,
and Jikun Kim, "U.S. Defense Industry Under Siege-An Agenda for
Change," Booz-Allen & Hamilton Viewpoint, July 2000; "Preserving
a Healthy and Competitive U.S. Defense Industry to Ensure our Future National
Security," Defense Science Board Task Force briefing to USCNS/21, June
2000; "U.S. Space Industrial Base Study," DoD and NRO Co-sponsored
Study by Booz-Allen & Hamilton, briefed to USCNS/21, June 2000; "The
National Crisis in the Defense Industry," study briefed by the Scowcroft
Group and DFI International to USCNS/21, June 2000.
*65 In DoD acquisition jargon, the period from
requirement definition to production of a weapon system is referred to as its
"cycle time."
*66 It might be appropriate for the revised FARs to test
a modified version of the award fee process tied to schedule, cost, and
performance. This discretionary award could range from a higher-than-present
level to a moderately negative level. The determining evaluation would be based
upon separate periodic input from the program manager, the contractor, and
outside auditors who would advise either the Service acquisition official or an
independent board with authority to determine the fee.
*67 While the military departments have never defined the
term MTW, we infer it to require all forms of military capability (land, sea,
air) on the scale equivalent to the Gulf War or that envisioned in the past for
North Korea.
*68 New World Coming, pp. 53-4, and Seeking a National
Strategy, p. 9.
*69 A National Security Strategy for a New Century
(Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999),pp. 12.
*70 This is how the 1999 DoD promulgated space policy
defined space superiority.
*71 See Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Space Superiority (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, February 2000.)
*72 The Outer Space Treaty bans only the deployment of
weapons of mass destruction in space, and the ABM Treaty only limits
interference with national means of verification with respect to arms control
agreements. Meanwhile, even the United Nations Charter, in Article 51, states
explicitly that no nation is precluded from taking appropriate defensive
measures in any environment.
*73 Recent or ongoing examinations of space issues
include: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Space Superiority
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, February 2000); "U.S. Space Industrial Base," Booz-Allen
Hamilton report to the NRO and DoD, June 2000; and the Congressionally-mandated
"Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization."
*74 The representation of relevant agencies would be
achieved through their departments; e.g., FAA representation through the
Department of Transportation, and that of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) through the Department of Commerce.
*75 A more detailed definition of space architecture
includes: the on-orbit force structure and missions; configurations to include
type of sensors, on-board processing, and dissemination; ground control systems
and downloading/processing capabilities; frequency spectrum use and
deconfliction; multi-mission capabilities; and system protection measures and
security requirements.
*76 The national Future Imagery Architecture [FIA] is
sponsored by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
*77 The NRO is responsible for satellite, constellation,
and ground operations design and acquisition; NIMA is responsible for imagery
product development and dissemination.
*78 The NSSA currently reports to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence ASD(C3I) for
DoD-related issues, and coordinates with the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (DDCI) and the DDCI for Collection Management on
intelligence-related issues.
*79 The primary elements would come from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)),
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Computers, and
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)). In essence ASD(C3I) would transfer the proposed
reorganization.
*80 New World Coming, p. 130.
*81 Seeking a National Strategy, p. 9.
*82 Panel on Civic Trust and Citizen Responsibility, A
Government to Trust and Respect: Rebuilding Citizen-Government Relations for
the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration,
1999), p. iii.
*83 Seeking a National Strategy, p. 9.
*84 Our model is the National Defense Education Act of
the late 1950s and 1960s, which provided loan forgiveness incentives for those
willing to serve in the military or teach in schools with disadvantaged
students or in disadvantaged areas. That act provided scholarships to those
studying hard sciences and mathematics, as well as those studying critical
foreign languages where the country at large confronted significant
deficiencies.
*85 National Security Education Act 1991 (Public Law
102-183-December 4, 1991.)
*86 The Marine Corps PLC scholarship program is similar
to the ROTC program, but is not affiliated with a particular learning
institution and is not tied to an actual cadre unit at a specific school.
*87 A limited version of this loan reduction concept is
currently under development in a portion of the Civil Service. See
"Proposed Rules-Repayment of Student Loans", Federal Register, June
22, 2000, pp. 38791- 38794.
*88 Paul C. Light and Virginia L. Thomas, The Merit and
Reputation of an Administration: Presidential Appointees on the Appointments
Process (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and The Heritage Foundation,
April 28, 2000), p. 3.
*89 Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon, "The
Confirmation Clog," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 91.
*90 Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of
the Secretary of Defense, February 2000), p. 41.
*91 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 89.
*92 Defense Science Board, p. D-6.
*93 The recently-rescinded Executive Order 12834, signed
by President Clinton on January 20, 1993, his first day in office, extended to
five years the previous one-year ban on an ex-official's appearance before his
or her former agency. This restriction was placed on the most senior
presidential appointees. All former employees face certain limitations, but
Senate-confirmable employees paid at the EL-V or EL-IV level (and non-career
SES appointees whose salaries fall within this range) face additional
regulations potentially very harmful to their post-service careers. Under
Executive Order 12834, they could not lobby their former agency for five years,
while other appointees are restricted only for one year. See Defense Science
Board, p. D-7 and the relevant section of the U.S. Code, 18 USC §207.
*94 Defense Science Board, pp. 42-43. 95 Ibid., p. 43.
*96 Ibid., p. 44.
*97 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 97. We also advocate
accelerating the appointment process for the 80 key science and technology
personnel in government. See Section II above, and Science and Technology in
the National Interest: The Presidential Appointments Process, National
Academies of Science, June 30, 2000. The 80 positions of which we speak are
listed on p. 8.
*98 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 94.
*99 Ibid., p. 95.
*100 Former FBI (and CIA) Director William Webster has
noted that these files are "often freighted with hearsay, rumor, innuendo,
and unsubstantial allegations." Quoted in ibid., p. 95. *101 According to
the National Center for Education Statistics, 30 to 35 percent of students at
three different grade levels performed below the "basic" level of
civics knowledge. 38 percent at the 4 th grade level, 41 percent at the 8 th
grade level, and 59 percent at the 12 th grade level performed below the
"basic" level of U.S. history knowledge. Roughly 30 percent of
students at all grade levels performed below the "basic" level in
geography.
*102 There are indications that retention may be a
looming concern as well. According to data provided by the State Department,
while most Foreign Service entering classes have shown attrition rates between
12 and 17 percent by the eighth year of service, two recent classes show
figures at 23 and 32 percent. These indications are not conclusive but they are
supported by two major studies on departmental talent management, one completed
by McKinsey & Company for the department and the other by the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel. Both found that while qualified applicants valued
faster advancement and greater autonomy, it is precisely those things, along
with quality management and respect for their family situations, they found
lacking once in the Foreign Service.
*103 The State-commissioned report by McKinsey &
Company, The War for Talent: Maintaining a Strong Talent Pool, emphasized that
for the State Department to sustain its talent base, it must improve talent
management. The final report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel built on
McKinsey's finding and highlighted that "private sector managers were
almost twice as likely as public-sector managers to give high performers the
best development opportunities and fast-track growth. More than 70 percent of
the private-sector managers viewed motivating and attending to people as a
prime priority, while less than 30 percent of State Department managers
interviewed considered it a top priority." [Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel, p. 52.]
*104 Ibid., p. 55.
*105 The Commission considers personnel from the
Departments of State (excluding the Foreign Service), Defense, Commerce,
Justice, and Treasury and members of the Intelligence Community to constitute
the core national security members of the Civil Service. Members of the
Intelligence Community, however, are governed by separate personnel regulations
and authorities.
*106 On the general question, compare the pessimistic
study led by Paul Volcker [The National Commission on the Public Service,
Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service (Washington, DC: The National
Commission on the Public Service, 1989)] with the more optimistic assessment of
Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman [In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of
the U.S. Federal Executive (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2000).]
*107 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, The Fact Book:
Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel
Management, September 1999).
*108 U.S. Office of Personnel Management and Senior
Executives Association, Survey of Senior Executive Service (Washington, DC:
Office of Personnel Management, 1999); United States General Accounting Office,
Senior Executive Service: Retirement Trends Underscore the Importance of
Succession Planning (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, May 2000), p.
2. This latter document offers startling figures for individual departments: 77
percent of those at the Department of Commerce, 74 percent of those at the
Department of Defense, and 71 percent of those at the Department of the
Treasury will be eligible for regular retirement by 2005, (p. 46).
*109 The Office of the Secretary of Defense has received
between 100 and 140 applications each year since 1997 for six to eight open PMI
positions. Data provided by the OSD, July 7, 2000.
*110 Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., Employee
Recruitment and Retention Survey Results, August 30, 2000, pp. 33.
*111 CIO Council, Meeting the Federal IT Workforce
Challenge (Washington, DC: CIO Council, June 1999), p. 15.
*112 Ibid., p. 11.
*113 Data provided by the National Security Agency.
*114 Examples include recruitment and retention bonuses,
the use of special pay scales for specific types of professionals, and pay
banding whereby agencies would have greater flexibility in allocating personnel
funds among employees of different quality and skills. New regulations
currently under review at OPM would allow departments to repay federally funded
student loans by $6,000 a year up to a maximum of $40,000. See "Proposed
Rules-Repayment of Student Loans."
*115 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, p. 55.
*116 The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) currently
has the authority and funding to conduct a five-year pilot program through
which he can hire up to 39 technical specialists in critical functions and pay
them on the basis of market standards rather than on the federal pay scale. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has a similar program.
*117 CIO Council, p. 13. On the CIO Council, see note 14
in Section I.
*118 Ibid., p. 15.
*119 The recent NSA outsourcing is estimated to save the
government $1 billion over the ten-year life of the contract. See ibid., p.
A29.
*120 Seeking A National Strategy, p. 14.
*121 For example, a recent OPM survey of SES personnel
indicates that only nine percent of those surveyed have changed jobs to work in
another agency since becoming an SES member, despite the fact that 45 percent
said that mobility would improve job performance. See U.S. Office of Personnel
Management and Senior Executives Association, pp. 27-8. *122 For example, departments
might designate that personnel must hold one assignment outside his or her
parent department in order to become a member of the SES and another such
assignment to be promoted to SES-4. [SES pay scales are numbered one through
six. An additional rotation is suggested for promotion to SES-4 because this is
the pay grade at which many SES members serve during their final tours, when
they generally have the highest level of responsibility for interagency
activities.]
*123 Data provided by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, showing both active and reserve recruiting results, July 2000. See
also William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2000), chapter 4.
*124 Statement of the Honorable Rudy De Leon, Under
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) before the Military Personnel
Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer
Force: Military Recruiting and Retention," March 8, 2000.
*125 Department of Defense, Quarterly Readiness Report to
Congress, January-March 2000.
*126 Some numbers illustrate the problem. The Navy is
nine hundred pilots short of necessary levels, while the Air Force reported the
largest peacetime pilot shortage in its history (1,200 pilots short of
operational requirements). The Air Force pilot loss rate is projected to double
by 2002 [William Taylor, S. Craig Moore, and C. Robert Roll, Jr., The Air Force
Pilot Shortage: A Crisis for Operational Units? (Washington, DC: RAND, 2000, pp.
iii and 1]. Over the past ten years, the Army has experienced a 58 percent
increase in the percentage of Captains voluntarily leaving the military before
promotion to Major [Information Paper TAPC-ARI-PS, October 22, 1999].
High-quality junior officers are also leaving military service earlier. In
1987, 38 percent of the Army's West Point graduates left military service
before ten years of active duty-the best retention rate among all Army
commissioning sources. In 1999, 68 percent of West Point graduates left before
the ten-year point, the lowest retention rate among all Army commissioning
sources. [DMDC West DoD Officer Retention Data, July 2000, verified by Army
Personnel Branch, July 2000]. High-quality Lieutenant Colonels/Colonels and
their Navy equivalents (O-5s and O-6s who have had
Department/Battalion/Squadron/Ship-level commands in their careers) are leaving
early, as well. The Navy reports that both post-department officers and
post-squadron Commanders are separating at a rate three times higher than a
decade ago.
*127 See "Spring 1999 Sample Survey of Military
Personnel: Career Intent," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences Survey Report, October 1999.
*128 Garnered from ten-year point junior officer
retention data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center to USCNS/21, July 2000.
*129 DOPMA Public Law 96-513.
*130 Those Majors/Lieutenant Commanders not selected for
promotion must normally retire at twenty years; Lieutenant Colonels and Navy
Commanders must retire at 28 years if not selected for promotion to
Colonel/Captain; Colonels, and Navy Captains have until the 30-years point to
make promotion to flag officer rank before mandatory retirement; and most flag
officers that remain in grade have a 35-year limit of commissioned service. It
should be noted that most Colonels/Navy Captains know by the time of their
promotion to O-6 whether they have a chance at further promotion. Most do not,
and the incentives currently in place encourage those officers to retire at the
earliest possible time. The result is a significant talent drain of officers
who, under the current system, could have served at least five or six
additional years.
*131 Charles Moskos, Military Recruitment Survey,
Northwestern University Students," report prepared for the Commission,
March 2000.
132 See DOPMA Public Law 96-513 §3202, 8202,
5444, 5442.
*133 Military Retirement Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-348).
This authorizes military benefits for personnel after twenty years of service
at 40 percent of their five years' highest basic pay. Effective October 1,
1999, the Military Retirement Act of 1986 (REDUX), U.S. Code, Title 10,
§1409(b), was repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act 1999
(Public Law 106-65; U.S. Code, Title 10, §1409 (b) which restored to
the military service members who entered military service after July 31, 1986,
50 percent of the highest three years average basic pay for twenty years of
active duty service, rather than 40 percent under REDUX. Also, it provided for
full cost of living adjustments (COLAs) rather than the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) minus one percentage point under REDUX.
*134 There is 2.5 percent increase in the retirement
percentage of base pay for each year of service past twenty years, which stops
at 30 years. In addition, 26 years of service is where the last bi-yearly
longevity salary increase occurs.
*135 DOPMA Public Law 96-513, §633 requires that
Lt. Colonels and Navy Commanders who are not listed for promotion to the next
higher grade be retired upon completion of 28 years of active commissioned
service.
*136 Half-pay is a term of art referring to the fact that
after twenty years' service, a soldier is entitled to 50 percent of pay upon
retirement. Since a soldier would get half pay even if he were not still in
service, staying in service can be characterized as working for the other 50
percent-hence the phrase "working for half pay."
*137 See Bernard Rostker, Harry Thie, James L. Lacy,
Jennifer H. Kawata, and S.W. Purnell, The Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act of 1980: A Retrospective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).
*138 Defense Science Board, p. 79
*139 The program is administered by the Veterans
Administration, under agreements with the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Transportation, who submit an annual request to Congress detailing
the necessary appropriations. Funds are transferred to the Veterans
Administration from the Department of Defense Education Benefits Fund
administered by the Treasury Department, or from appropriations made to the
Department of Transportation in the case of the Coast Guard .
*140 See Veterans Administration web site October 2000,
Summary of Educational Benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty
Educational Assistance Program, Chapter 30 of Title 38 U.S. Code and Selected
Reserve Educational Assistance Program Chapter 1606 of Title 10 U.S. Code.
Active duty servicemen and women can elect a $100/month reduction in pay for
twelve months in exchange for up to 36 months of educational entitlements. The
maximum entitlement rate is $552 per month. However, servicemen do not
necessarily receive the full $552. Monthly rates are calculated according to
the cost of tuition. Recipients are entitled to a full 36 months of benefits,
not the compounded total of $552 for 36 months. Reservists do not contribute
$100 per month, but receive a maximum of only $263 per month. Bill S1402,
currently pending Presidential approval, would increase the Active Duty Rate to
$650 per month in educational entitlements. In the event of death, the $1,200
reduction in pay is refunded, but benefits are non-transferable.
*141 The College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2000.
The College Board report indicates 2000-01 annual costs for a commuter student
at a public four-year institution is $9,229 and $7,024 for a two-year
institution. This far exceeds the current maximum GI Bill entitlement of $552
per month for active duty members.
*142 The double pass over rule refers to officers who
have been in the primary zone for promotion to the next higher grade but who
have been passed over for promotion for two consecutive years. Once such
officers are passed over twice, they become subject to DOPMAs mandatory
"up-or-out" exit flowpoints.
*143 In 1964 senior enlisted leader (E-8s) pay was by
comparison to junior enlisted (E-2's) pay a 7:1 ratio. With the pay increases
associated with the All-Volunteer Force, the ratio of senior to junior enlisted
pay is currently 3:1. In other words, in relation to the junior personnel they
supervise, senior enlisted service members are paid significantly less than
senior NCOs were in the draft military. In addition, the advent of large
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for junior enlisted personnel menas that
ratio of senior to junior enlisted pay has compressed even further.
*144 This resulted from increased taxes paid by veterans
who achieved higher incomes made possible by college education.
*145 About one-third of all recruits do not complete
their initial military obligation.
*146 Two-year budgeting specifically for DoD
modernization accounts would entail authorization and appropriation for both
fiscal years simultaneously, if our recommendation 31is adopted.
*147 See the discussion on page 69 following recommendation
28.
*148 A problem well described years ago in C.P. Snow,
Science and Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
*149 Note 5 in Section II, on page 34, lists these four
constituent parts.
*150 The termination date of the study was moved to July
31, 2001 in October 2000.